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Preface 
I would like to dedicate this issue of  the proceedings to the memory of  John 
O. Tollefson,  dean of  the Kansas University School of  Business from  1981-90. 
During his tenure as dean, John was an enthusiastic supporter of  the auditing 
symposium. He returned to teaching a year before  his untimely death in a log-
ging accident in 1991. He is greatly missed by his colleagues and students at 
KU. 
The 1992 symposium was the 11th in the series of  biennial auditing sym-
posia held at the University of  Kansas. It gives me great pleasure to acknowl-
edge the continued financial  and moral support of  Deloitte & Touche for  the 
University of  Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems. In particular, I would 
like to thank Ed Kangas, Managing Partner of  Deloitte & Touche, David 
Hunerberg, Managing Partner of  the Kansas City Office,  and Howard Cohen, 
Partner in the Kansas City Office,  for  their enthusiasm, commitment and dedi-
cation to the symposium. 
Topics relevant to both academics and practitioners and the individuals who 
served as presenters and discussants were selected after  extensive consultations 
with faculty  members at the University of  Kansas and professionals  in auditing 
at other universities and in practice. In particular, I am indebted to my col-
leagues in the accounting and information  systems area, Bruce Bublitz, Allen 
Ford, Betsy Goss, Bill Salatka, Tom Sarowsky, Tim Shaftel,  Beverley Wilson, 
and Jim Waegelein. Special thanks are due to Val Renault for  her editorial 
assistance, and to the graduate students in accounting and information  systems 
for  their general support. 
The symposium started with a paper reviewing the philosophy and psycholo-
gy of  independence and objectivity of  the auditor, and concluded with the paper 
"Internal Control: Progress and Perils." Each paper was critiqued by a discus-
sant. Maintaining with the symposium tradition, we selected a practitioner to be 
the discussant for  a paper by an academician and vice versa. All papers, except 
for  the keynote speech by Bill Kanaga, were distributed in advance. Each paper 
was allocated about 90 minutes - 20 minutes for  the presenter to summarize the 
results, 20 minutes for  the discussant's remarks, and about 50 minutes for  open 
discussion with the participants. As expected, the open discussion resulted in 
lively debate by the distinguished participants on many of  the major issues con-
fronting  the profession. 
About fifty-five  invited participants were present each day of  the two-day 
symposium. A roster of  the participants is given before  this preface.  Also, a 
number of  observers, such as doctoral students, faculty  members from  account-
ing and other disciplines, and practitioners in the area, attended parts of  the 
symposium. For those who might like an opportunity to participate in the dis-
cussions at a future  symposium, we would be pleased to receive an indication of 
your interest. 
The proceedings of  each of  the symposia except the first  are still in print and 
may be purchased from: 
Kansas Union Bookstore 
University of  Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66045 
Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The 1992 symposium proceed-
ings are priced at $15.00 each. The prepaid price covers mailing costs with the 
exception of  orders outside of  the United States and Canada, in which case an 
additional $3.00 for  each copy should be included for  surface  transportation. 
The papers included in each of  the available proceedings, the authors of  those 
papers, and the prepaid price of  each volume from  the Kansas Union Bookstore 
are listed below for  the benefit  of  those who may wish to refer  to a paper in one 
of  the previous volumes. 
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Ethics and Morality* 
William Kanaga 
Retired Chairman, Arthur Young & Co. 
Thank you, Jerry,1 and thank you all for  having me. I am going to depart 
really from  what I had intended to speak to, Raj (Rajendra P. Srivastava), when 
I agreed to come. I hope it won't cause heartburn for  you and for  the others in 
the crowd. Before  I left  for  eastern Europe in early April, I had prepared some 
draft  remarks on the question of  ethics in the community and the impact on the 
auditing profession.  Jerry Sullivan and I can remember a few  days discussing 
the aims and objectives of  the Treadway Commission and how that might 
impact the profession.  When I came back to the United States I decided to scrap 
the draft  that I had and to deal with a more fundamental  issue, which is the 
ethics and morality of  society in general. I have a captive audience here to share 
some of  the impressions that I gained in eastern Europe and those countries that 
have emerged from  communism, as well as what those observations might 
mean to us. 
For the past month-and-a-half  I have had the experience—I probably should 
say privilege, because it is a privilege—to spend time in and get some insight 
into an area of  the world that is going through a major transition. I spent time in 
Albania and then in Siberia, plus two extended stopovers in Moscow. In talking 
with many of  the citizens of  those countries, both in the public sphere, govern-
ment, cultural and private positions, a common theme emerges. During the 
communist dictatorships, some 75 years in Russia and almost 50 years in 
Albania, the leadership in both of  those countries attempted to eliminate any 
kind of  moral code and substitute for  any moral decision making the absolute 
power of  dictatorship. In both, the church came under direct attack. 
In Albania, the dictator Hoxha, went further  than those in the other countries 
of  eastern Europe. I have spent a great deal of  time in Poland, Rumania, 
Hungry, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, and in my opinion, Albania was the 
worst of  the group . The dictator Hoxha imprisoned or killed all the clergy in 
this country, both Christian and Moslem, and destroyed the churches and 
mosques throughout the country. He left  a few  standing and they have been 
returned to the church authorities, but those few  that were left  standing were 
converted either into movie houses or into indoctrination centers. When I first 
went to Albania early last year when the doors opened, all evidence that there 
had been churches had been removed. 
* This paper is an audio transcript of  the keynote speech delivered by Bill Kanaga at the sympo-
sium. 
1 Jerry Golden of  Ernst & Young introduced Mr. Kanaga, who served as chairman of  Arthur Young 
from  1977 until his retirement in 1985. 
That destruction was in the 1960s. In 1976 he declared that Albania would be 
henceforth  the world's first  atheistic state. His internal secret police reported on 
each and every family.  They had the equivalent tactics of  the Gang of  Four from 
China, they went in every home and searched the home and removed anything 
that would indicate any tie to the church. They smashed all the icons, they 
destroyed churches that were over a 1,000 years old. And anybody that criti-
cized or in any way indicated that they were unhappy with the regime went to 
prison. 
There was an alternative, which was prison work camps. Anybody that 
didn't agree was in danger, not only his own immediate family,  his wife  and 
children, but also his parents and his brothers and sisters and their spouses and 
families.  So it was a pretty horrible but effective  deterrent. 
The story was repeated over and over again, in eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union, although I believe that Albania was unique in its ferocity.  Based 
on my experiences over the last four  years in these countries, I have been 
appalled at the lingering impact today on the moral values in these societies. 
I'm chairman of  the Center for  International Private Enterprise operating 
out of  Washington, which supports the indigenous institutions that are helping 
to return those countries to private enterprise, the market system, entre-
preneurial activities, management training, etc. As a consequence, I have spent 
a good bit of  time with individuals in those institutions in various countries. 
I have gotten a chance to talk to them about how they deal with the vacuum that 
was left. 
What happened in each and every country was that there were really no 
moral principles, no debate, just dictatorship fiat.  When the lifting  of  those 
despotic regimes occurred, we have seen what I would call an unlovely picture: 
a moral vacuum. We see people who have great trouble in distinguishing right 
from  wrong. They are angry, even bitter, but without a way to deal with all of 
that bitterness. One of  the ministers in the Albanian government said to me— 
and I would say that he himself  is a man of  compassion, a poet and an author— 
"We obviously have great physical needs here in my country— food,  medicine, 
clothes, housing, but paradoxically our greatest need is to restore the spirit of 
my people, the spirit inside each and every person. And when I say spirit I mean 
spiritual needs. Food and medicine and the rest will be spent and gone tomor-
row, but what we need and my people have to have is something permanent 
within them for  this country to change. Unless they have something permanent 
inside, they have nothing to go on for  tomorrow." 
We had time and again debates on how to get these moral values back and 
how to instruct the people in right and wrong. These concerned simple things, 
mundane situations. One of  the Albanians told me that when he flew  to Rome 
he got on the plane and the first  two fellows  who got on sat down in First Class. 
The stewardess said, "Your tickets are not first  class, you have to go to the back 
of  the plane," and they said, "We were here first."  So possession is all—it's the 
right of  the jungle in effect. 
There is a great shortage of  food,  so one question is, if  your family  is starv-
ing is it right to steal food  for  them? We have a free  market system and unfortu-
nately they have had much publicity in years past about our capitalistic sys-
tem—all of  it bad. Everything that went on the front  page in the communist 
world concerned some deficiency  in our system, so people in these countries 
believe when you talk free  market that it means cheating one another. It is 
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exemplified  by greed. 
Trying to correct that perception is one of  our major tasks at the center. We 
are working with education of  the media, attempting to instruct the journalists in 
what a free  market system really means, what our kind of  system really means. 
And if  we are disappointed on occasion with our own journalists, let me tell you 
that there are problems magnified  in the communist world. The leader of  one of 
the major autonomous regions in Siberia said, "You know we have a real prob-
lem here. We have all been motivated over our entire life  time by fear.  We have 
lifted  the fear  from  our life  and we haven't replaced it with anything. So we are 
floundering."  He went on to say that it certainly hadn't been replaced by money. 
I didn't see "60 Minutes" the other night, but for  those of  you who did, you 
know that the doctors are being paid the equivalent of  about $7 a month, that is 
in rubles, compared to $15 for  the bus drivers. I'm not begrudging the bus dri-
vers their $15, but the doctors are deserting Albania in droves. I helped support 
a group of  doctors that went to Albania in March. They spent three weeks, took 
$10 million worth of  equipment and supplies into the medical profession,  the 
principal objective being to retain the doctors that were there, to encourage 
them, because many of  them have become baggage handlers in New York City. 
The minister of  economics in the last communist regime in Hungary, not 
himself  a supporter of  the system, in fact  quite a critic, said to me (before  the 
fall  of  the communist government, about three years ago) that it was his belief, 
that the system could not work, would not work. He said—and I think that you 
would be interested here at the University to know—"I don't think that there are 
any confirmed  communists any where in the world except on the campuses of 
your universities." He said that the problem was to get people back to feeling  a 
sense of  responsibility, not only for  the country but for  themselves personally. 
They are now telling these people that there is not going to be cradle to grave 
support by the government. All of  a sudden they are going to have to fund  their 
childrens' college education and they are appalled at this new economic system 
because they don't see any way under their current incomes to fund  the things 
that are coming up. Now they are going to switch over to having to fund  the 
health system and the health system is bad. 
What we have been looking at in this communist world is what happens in a 
society devoid of  moral structure, devoid of  religious belief,  devoid of  individ-
ual liberty. And I can tell you it is a scary picture. The people themselves indi-
vidually are warm and hospitable but they are scared. Why am I spending so 
much time on such an obvious failure,  the failure  of  a system that we never 
embraced here in this country? The reason is that I believe there are some 
lessons in that situation for  us. In this country we have a constant reminder in 
the headlines of  our daily papers of  the failures  of  businessmen. We have fail-
ures of  a lot of  others, but I'm referring  in this group to businessmen, men in 
leadership roles without the desire or the will to make the right or moral de-
cision when looking at a number of  alternatives. In some cases it is individual 
failure,  in some cases it is quite clearly institutional failure  as in some of  the 
insider trading cases — or the case of  the bank scam that E. F. Hutton operated, 
or in the earnings fraud  that I'm sure your business schools all look at involving 
a number of  divisions of  H. J. Heinz. In some whole plants or divisions of 
defense  contractors there were a tremendous number of  people involved in 
scams and no one, or at least no one apparently, with the instinctive reaction to 
blow the whistle or stop the practice. 
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We are in a society, in my opinion, in open warfare  against values and moral 
standards. Battles are going on against prayer in public forum  while lawlessness 
reaches a new high. We have battles being fought  for  moral standards of  our 
youth to emphasize the individual importance of  each, while at the same passing 
out condoms in our schools. We are the world's center of  pornography, whose 
sole aim is to degrade women, and at the same time we are making a national 
issue of  questionable remarks that men might make to women. There is a di-
chotomy that we are faced  with and I believe, thank God, that in the people 
there is a great revulsion against the waning of  moral principle. 
We had a serious problem while I was without newspapers in Siberia, with 
riots coming out of  the trials of  the policemen in the Rodney King case. I 
arrived home this past weekend from  Russia to see on the front  page the pic-
tures of  a number of  mayors in Washington denouncing not the action of  the 
lawless rioters, but denouncing the federal  government. Not a statesman among 
them took responsibility for  leadership in the riot torn communities. As De 
Tocqueville [1900] said, and we have had quoted so many times, "America will 
be great as long as it's good. When America ceases to be good it will cease to 
be great." Business and our profession,  our universities, have a great stake in 
the battle. We cannot sit idly by hoping that the moral climate will change. We 
have to be out in our communities, in our schools, in our newspapers, on TV, 
telling the story of  the importance of  moral standards, confronting  the cynics 
and the demagogues and, for  example, speaking truth to the voters, not pander-
ing for  their votes. 
In our Treadway Commission deliberations several years ago, there was one 
clear truth on which all of  us agreed, and there weren't all that many things that 
we all agreed on, as Jack Krogstad knows—Jack and I both worked on it in 
Washington. That was that the key to all of  the problems we have had in the 
business world was leadership. Ethical behavior in any organization will exist 
if  the leadership is there to lead. And the organization, I can tell you, will fol-
low. If  that leadership takes a strong stand on honesty and integrity, so will the 
organization. We just have to mobilize leadership in this country. Each and 
every one of  us has to take a leadership role in our own community, in our own 
business, in the educational systems and institutions where we live and in our 
churches. The price I have seen in an amoral society is more, I can assure you, 
than we can bear. 
You have the misfortune  this lunch time in Lawrence of  an individual who is 
on his high horse. But [this reflects  my experience], having just gotten off  the 
plane from  the misery and misfortune  of  a huge area of  the world dragged down 
by as much as 75 years of  unbelievable hardship and returning to our country so 
complacent, self  assured and seemingly invulnerable. I read recently a quote 
from  Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who experienced at close hand the awful  cost 
through the loss of  moral value in his native Russia and for  the last ten years or 
so in this country. He says [Solzhenitsyn, 1991]: 
The strength or weakness of  a society depends more on the level of  spiri-
tual life  than on its level of  industrialization. Neither a market economy 
nor even general abundance constitutes the crowning achievement of 
human life.  If  a nation's spiritual energies have been exhausted it will not 
be saved from  collapse by the most perfect  government structure or an 
industrial development. A tree with a rotten core cannot stand. This is so 
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because of  all the possible freedoms,  the one that will inevitably come to 
the fore  will be the freedom  to be unscrupulous. That is the freedom  that 
can be neither prevented nor anticipated by any law. It's an unfortunate 
fact  that a pure social atmosphere cannot be legislated into being. 
In my opinion this all does bear directly on our profession.  A country whose 
moral values have decayed will be a country whose businesses are a danger to 
the auditor. Where the management operates without principle, the risks for  us 
are enormous. We have much to be grateful  for  in this country and much bat-
tling to preserve it. You and I have an obligation to each other, our families,  our 
communities and our profession. 
Take the stand that will make the difference. 
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The Auditor's Role: The Philosophy and Psychology 
of  Independence and Objectivity 
James C. Gaa* 
McMaster University 
The auditor, like any professional  man, has a responsibility to the society that recognizes and 
encourages his professional  status as well as to the clients he serves directly. It behooves us, 
therefore,  to give some attention to this responsibility. What is the social function  of  the 
auditor? What responsibilities flow  from  it? 
Mautz and Sharaf,  1961, p. 50 
The independent auditor's role in society is described by both his function—what  he does— 
and his relationships to parties interested in that function. 
Cohen Commission, 1978, p. 1 
The essence of  all professions—including  public accounting—lies in the expertise of  its 
members. ... A characteristic of  the auditing profession  is then a unique knowledge-set or 
expertise. 
Bedard, 1989, p. 113 
Introduction 
The role of  the "independent" auditor has been controversial off  and on for 
many years. For over 100 years, auditors have been defendants  in civil lawsuits, 
charged with failing  to perform  their job in accordance with their obligations to 
others. Over roughly the last sixty years (i.e., since the debates giving rise to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S.), there have also been periodic 
political controversies regarding the public's expectations about what auditors 
are supposed to be doing, and whether they are delivering the goods. 
Since Mautz and Sharaf  wrote their words, the formerly  all-male world of 
auditing has changed significantly.  However, their observations on the social 
role of  auditors are still as current—and as little resolved—as they were thirty 
years ago. Indeed, the issues they raise are just as important as they were then, 
if  not more so. 
Mautz and Sharaf  pointed out that the overall problem of  the auditor's role 
breaks down into two parts: what service auditors are supposed to perform,  and 
for  whom they are supposed to be doing it. Controversies seem to focus  more 
on the former  (e.g., concerning the scope of  public accountants' services to 
*The author wishes to thank Efrim  Boritz, John Gaa, Cindy Moeckel, Khalid Nainar, Lawrence 
Ponemon, Robert Ruland, Ira Solomon, Michael Stein, and Wil Waluchow for  helpful  comments 
and suggestions made at various stages in the preparation of  this paper. They are not responsible for 
its content. The research reported in this paper is supported by a grant from  the CGA-Canada 
Research Foundation, which is gratefully  acknowledged. 
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clients, and whether auditors should examine and report on the client's internal 
control system) than on the latter. With respect to the auditor's relationship to 
other parties, while it is generally recognized that objectivity and independence 
are the heart of  the role of  the external auditor, we have no theory developing 
the foundations  of  that role. Even with the decreasing importance of  auditing as 
a source of  profits  for  public accounting firms,  it is not hard to argue that the 
external audit function  is the heart of  public accounting. So, it is unfortunate 
that these concepts have defied  the efforts  of  a number of  writers to define  it 
and place it into a conceptual structure. 
Virtually no research has been done on the ethics of  the auditing profession. 
This is evidenced by the recent publication Research Opportunities  in Auditing 
[Abdel-khalik and Solomon, 1988]. This careful  and comprehensive survey of 
the field  does not appear to mention ethics at all. Likewise, Gibbins's [1984] 
long and thoughtful  examination of  the problems of  judgment in accounting 
explicitly excludes moral issues. Closer to the subject of  this paper, recent re-
views of  research on the expertise of  auditors in making professional  judgments 
(e.g., Davis and Solomon [1989], and Bonner and Pennington [1991]) do not 
mention moral judgment. There is a good reason for  this lack of  attention. At 
this point, academic research in the ethics of  the public accounting profession 
hardly exists. Hence, it would be difficult  for  either researchers or practitioners 
to see how it might proceed at all, and be a fruitful  line of  research. 
The purpose of  this paper is two-fold.  The first  is to present the outlines of  a 
normative theory of  the auditor's role, based on philosophical literature dealing 
with moral judgment and action. According to this analysis, a social contract 
between the auditing profession  and the rest of  society establishes the reasons 
why it is important for  auditors to act in accordance with a set of  ethical stan-
dards. Essentially, in accepting the role of  auditor, auditors have agreed to the 
terms of  a contract, and are therefore  morally obligated to honor these terms. 
Among other things, they are expected to act in accordance with "the moral 
point of  view." Auditor independence and objectivity are explained as interpre-
tations of  this more general principle. 
This provides a partial characterization of  the auditor's role and attendant 
responsibilities, and leads to the second question of  how auditors might act ethi-
cally, i.e., how they are to make the moral judgments required by their role. 
Building on the philosophical foundation,  the second objective is to propose a 
psychological theory of  moral judgment and expertise as the foundations  of 
moral judgment by auditors. It is hoped that such a theory and empirical 
research leading from  it may yield a better understanding of  the ways in which 
moral judgments are made by auditors, and may even lead to changes in the 
education and training of  auditors, and thus to changes in the practice of  audit-
ing. 
The next section of  this paper presents the ethical foundations  underlying the 
ethics of  auditing. As mentioned above, the basic idea is that auditors have a 
social contract, i.e., an agreement with the rest of  society, that obliges them to 
act from  "the moral point of  view." The "terms" of  this contract are analyzed, 
via the pronouncements made by the public accounting profession.  Definitions 
of  auditor objectivity and independence are presented. This analysis leads to the 
conclusion that, even with a multitude of  rules and principles governing the 
behavior of  auditors, they still must make professional  judgments which meet 
the requirements of  the moral point of  view. So, the psychological question of 
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how auditors are supposed to make ethical judgments arises, which is the sub-
ject of  the next section. The concept of  moral expertise is advanced, and ana-
lyzed and compared to the more technical (and traditionally recognized) forms 
of  auditor expertise. Measures of  moral expertise are proposed. The penultimate 
section presents some of  the possible implications of  moral expertise, for  both 
research and practice. This is followed  by a short conclusion. 
This paper is exploratory in nature, bringing together several diverse litera-
tures in both philosophy and psychology. Because of  limited space, the paper 
presents the outlines of  a theory, rather than a finished  theory, and is meant to 
stimulate further  discussion, with the hope that a more rigorous and complete 
theory of  moral expertise, and empirical research leading from  it, will emerge. 
Contractual Foundations of  the Auditor's Role 
Recently, the attention of  both researchers and practitioners has focused  on 
the economic-contractual aspects of  the auditor's relationships with other par-
ties such as clients, investors and creditors, and regulators. (Recent examples 
include the papers and critiques in a forum  in the January 1992 issue of  The 
Accounting Review.) Such investigations are important, since the institution of 
external auditing does exist in an economic setting in which auditors provide 
their services for  a fee,  and the service consists primarily of  informing  others 
about the reliability of  information  about the economic activities of  the client 
firm. 1 However, the concepts of  objectivity and independence are not them-
selves economic concepts (although they do have implications of  an economic 
nature). Rather, they are ethical, or normative, since they concern the issue of 
how an auditor ought to act in the course of  performing  an audit, and in ulti-
mately deciding on the content of  the auditor's report to third parties. 
Both ethics and economics concern rational choice. The differences  and sim-
ilarities between them may be characterized in a variety of  ways.2 One way is 
that economics focuses  on choice when each individual is regarded as an atom-
istic, self-interested,  utility maximizer, who makes rational decisions without 
regard to the impact of  her actions on the welfare  of  others. Ethics, on the other 
hand, focuses  on the problems of  choice when it is explicitly recognized that 
one's actions do have effects  on others, and that those effects  should be taken 
into account in deciding how to act. Ipso  facto,  taking the ethical point of  view 
denies the validity of  "ethical egoism" as a normative theory of  rational choice.3 
Roles and Norms 
Strictly economic analyses of  behavior have difficulty  dealing with the fact 
1 Internal auditors have enormous problems defining  their role as independent employees of  the 
entity which they are auditing. Despite apparent similarities in the work performed  by external and 
internal auditors, I believe that the theoretical foundation  of  the internal auditor's role will turn out 
to be different  from  that of  the external auditor. For this reason, this paper concerns only the inde-
pendence of  the latter. 
2 The relationship between ethics and economics is complex. So, any simple characterization of  it is 
automatically an over-simplification.  In particular, the statements made in the text of  this paper 
should not be interpreted to mean that they are separate disciplines, with totally different  goals and 
methods. Rather, they are (or should be) intertwined. Insofar  as they are concerned with the ratio-
nality of  human choice and behavior, it would be a mistake to think that either one can proceed sat-
isfactorily  in isolation from  the other. For a detailed examination of  this, see Sen [1987]. 
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that people choose and perform  their actions within the context of  a role. The 
concept of  a role is a legal/moral concept4 and is defined  here as a cluster of 
rights and duties with some sort of  social function  [Downie, 1971, p. 128. See 
also, e.g., Williams, 1985, p. 7]. Everybody occupies a number of  roles simulta-
neously, such as parent, child, spouse, citizen, and so on. Some of  the roles peo-
ple occupy are not voluntarily chosen (such as that of  child), while others are 
assumed as a matter of  voluntary choice. Specific  occupational roles, such as 
that of  auditor, are typically chosen. This means that the rights and duties which 
define  these latter roles are agreed to by persons adopting them, and that they 
have the rights that accompany it and agree to abide by the obligations as well. 
Thus, voluntary acceptance of  a role is a matter with ethical import. This has an 
important consequence for  a theory of  the role of  the auditor, and for  auditor 
objectivity and independence in particular. The consequence is that, contrary to 
the positive, principal-agent, conception of  auditor decision making, an auditor 
is not free  simply to decide (as a matter of  maximizing self-interest)  whether to 
report a breach of  generally accepted accounting principles [DeAngelo, 1981]. 
Instead, she has an obligation to make such a report, and, by implication, this is 
the case even if  such a report is not in her self-interest. 
Rights and duties are generally recognized as fundamental  to the ethics of  the 
accounting profession,  in view of  the fact  that virtually every professional  orga-
nization of  accountants has a code of  professional  conduct, specifying  (primari-
ly) the duties of  members of  the organization to other interested parties, includ-
ing the general public, their colleagues, and to the organization itself. 
Furthermore, the relationships of  the auditor to other interested parties may be 
analyzed in terms of  the rights and responsibilities which define  the role of  the 
auditor. 
People in general, and auditors in particular, often  find  themselves in situa-
tions where their actions have an impact on themselves and others, and where 
there is no feasible  course of  action which will be in the interest of  all of  them. 
In such cases, a principle or criterion is needed for  deciding which of  the com-
peting or conflicting  interests is to be given priority over the others.5 In these 
situations, norms provide guidance (and possibly, incentives provided through 
their enforceability),  by indicating actions which are required, allowable, or for-
bidden in a given situation. 
Norms are standards of  behaviour. They have the following  logical structure: 
Person P in situation S may (or should or should not) do A in manner M.6 
For role-related norms, this definition  encompasses both aspects of  the auditor's 
role distinguished by Mautz and Sharaf  [1961]. First, it states that a norm speci-
3 Ethical egoism is the theory that all rational individuals ought to act exclusively in their own self-
interest and without regard to the impact of  their actions on others (except to the extent that such 
effects  "rebound" on the individual). Ethical egoism is theoretically untenable. For one thing, it is 
not universalizable, since it is self-defeating  when advocated as a general statement about how peo-
ple ought to act). See Bowie [1991]; Sen [1987]; Etzioni [1988]; Frank [ 1988]. 
4 This definition  is a normative one. Roles are also understood in a positive, sociological sense, as a 
set of  empirically determined behavior patterns, which have empirically determined outcomes for 
society. Thus, the auditor's role would be defined  positively as consisting of  those actions which are 
done by people who have been labelled as auditors, and which have a pattern of  outcomes. (The 
purpose of  the second clause is to omit "accidental" characteristics which have no pattern of  effect 
from  being included in the role). Roles in this positive sense are not the concern of  this paper. 
5 It is also possible that one interest might be traded off  against another, in the sense that it is given a 
heavier weight rather than absolute priority. 
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fies  which actions person P is supposed to perform  (or not perform).  The rela-
tionships which an auditor is supposed to have concern the other part of  the def-
inition. First, the situations which P is allowed to be (or supposed to be) in, may 
preclude certain relationships. For example, it is a universally accepted norm 
that an auditor may not perform  an audit if  she is actively involved in the opera-
tion of  the client's business. Second, the manner in which P performs  action A 
relates to the way in which the auditor takes into account the contending inter-
ests of  various parties. 
Norms have two main functions.  First, they provide criteria to evaluate situa-
tions and actions. Second, they provide guides for  action, helping people to 
decide which action is appropriate or correct to perform.  Following from  both 
of  these functions,  norms may also provide standards for  the enforcement  of 
certain types of  behaviour.7 When this is the case, ethical norms may become 
formalized  as statutes or government regulations, or as precedents in the com-
mon law. Thus, norms have normative content. Rules, principles, regulations, 
customs, and mores are additional types of  norms which guide us in choosing 
our courses of  action. The role of  norms in influencing  people's moral behavior 
is described by Baier [1965, p. v-vi.]: 
...Moralities are best understood as special forms  of  social control and as 
special forms  of  practical reasoning. Any form  of  social direction and 
control must attempt to accomplish two major tasks: to provide for  the 
members of  the group an easy way of  answering the question of  what is 
required of  them by this particular form  of  direction and control, and to 
ensure compliance with these requirements. The first  task is accomplished 
by the formulation  of  appropriate principles, precepts, rules, and regula-
tions in a way which makes them easy to remember, to pass on to others, 
and to apply in a variety of  different  circumstances, and by the instruction 
of  the members in these principles, etc. The second task is accomplished 
by group practices designed to exert pressure on individuals to satisfy 
these requirements, such as the practice of  'investigating' individuals to 
see whether they have adhered to the appropriate principles, precepts, 
rules, and regulations, and of  'meting out' to them whatever is thought ap-
propriate in the light of  these investigations. 
One of  the pervasive facts  about public accounting is the multitude of  rules 
which its practitioners are supposed to follow.  Rules governing their behavior 
are contained in generally accepted accounting principles, generally accepted 
auditing standards, codes of  professional  conduct, as well as statutes and regula-
tions of  government regulatory bodies. It may be that accounting has more rules 
than other professions.  But the existence of  rules is no accident, for  rules are a 
primary means of  defining  the nature of  a profession.  That is, they codify  a set 
of  expectations about what members of  a profession  will do, and how they will 
do it, and in this way define  (as well as guide) the practice of  public accounting. 
There are two types of  norms [Bayles, 1989]. One consists of  universal 
norms, that is, norms which apply to people in a society merely by virtue of 
6 This definition  is based on Bayles [1989, p. 20]. 
7 In order to have value in this regard, they must be explicitly formulated,  and sufficiently  precise to 
allow people to determine readily whether their actions are or would be in accordance with the 
norm. 
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their membership in that society. Examples might include norms against lying 
and deception, and inflicting  harm gratuitously. Such norms are universal 
because they are regarded as applying to everybody, not that they hold without 
exception. For example, it is generally agreed that the norm against lying may 
be violated in a variety of  circumstances, but only if  there is sufficiently  good 
reason. (For an application to auditing, see Gaa and Smith [1985].) 
Even though universal norms as such enjoy no special status over role-relat-
ed norms in the practice of  auditing and accounting, some of  them are apparent-
ly so central to the practice of  accounting and auditing that they are explicitly 
included in codes of  professional  conduct. For example, the Code of 
Professional  Conduct of  the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants 
[ AICPA, 1988] states that members of  the Institute: 
• should perform  with the highest sense of  integrity [Article III], 
• should strive continually to improve competence [Article V], 
• should be honest [Sec. 54.01] and not knowingly misrepresent facts 
[Rule 102], 
• are obligated to comply with a validly issued and enforceable  subpoe-
na or summons [Rule 301 ], and 
• shall not solicit clients in a false,  misleading, or deceptive manner 
[Rule 502]. 
Although these norms (consisting of  both principles and rules) are contained in 
the Code and specifically  apply only to accountants who are members of  the 
AICPA, they are really universal norms, because they merely formalize  (in the 
Code) standards of  behaviour which are expected of  all people.8 That is, these 
universal norms do not, or at least need not, specifically  refer  to people acting in 
their role of  accountants or auditors. 
Auditors are also subject to a second type of  norm, i.e., role-related norms. 
[Bayles, 1989, pp. 22-251 These norms apply to auditors solely in virtue of  their 
occupying a particular role in society. Other than those mentioned above, most 
of  the norms in codes of  professional  conduct are role-related norms.9 Held 
[1984, p.30] makes the connection between roles and norms clear: 
A role is also a set of  norms or rules concerning behavior. In accepting a 
role, we accept these norms. In being a lawyer, we put ourselves in a con-
dition of  'being a lawyer,' but this should not be understood merely in 
terms of  making the empirical description 'that person is a lawyer' true.... 
we are accepting the norms constituting the role of  the lawyer in that soci-
ety as valid norms. 
8 Some would argue that universal norms apply to all members of  the human race, no matter which 
culture they are part of.  For a brief  discussion of  ethical relativism [Bowie and Duska, 1990, pp. 21-
22] . 
9 Not all norms are ethical. For example, auditors are subject to a variety of  role-related norms, 
including a number of  sources of  generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Many of  these are not directly ethical; rather, they simply 
specify  efficient  ways of  performing  one's duties (GAAS, for  the most part) or specify  standard 
methods of  accounting and reporting (GAAP, for  the most part). Parts of  the Conceptual 
Frameworks of  financial  accounting and reporting do have ethical content, in that they specify  the 
priority of  interests among those parties who have a stake in the content of  financial  reports. See 
Gaa [1986]. 
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For the reasons presented at the beginning of  this paper, auditor objectivity 
and independence are the most important role-related norms of  the public 
accounting profession.  Indeed, since independence is the only norm which 
refers  specifically  to the role of  auditor, it defines  and distinguishes the role of 
auditor within the more general role of  public accountant. Although the norm of 
auditor independence is formulated  in a variety of  ways in the various codes of 
professional  conduct, they are all basically similar. For example, the AICPA 
Code [1988, Article IV] states as a general principle that: 
A member in public practice should be independent in fact  and appear-
ance when providing auditing and other attestation services. 
That is, the public accountant qua auditor, i.e., a public accountant acting in the 
role of  auditor, should be independent. The Code also contains a more specific 
rule [Rule 101]: 
A member in public practice shall be independent in the performance  of 
professional  services as required by standards promulgated by bodies des-
ignated by Council. 
Social Contracts 
There are two ways to look at high-sounding statements such as these. One is 
the "positive" way, based on an economic model of  contracts between princi-
pals and agents, according to which economic agents will act "rationally," with 
the implication that they will act in accordance with the terms of  a contract only 
when it is in their own perceived self-interest  to do so.10 This approach to the 
behavior of  auditors may be able to explain some (or even much) of  what is 
observed in the practice of  public accounting. While it may thus have much to 
recommend it, this approach cannot address, much less solve, important prob-
lems in the professional  ethics of  the auditing (i.e., public accounting) profes-
sion. The problems which it cannot handle (at least not without great difficulty) 
are fundamental  issues involving the role of  the auditing profession  in society, 
and the ethical obligations which attend that role. These include the often-
expressed view that auditors occupy a fiduciary  role, and the existence of  con-
flicts  of  interest in performing  the auditor's role. 
Another literature which has a surface  resemblance to the principal-agent 
framework  addresses these foundational  issues directly, in contractual terms. 
This contractarian approach assumes that people are rational decision makers." 
However, instead of  attempting to reach an agreement about the terms of  a spe-
cific  contract, such as an employment or profit-  or risk-sharing contract, they 
are attempting to achieve a collective agreement, i.e., a social contract, about 
the structure of  basic social institutions. Within this structure, specific  principal-
agent contracts are agreed upon and performed. 
The idea that there is an "arrangement" of  some sort between the auditing 
profession  and society has been recognized for  many years. For example, Mautz 
and Sharaf  [1961, p. 50] state as one of  eight tentative postulates of  auditing 
10 In addition to having a number of  problems when applied to ethical issues. Even with respect to 
economic relationships and transactions, it is increasingly controversial. For a critique, see e.g.. Sen 
[1987]; Etzioni [1988]; Frank [1988]. 
11 Though not necessarily expected utility maximizers [Gaa, 1988]. 
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that "professional  status imposes commensurate obligations." In conjunction 
with a postulate stating that an auditor should work exclusively as an auditor, 
this postulate is said to provide "the basis on which we determine the auditor's 
responsibility to society, to his client, and to fellow  auditors" [Mautz and 
Sharaf,  1961, p. 50]. They stated the principle as a postulate, because they 
lacked a theoretical foundation  for  it. This section provides a brief  account of 
such a foundation,  from  which additional implications are also derived. 
The contractual approach to institutional issues has been used as an analytic 
foundation  in business ethics [e.g., Donaldson, 1982; Keeley, 1988; Dunfee, 
1991] and in financial  accounting standard setting [Gaa, 1988; Noreen, 1988]. 
The subject of  the social contract in this case is the structure of  the relationship 
between auditors and various interested parties, i.e., their constituents. 
Specifically,  the terms of  the "contract" characterizes the role of  auditors, by 
specifying  the rights and duties of  auditors vis a vis third parties. 
As such, the analysis is clearly normative in its focus  on the actions which 
auditors must perform,  may perform  or may not perform,  and the relationships 
which they must, may or may not have with others. Within the bounds of  this 
social contract, auditors and their clients may make principal-agent contracts 
which are in their mutual self-interest.  But contracts which violate the condi-
tions of  the social contract are not allowed, since they violate the norms defin-
ing the auditor's role. An analysis of  this social contract is briefly  sketched out 
here [for  more details, see Gaa 1990).12 The relationship of  auditors with other 
members of  society is governed by general principles and rules. As indicated 
above, this means that an agreement on the role of  auditors is a general societal 
agreement. 
The structure within which this contract is constructed is analyzed as a game 
with two players, each of  whom is trying to obtain the "best deal" possible. One 
player in the game is the auditing profession  as a collective whole, represented 
either by prominent individuals or by an organization of  public accountants. 
The other party is society, taken as a whole. The purpose of  the game is to settle 
on the role of  auditors in society, which consists in an equilibrium agreement 
specifying  both the rights of  auditors to practice their occupation, and the social 
responsibilities which they agree to honor in exchange for  these rights. Thus, 
there is a quid pro quo: public accountants collectively gain the benefits  of  orga-
nizing as a profession,  such as the right to regulate their admission to the profes-
sion and to impose standards. In exchange for  this autonomy, it agrees to act in 
a socially responsible manner. This is accomplished in part by establishing 
norms of  competence [Moore, 1970], specifying,  e.g., the training required to 
become an auditor, and principles and rules defining  the standard of  behavior 
expected of  practicing auditors. Included among these norms are standards of 
ethical conduct, such as are contained codes of  professional  conduct. Because 
the profession  will need to provide continuing assurance to the rest of  society 
that it is holding up its end of  the bargain, these rules and principles must speci-
fy  clear and enforceable  standards of  behavior, and will require an effective 
12 The analysis presented here is about the overall structure of  the relationship between the auditing 
profession  and the rest of  society. The recent "expectations gap" controversy in the U.S. was a dis-
agreement between the public accounting profession  and "the public" (in the person of  members of 
the U.S. Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission), within the overall social structure, 
about the role of  auditors. For an analysis of  this particular controversy, see Gaa [1991]. 
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enforcement  mechanism. 
Contractarian analyses of  ethical theories and principles are sometimes criti-
cized on the grounds that they concern only hypothetical agreements between 
hypothetical people, and as such have no normative force  on actual people in 
actual situations. This is a controversial matter [Davis, 1992]. Whatever the 
force  of  these criticisms in general, they do not apply in this instance. The rea-
son for  this is that there is in fact  an agreement between auditors and society, as 
evidenced for  example by legislation recognizing the special status of  profes-
sional organizations of  public accountants, "local" licensing laws, and recogni-
tion in corporation and securities laws. For example, the Securities Acts in the 
U.S. require that the financial  statements of  publicly held corporations be exam-
ined by independent auditors. In exchange for  this benefit,  it is agreed that there 
will be public oversight of  the auditing profession.  In short, auditors have 
agreed to act in a socially responsible way in exchange for  certain benefits 
granted to them by society. 
The contractarian approach shows that auditors are rational to make an 
agreement with society, which specifies  their role. By accepting the benefits 
bestowed by the social contract, auditors voluntarily accept a set of  rights and 
responsibilities governing their behavior. That is, contract theory provides a the-
ory about the ethical foundations  of  the profession  (implicit in the specification 
and acceptance of  their social role). This has major implications. For example, 
unlike the economic view mentioned above (according to which an auditor is 
rational to renege on a contract whenever it is in her self-interest  to do so), the 
social contract approach says that auditors are obligated to act in accordance 
with the dictates of  that role. 
The Moral Point of  View 
The moral point of  view has several important components. First, moral 
agents are supposed to act in the interest of  all members of  society, and not just 
in their self-interest.  In addition, the interests of  every member is to count 
equally. Second, on the plausible assumption that a person's actions cannot be 
expected always to maximize the interest of  every member of  the community, a 
further  implication is that moral agents should expect that at least sometimes 
they ought to perform  an action which is against their own self-interest.  In addi-
tion, the moral point of  view requires that the rules and principles governing 
people's behavior must be generalizable. This means that no individuals have 
special status exempting them from  the principles; rather, they apply to all peo-
ple who fit  within their scope. 
This may be applied to the institution of  auditing. First, the obligations con-
stituting the role of  the auditor apply to all auditors alike.13 So, the moral point 
of  view is satisfied  by auditors if  they act in accordance with their role, i.e., in 
accordance with the obligations specified  in the social contract, and with the 
rules which interpret the general terms of  that agreement. By agreeing to this 
arrangement, auditors essentially promise (in exchange for  a fee)  to act for  the 
benefit  of  others, in accordance with principles and rules governing their 
13 It is a little more complicated. For example, the specific  rules and principles which constitute the 
auditor's role may have exceptions, which are either explicitly stated or implicitly understood. In 
addition, duties (and rules) may conflict,  forcing  the individual to decide which one has priority. 
These observations do not reduce the force  of  the universalibility criterion itself. 
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actions. In order to satisfy  the requirements of  the role, auditors are no longer 
free  to act exclusively in their own self-interest  in the performance  of  audit 
engagements. That is, having voluntarily agreed to act in accordance with the 
role of  auditor, they should expect that sometimes they will be morally obligat-
ed to perform  an action which is not in their own interest.14 
In conclusion, auditors are obligated to act in accordance with a set of  moral 
obligations (which specify  their social role) because they have agreed to them. 
They are not free  to violate the role of  the auditor, even if  it is in their self-inter-
est (and thus economically rational, according to the conventional economic 
point of  view) to do so. Rather, it is rational for  auditors to make a social con-
tract specifying  their role and, in making that agreement, to agree to act in 
accordance with its terms. Making a contract implies an expectation that the 
other party will abide by it.15 
Objectivity, Independence and Conflict  of  Interest 
As noted above, a contract between the organized auditing profession  and 
society is in fact  readily identifiable  (even if  its exact terms are both vague and 
variable over time [Gaa, 1991]). Statements of  the moral point of  view may be 
found  in the profession's  own pronouncements. For example, the preamble to 
the Principles section of  the AICPA Code of  Professional  Conduct [AICPA, 
1988] states the following: 
"The Principles call for  an unswerving commitment to honorable behav-
ior, even at the sacrifice  of  personal advantage." 
This code also proclaims that [AICPA, 1988, Sec. 54.01]: 
"Service and the public trust should not be subordinated to personal gain 
and advantage." 
The normative approach takes such statements of  the professional  organiza-
tions literally and seriously, i.e., as statements of  norms which partially charac-
terize the role of  the public accountant. Statements of  principles and rules are 
important from  the moral point of  view, precisely because they obligate mem-
bers of  the profession  to adopt the moral point of  view. In essence, they are 
promises to the rest of  society, and are morally binding on auditors in the same 
way any promise is. 
An alternative interpretation of  such statements is that they are intended as 
political gimmicks, i.e. ritual statements empty of  content, intended to fool  out-
siders into believing that auditors are actually concerned with "the public inter-
est." Thus, the ethical analysis of  the role of  auditors might strike some as naive 
or far-fetched.  For example, some might claim that auditors will act in accor-
dance with their own perceived self-interest,  no matter what a code of  conduct 
might say. Whether auditors really do act as claimed, and whether a belief  to the 
14 At the same time, if  acting as an auditor required auditors regularly to act against their self-inter-
est, either they would seek to re-negotiate the social contract or (since they are not obligated to con-
tinue to act as auditors) they would cease to act in that role [Gaa, 1990]. However, as long as they 
act in that role, they are obligated to act in accordance with its requirements. 
15 It would be inconsistent for  a person to have such an expectation, and also to hold that she is free 
to violate it at will. Giving oneself  a privileged position, such that one is free  to violate contracts 
while others are obligated to carry them out, cannot be consistently generalized as a universal rule 
[Bowie and Duska, 1990, Ch. 3]. 
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contrary is naive, are empirical questions, about which systematic evidence is 
sketchy at best.16 
In spite of  the fact  that we don't know much about how auditors act, two 
conclusions seem safe.  One is that it surely is naive to believe that all auditors 
always act in accordance with the obligations of  their role. Second, regardless 
of  that, it is not naive for  society to attempt to determine whether auditors are in 
fact  acting in accordance with their contractual obligations, and to hold them 
accountable whenever their actions are judged to violate the norms of  the audi-
tor's role. 
It is important to note that even though the general principles in a code of 
conduct are not intended to be enforceable,  they still have normative force.  This 
is because they state ethical obligations of  professional  accountants. In fact, 
enforceability  has little to do with it. In order for  a norm to be enforceable  there 
must exist a) an explicit rule, b) an investigation system to discover and in-
vestigate alleged transgressions, and c) a judicial system to ascertain whether an 
action is a violation of  the rules, and if  so, what penalty ought to be inflicted. 
Many social norms are not enforceable,  in this sense. They are no less important 
for  that, because in general, and in the case of  professional  codes in particular, 
such norms are the foundations  for  the enforceable  parts of  the codes (i.e., the 
rules). In fact,  the rules exist in order to implement the Principles (insofar  as 
enforcement  is both desirable and possible within the context of  the member's 
basic legal rights). Basically, the statements from  the AICPA code quoted above 
make the general point that auditors do recognize the existence and normative 
force  of  their social contract. It remains to consider the role of  auditors, vis a vis 
other parties, in more detail. 
Objectivity and Independence 
Objectivity and independence are closely linked concepts which occupy cen-
ter stage in the codes of  professional  conduct of  the various professional  organi-
zations of  public accountants. The reason for  this is clear from  the foregoing 
analysis. Since the role of  the auditor is determined as the result of  social con-
tracts between society and the organizations representing members of  the public 
accounting profession, 17 such codes are the "official  text" of  such agreements. 
So, what are the meanings of  auditor objectivity and auditor independence? At 
least as a first  approximation, they mean what the code says they mean. 
Unfortunately,  they are not well-defined  in any of  them, because they are vague, 
ambiguous, and various interested parties may disagree about just what the 
16 As noted above, there are plenty of  examples of  situations in which people commonly act in ways 
which are not easily explainable on self-interest  grounds. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that 
such behavior never occurs in auditing. Empirical studies which show that behavior is consistent 
with self-interest  maximization are not enough to settle the issue. Such studies would also have to 
be strong enough to show that auditors never act against their self-interest  even in situations in 
which (according to, say, the tenets of  their code of  conduct) they should. Notice that to perform 
such a test would require a criterion of  what is in a person's self-interest  independent of  revealed 
preference. 
17 Each professional  organization whose members conduct external audits may be interpreted as 
having a slightly different  version of  the basic social contract, in the sense that the precise wording 
differs  slightly from  code to code. (Detailed comparison of  various codes is beyond the scope of  this 
paper.) This is not so easily recognized in the U.S.. since one organization represents virtually all 
auditors. However, other countries have their own organizations, whose codes of  conduct and stan-
dards of  professionalization  (e.g., educational requirements) differ. 
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social contract calls for. 18 
Nevertheless, the statements in the codes of  conduct of  the professional  orga-
nizations are the primary source, and in spite of  their shortcomings, provide 
important information  about the content of  the social contract. 
The analysis in this section examines the meaning of  these concepts, using 
the Guidelines  on Ethics for  Professional  Accountants of  the International 
Federation  of  Accountants  [1FAC, 1990].19 The Guidelines has two sections, 
one concerning public accounting in general (Part A), and the other confined  to 
the auditing (attest) function  (Part B). 
According to the IFAC Guidelines, the principle of  objectivity is the follow-
ing: 
A professional  accountant should be fair  and should not allow prejudice 
or bias or influence  of  others to override objectivity [Introduction, para. 
15]. 
According to Part A: 
The principle of  objectivity imposes the obligation on all professional 
accountants to be fair,  intellectually honest and free  of  conflicts  of  interest 
[Para. 1.1]. 
Part B of  the IFAC Guidelines, which concerns accountants in public practice, 
expands only slightly on the special obligations of  auditors over and above their 
obligations as public accountants. It says only that: 
Professional  accountants in public practice when undertaking a reporting 
assignment should be independent in fact  and appearance [Para. 8.1]. 
As is normal with codes of  the professional  organizations, this statement is fol-
lowed by a list of  situations in which a public accountant's independence would 
be questioned [Paras. 8.3-8.11 ].20 
The ethical content of  these statements is clear and simple: They essentially 
say that public accountants should adopt the moral point of  view in deciding on 
18 For example, the Continental Vending case hinged on the meaning of  "fairly  presents" in the stan-
dard auditor's report. The profession  claimed that it meant only that the financial  statements were 
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. The court disagreed, saying 
that it meant more than that. Thus, in this case, the parties to the social contract (i.e., auditors as rep-
resented by their firms  and the AICPA, and the general public as represented by the judge and jury 
in this case) disagreed about the terms of  the social contract. See AICPA [1970]. 
19 IFAC is an international organization whose members are the professional  organizations in the 
various countries. Professional  accountants are members of  the member bodies of  the IFAC, and not 
members of  IFAC directly. Based on the belief  that the worldwide accounting profession  has a num-
ber of  important common objectives and principles, IFAC's purpose is to develop standards which 
will be used by its member bodies to harmonize practice around the world. It is useful  to base the 
analysis in this section on the IFAC Guidelines, because it reinforces  the view that codes of  conduct 
are more than a codification  of  legalistic rules which pertain to a specific  legal jurisdiction (and pro-
fessional  organization). In any case, the codes of  professional  conduct for  North American organiza-
tions (i.e., the American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants, the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, and the Certified  General Accountants Association of  Canada, and their 
constituent organizations) are quite similar. 
2 0 These situations include the more-or-less standard categories of  financial  involvement with, or in 
the affairs  of,  clients; appointments in companies; provision of  other services to audit clients; per-
sonal and family  relationships; amount and nature of  fees;  acceptance of  goods and services from 
client: and ownership of  the public accounting practice. 
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their actions. Lack of  prejudice and bias, and fairness  and honesty suggest a 
sense of  neutrality or equality, in serving the interests of  the various parties who 
have a stake in the product of  the auditor's work (i.e., the auditor's report). 
Freedom from  conflict  of  interest recognizes that the interests of  these parties 
(including the auditor's own interest) may conflict  in some cases, and that a pri-
ority among these interests must be established. More detailed analysis of  the 
concept of  conflict  of  interest, via explicit pronouncements provides further 
insight. 
Conflict  of  Interest 
As Beauchamp and Bowie [1988, p. 472] point out, conflict  of  interest 
requires the existence of  a role in which a person has a conflict  either between a 
role obligation and her self-interest,  or between two different  role obligations. 
Furthermore, the agent must exercise judgment in the performance  of  that role. 
The conflict  lies in the fact  that influences  on the agent, or the agent's loyalties 
or temptations might lead her to act in a way which is contrary to what the sec-
ond person has a right to expect. 
Based on an analysis of  the Code  of  Professional  Responsibility  of  the 
American Bar Association, Davis [1982, p. 24]21 formalizes  these ideas in the 
following  definition: 
A person P1 has a conflict  of  interest in role R if,  and only if: 
a. P1 occupies R; 
b. R requires exercise of  (competent) judgment with regard to certain 
questions Q; 
c. A person's occupying R justifies  another person relying on the occu-
pant's judgment being exercised in the other's service with regard to 
Q; 
d. Person P 2 is justified  in relying on P 1 ' s judgment in R with regard to 
Q (in part at least) because P1 occupies R: and 
e. P1 is ... subject to influences,  loyalties, temptation, or other interests 
tending to make P 1 ' s (competent) judgment in R with regard to Q less 
likely to benefit  P 2 than P1's occupying R justifies  P2 in expecting. 
Application of  this definition  to auditing is relatively straightforward.  Auditors 
occupy a role which specifies  the services which they are expected to perform, 
i.e., the performance  of  an audit (or other attestation services), including the 
publication of  an auditor's report. Audits require significant  amounts of  profes-
sional judgment. The role of  auditor also specifies  who are the primary benefi-
ciaries of  the auditor's judgments: society at large, including especially poten-
tial and actual investors and creditors, financial  analysts, and other constituents 
who are regularly listed as the users of  audited financial  reports. Furthermore, 
the social contract between the profession  and society justifies  the latter in 
expecting that the judgments required will be exercised in their interest. The last 
clause of  the definition  is critical: An auditor has a conflict  of  interest if  there is 
any other interest (including obligations to other parties, such as clients) which 
would decrease the likelihood that the auditor's report is less reliable than one 
21 This definition  is also used by Gunz and McCutcheon [1991]. 
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has a right to expect.22 
Whether an individual has a conflict  of  interest in a particular situation, 
depends on whether there is an influence,  loyalty, temptation, or other interest 
which would tend to cause society (or its "designees," the users of  the reports) 
to be less likely to benefit  from  the audit than it has a right to expect. Because 
of  the auditor's central position in the situation, she would not be the best judge 
of  the likelihood of  influence.  Instead, the beneficiaries  themselves should be 
the judges.23 Although the likelihood that an agent's judgments will be influ-
enced to the detriment of  the beneficiaries  is a matter of  degree, Davis finds  it 
useful  to distinguish three levels of  conflict  of  interest. Actual conflicts  of  inter-
est refer  to situations in which it is certain that a beneficiary  will be adversely 
affected  by the auditor's actions. The second category consists of  latent con-
flicts  of  interest, in which the individual is in a position where there is a "rea-
sonable probability" that the beneficiary  will be adversely affected.  In cases of 
latent conflict,  there is no actual conflict,  but it is reasonable to foresee  that a 
change of  circumstances would yield an actual conflict.  Third are potential con-
flicts  of  interest, in which it is foreseeable  that the agent might be in a situation 
producing an actual conflict  of  interest. 
An example of  an actual conflict  involving an auditor is the Fund of  Funds 
case, in which the accounting firm  owed a duty to two clients, and it was impos-
sible to satisfy  both [Gunz and McCutcheon, 1992]. Other examples include an 
auditor who has a material ownership interest in the client firm;  an auditor who 
takes a bribe from  a client in exchange for  a clean opinion; and an auditor who 
accepts an engagement, the fee  for  which is contingent on the client obtaining 
financing.  Examples of  latent conflicts  of  interest include a public accounting 
firm  which performs  management advisory services for  an audit, or forms  joint 
ventures with an audit client. These situations do not imply that the interest of 
either the public or the client have been sacrificed,  but there is a reasonable 
probability of  that, at least in many people's eyes. Examples of  potential con-
flicts  of  interest include the possibility that a personal relationship between indi-
vidual auditors and clients may influence  the auditor's judgment, and the fact 
that an auditor's fee  is paid directly by the client (rather than through some 
other arrangement, such as from  a pool of  funds). 
It is evident that under the present institutional arrangements, the auditor-
client relationship has built-in conflicts  of  interest to some degree. The indepen-
dence rules24 address this problem by claiming to forbid  any conflicts  of  inter-
est. According to the definition  presented above, however, such a restriction is 
infeasible,  since auditors always have at least a latent conflict  of  interest, vis a 
vis their clients. However, the independence rules do have a function,  which is 
22 Two important questions are the following:  What does a reader of  an auditor's report have a right 
to expect? What conditions would render the auditor's report less reliable? These questions are 
essentially the issues which arise whenever an "expectations gap" arises, and when the problem of 
the scope of  services provided by public accounting firms  arises. They will not be discussed here. 
2 3 This is analogous to the "perspective of  the deceived" as the benchmark for  evaluating the justifi-
ability of  deception. See Gaa and Smith [1985]. Presumably, the judge of  the likelihood of  adverse 
impact would be unbiased and reasonably well informed  about financial  accounting and reporting, 
the technical aspects of  auditing, and the operation of  financial  markets. 
24 The Code of  Professional  Conduct of  the Institute of  Chartered Accountants of  Ontario [ICAO, 
1988] defines  objectivity in essentially the same way that other codes define  independence. The 
ICAO has no principle corresponding to the objectivity in the other codes. Hence, the discussion of 
independence in the text applies to the ICAO code provisions on objectivity. 
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to forbid  auditors from  performing  audits when there is either an actual conflict 
of  interest or a "high" degree of  likelihood (rather than just a "reasonable" like-
lihood) that a potential conflict  of  interest would become actual. They boil 
down to saying that a range of  auditor-client relationships must be avoided, be-
cause of  the likelihood that the interest of  the client will cause the auditor's 
report to be less reliable than the beneficiaries  have a right to expect. The rules 
do allow potential and some latent conflicts  of  interest. 
Although this terminology is unfamiliar  in the context of  auditing, these con-
cepts are not entirely novel. First, it resembles fairly  closely the statement of 
Mautz and Sharaf  that there is no necessary conflict  of  interest between auditors 
and their clients [1961, p. 44-46]. Second, it is more useful  than the rule-
oriented distinction between independence in fact  and independence in appear-
ance25, which draws a false  dichotomy, masking the judgmental nature of  the 
concept of  conflict  of  interest. In this way, it also conflicts  with characteriza-
tions of  independence as an all-or-nothing matter [Lavin, 1976], On the other 
hand, it resembles the definition  of  Simunic [1984, p. 679]: 
...any situation which alters incentives such that a self-interested  auditor is 
more likely to ignore, conceal, or misrepresent his findings  is described as 
decreasing the auditor's independence. A setting where an auditor must 
evaluate (trade off)  the benefits  and costs of  truthful  reporting can also be 
described as a conflict  of  interest situation. 
Third, according to this definition,  auditors are never free  of  conflict  of  inter-
est, although they may be free  of  actual conflicts.  As long as an auditor's rela-
tionship with her client is not forbidden  by an explicit rule as either an actual 
conflict  of  interest or an expressly forbidden  potential conflict,  she is free  to 
perform  an audit. This means that she must exercise professional  judgment in a 
situation where she might be acting in her own self-interest  or in the interest of 
another party, at the expense of  those who have a right to expect that their inter-
ests will be served. However, the principle (and rules) of  independence provide 
no guidance to auditors on how they ought to proceed in the face  of  latent (or 
potential) conflict  of  interest. The principle of  objectivity, i.e., act according to 
the moral point of  view, provides general guidelines, but does not provide any 
specific  decision rule, procedure, or algorithm. No set of  rules will be a com-
plete guide to behavior, for  a number of  reasons. First, rules are incomplete, in 
that they do not specify  actions for  every situation. Second, they are vague, 
meaning that in many cases they require judgment in deciding whether a given 
situation falls  within the scope of  the rule or not. Sets of  rules may also conflict, 
in the sense that one valid rule may specify  one action, while a second valid rule 
may specify  another action or forbid  the action called for  by the first  rule.26 
Since conflicts  of  interest are a regular feature  of  the performance  of  the 
auditor's role, it is important that the auditor understand whose interests are to 
be given priority. It is not necessary for  the auditor to actually attempt to assess 
all of  the possible consequences of  all of  her possible courses of  action for  all 
members of  society, when making a decision. Instead, the rules and principles 
in auditors' codes of  professional  conduct function  as guides to the auditor in 
25 The ICAO Code [ICAO, 1988] does not use the terminology of  independence in fact  and appear-
ance, focusing  more explicitly on conflict  of  interest. 
2 6 For example, the rule requiring disclosure of  material information  about a client may conflict  with 
the rule requiring confidentiality  of  client information  [Beach. 1985; Gunz and McCutcheon. 1992]. 
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attempting to carry out the demands of  her role. As such, they should provide a 
relatively clear and simple way for  her to act in accordance with the moral point 
of  view: The interests of  members of  society, including both actual and poten-
tial creditors and investors, but not including the client's management or the 
auditor herself,  are paramount. Among other things, this means that the possi-
bility of  actual conflicts  of  interest are so great in some situations that the rules 
of  the codes of  conduct forbid  auditors from  performing  audits at all. 
Acting in the interest of  other parties, in the face  of  uncertainty and possible 
conflict  of  interest is a daunting task, requires careful  and sophisticated judg-
ment. How well equipped is an auditor to perform  the tasks to which she has 
agreed? 
Moral Expertise 
The job of  the auditor requires technical expertise. The previous section pre-
sented an analysis of  the concepts of  objectivity and independence, according to 
which the auditor is supposed to make moral judgments (from  the moral point 
of  view), and in the case of  independence not to put oneself  in a position where 
there is a significant  chance of  benefitting  personally at the expense of  other 
(external) interested parties. Thus, auditors are expected by the social contract 
to exhibit socially responsible behavior. 
Nevertheless, they might fail  to do this by acting in their own self-interest  (so 
to speak, in willful  violation of  their obligations) at the expense of  others. This 
has already been dealt with. But they may also fail  to act in the interest of  those 
to whom they owe a duty for  "innocent" reasons. Suppose that an auditor is eth-
ical, in the sense that she has committed herself  to act in accordance with her 
obligations to others, because she has voluntarily agreed to do so via her accep-
tance of  the role of  auditor. There is still a difficulty,  for  there is no way of 
guaranteeing that an auditor will successfully  satisfy  the ethical requirements of 
her role, even with the best of  motives. Instead, she might fail  to act in accor-
dance with her obligations due to a lack of  ability to judge appropriately what 
action accords with the moral point of  view. Auditors have a multitude of  rules 
governing their behavior, and it is important that they follow  them. Neverthe-
less, no set of  rules is a complete guide to ethical behavior: for  example, the 
rules themselves may be incomplete, and sometimes they ought to be broken. 
This section advances some tentative ideas about how progress might be 
made in understanding how auditors make ethical judgments within the context 
of  their ethical obligations. The idea is that both technical expertise and moral 
expertise are necessary in order to fulfil  the technical and moral aspects of  the 
auditor's role. Thus, the ability to make ethical judgments in accordance with 
the moral point of  view may be regarded as a form  of  expertise in auditing.27 
27 Distinguishing between technical and moral expertise might suggest to some that they are two 
radically different  kinds of  expertise. For example, if  one believed in a radical distinction between 
normative and descriptive theories or issues, or between empirical and normative domains, or 
believed that science is value-free  or value-neutral, one might be tempted to come to make this dis-
tinction between types of  expertise. This is not implied by the distinction in the text. For an analysis 
of  the underlying problem, see Gaa [1977]. The distinction between technical and moral expertise 
should be interpreted as focusing  on the issues being addressed by an auditor in a particular situa-
tion. So, for  example, an auditor who is planning an audit engagement has a number of  technical 
judgments to make, requiring technical expertise. As part of  the overall planning process, there may 
be some ethical judgments required, calling for  ethical expertise. Or, an auditor may be trying to 
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The purpose of  the rest of  this section is to make an argument for  the plausibili-
ty of  this view, and to suggest ways in which the process of  making ethical 
judgments may be studied through the lens of  expert moral judgment. 
Philosophical Aspects of  Moral Expertise 
The first  issue to address is whether the concept of  a moral expert makes 
sense at all. A common view about ethics holds that ethical judgment is "sub-
jective," i.e., that it is not subject to standards of  rationality or that it is not 
objective in some other sense. For example, it might be claimed that ethical 
judgment is merely intuitive or based on emotion.28 Alternatively, ethical judg-
ment might simply be the product of  learned patterns of  behavior. If  either of 
these positions were correct, the concept of  a moral expert would be highly sus-
pect. For, if  it is impossible to say that one moral agent is better at making 
moral judgments, then the concept of  moral expertise in particular is open to 
question. This issue is extremely important, since it relates directly to the foun-
dations of  auditors' obligations to society: if  the concept cannot be adequately 
defined,  then it is not clear how to determine whether an auditor is honoring the 
social contract in a given situation. 
The concept of  a moral expert has received some attention from  philosophers 
[e.g., Singer, 1972; Szabados, 1978; Nielsen, 1978] As Szabados [1978, p. 123] 
points out, expertise is usually thought of  as involving the efficient  achievement 
of  an agreed-upon objective or value, whereas ethical issues arise where values 
conflict.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these discussions concern whether moral 
philosophers are moral experts, in view of  their analytic skills and understand-
ing of  moral concepts and principles. A common conclusion is that these skills 
and understanding are helpful,  but that additional factors  (which moral philoso-
phers have no special access to) are required in order for  one to be a moral 
expert.29 For example, one must be able to gather, select, and combine in-
formation  about the specific  issues or situations calling for  judgment [Singer, 
1972, p. 116]. Szabados's [1978, p. 122] conclusion is that with a number of 
provisos, the concept of  moral expertise does make sense: 
Clearly there are skills, tasks and abilities involved in being moral at 
which some people are better than others. It is also plain that these skills 
can be taught and the relevant abilities can be more or less developed. It is 
these features  that lend credibility to the idea of  moral expertise. 
This general statement raises immediately the question of  whether auditors in 
particular can be moral experts, and (if  so) to what degree. This is crucially 
important, since there is no mechanical or rule-bound method to guarantee that 
auditors (or anybody else) will make the "right decision" in an ethical situation. 
decide what form  of  audit report to issue, in a situation where there are a number of  ambiguous and 
vague points regarding the audit evidence collected, or the extent of  disclosure of  major items. Such 
a judgment may be primarily ethical, in the sense that the impact of  her decision on the various 
interested parties may be the primary focus.  In such a situation, moral expertise would be critical. 
2 8 This sort of  opinion might in fact  account for  the fact  that ethical judgment has not been a subject 
of  research in auditing until recently, and is still minor in comparison with the number of  studies 
done on other aspects of  auditing expertise. 
2 9 Singer [1972] concludes that moral philosophers may be superior moral judges, a view rejected by 
Szabados and Nielsen. 
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Indeed, without some concept of  expertise, the whole question of  auditors' 
obligations to act from  the moral point of  view would be suspect. 
Psychological Aspects of  Moral Expertise 
The cognitive approach to expertise emphasizes the knowledge of  the expert 
and the cognitive process through which judgments are made. Accordingly, 
whether a "correct" decision has been made is less important than to understand 
how experts make their decisions. The cognitive approach to expertise is appro-
priate for  the purposes of  this paper, for  two reasons. First, it has been frequent-
ly pointed out that auditing is filled  with situations in which there is no external 
criterion for  determining the correctness of  an expert judgment. According to 
Gibbins [1984, p. 116; see also, e.g., Bedard and Chi, 1992, p. 15; and Davis 
and Solomon, 1989], 
As problems such as lawsuits have increased and accounting firms  (and 
the profession)  have grown large, pressure has increased to ensure that 
quality [of  professional  judgment in public accounting] is sufficient. 
Measurement of  quality according to outcomes is difficult  because many 
important outcomes ... can follow  actions by a long period of  time and 
responsibility for  particular outcomes can be diffused  among a number of 
actions. In such circumstances, procedures to maintain quality turn on the 
apparent wisdom or consistency of  the action at the time it is imple-
mented, without reference  to any specific  outcome. 
Thus, expert auditors typically act in situations in which there is no useful  exter-
nally given criterion to be used either to guide the judgment or as feedback  to 
help an auditor learn over time how to make professional  judgments "better." 
This observation is reinforced  by the second reason for  adopting the cogni-
tive approach to expertise. By their nature, ethical issues are not subject to any 
type of  independent criterion of  correctness, or algorithm which will guarantee 
that the "right" action is taken. Rather, as indicated above, they involve con-
flicts  among the interests of  individuals, in which the interests of  some will be 
given priority over the interests of  others. Ethical principles may play a role in 
the process of  deciding on a course of  action, but there is no guarantee of  "suc-
cess." This observation is closely analogous to the philosophical concepts of 
procedural justice, in their focus  on process versus outcome. Perfect  procedural 
justice requires that there exist both a criterion of  what counts as a just outcome, 
and a procedure guaranteed to reach that outcome. Imperfect  procedural justice 
requires a criterion of  a just outcome, but lacks a procedure which guarantees 
success in applying it. The ethical situation of  auditors is analogous. There are 
external criteria in the required sense. One approach, based on the expected 
consequences of  one's actions, holds that the auditor's actions are supposed to 
maximize the welfare  of  members of  society.30 Another approach is based 
directly on the existence of  fundamental  duties of  accountants [Ruland 1984, 
1989; Ruland and Lindblom, 1992]. But there is no decision procedure for  guar-
anteeing that the criterion is satisfied.  We are left  with the legitimacy of  the 
process itself  as a criterion of  appropriate behavior.31 
30 The various ethical theories differ  among themselves in their interpretations of  what the welfare  of 
society means, and some would deny that welfare  in any sense is the appropriate criterion for  deter-
mining what counts as "ethical" behavior. 
31 This is the general approach adopted by Gaa [1988; see esp. pp. 136-7] for  the development of  a 
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Expertise has been defined  in a number of  ways [see, e.g., Bedard, 1989; 
Davis and Solomon, 1989]. Following Bedard and Chi [1992], the definition 
used in the remainder of  this paper is that of  Frensch and Sternberg [1989, p. 
158]: "the ability, acquired by practice, to perform  qualitatively well in a partic-
ular task domain." According to them, expertise has three main components. 
First, it is acquired by practice, which means that performance  of  the skill is a 
matter of  degree, and that people thus exhibit degrees of  the skills that make up 
a particular form  of  expertise. Second, the quality of  performance  is the criteri-
on of  expertise, rather than, e.g., speed of  execution of  a task or years of  experi-
ence at performing  it. Third, according to Frensch and Sternberg, the perfor-
mance of  experts is superior in quality to that of  non-experts. In short, experts 
are those people who perform  well at something important. 
While all three of  these aspects of  expertise are important to the development 
of  a concept of  moral expertise, the third deserves additional mention at this 
point. For, the notion that people with greater expertise do a task better than 
those with less expertise is an inescapably normative idea. Making qualitative 
superiority a criterion of  expertise presupposes some value judgments about 
what kinds of  skills are important, and what kinds of  performance  should be 
rated as superior to others. It is thus clear that the concept of  expertise is itself 
value-laden: an expert is someone who is good  at doing something important. 
Thus, speed of  performing  a task is an important and valuable feature  of  exper-
tise (ceteris  paribus), since it reduces the cost of  performing  an audit, but it is 
not part of  the definition  of  auditor expertise, nor is it a primary component of 
the social contract.32 In the case of  the auditor, the auditor is supposed to be 
good at something society regards as important, as contained in its social con-
tract with the profession.  Furthermore, expertise in one task or in one domain 
does not imply the possession of  expertise in some other domain. 
Expertise involves the use of  judgment in the performance  of  a task, where 
judgment is defined  [Gibbins and Mason, 1988, p. 4] as "the process of  making 
a choice, a decision, leading to action." The possibility that auditors may exhibit 
moral expertise (or the lack thereof)  does not seem to have been recognized 
explicitly in the literature. At the same time, the possibility has not been ex-
cluded. For example, Gibbins and Mason [1988, p. 5] define  professional  judg-
ment as: 
[J]udgment exercised with due care, objectivity and integrity within the 
framework  provided by applicable professional  standards, by experienced 
and knowledgeable people. 
An expert professional,  then, combining the above definition  with Frensch and 
Sternberg's definition,  is one who makes professional  judgments in a manner 
which is qualitatively superior. Two points should be noted about this defini-
tion. The first  is that the definition  of  professional  judgment contained in it 
imports ethical concepts directly into the definition  of  an expert professional. 
Thus, no professional  auditor can make professional  judgments independently 
of  ethical norms or standards. Second, this definition  is sufficiently  general to 
encompass moral expertise, which may be defined  as the ability to make ethical 
theory of  standard setting for  corporate financial  accounting and reporting. 
Frensch and Sternberg point out, for  example, that speed tends to decline with age. but there is no 
particular reason to believe that the quality of  performance  declines with age. 
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judgments in a qualitatively superior way. In the case of  auditing, the ethical 
judgments in question are those implied by the obligations imposed on auditors 
by the universal norms and the role-related norms specified  by their social con-
tract to perform  qualitatively well in a particular task domain. 
Moral Judgment and Moral Expertise 
The abstract concept of  moral expertise requires a more concrete interpreta-
tion. A promising candidate is the theory of  moral development. According to 
Rest [1986, p. 7f],  moral behavior has four  components. One is that a person 
must be able to recognize a situation as having an ethical component, and there-
fore  requiring an ethical judgment. This involves recognizing that an ethical 
conflict  exists, determining what courses of  action are feasible,  who is affected 
by these actions, and how they would be affected.  Second, the individual must 
make a judgment about which course of  action is morally right33, and ipso facto 
ought to be performed.  Third, an individual must be committed to morally 
appropriate action, in the sense that she gives priority to ethical values and prin-
ciples over personal values. Fourth, the individual must have enough persever-
ance, ego strength, implementation skills, and perhaps courage, to actually carry 
out her intentions to act according to her ethical judgment of  what action ought 
to be performed. 
It appears that three of  these components of  moral development (i.e., the 
first,  second, and fourth)  may involve some form  of  skill or expertise. For 
example, personal experience shows clearly that the ability to recognize the eth-
ical dimensions of  situations is a skill that individuals possess in varying 
degrees, and that it can be developed. This component of  the moral develop-
ment of  auditors is examined by Shaub, Finn, and Munter [1992], Both in gen-
eral, and in the case of  accounting in particular, the second component has 
received most of  the attention of  researchers. If  this is a promising line of 
research, this component probably would be its focus.  For this reason, it will be 
helpful  to provide a brief  review of  the Kohlberg-Rest theory of  moral develop-
ment. 
According to the psychological theory of  moral judgment, as developed by 
Kohlberg [1984], Rest [1986], and others, people's moral reasoning progresses 
through a hierarchy of  developmental stages, in which they learn how to deal 
with ethical issues in increasingly sophisticated ways. According to the theory, 
there are three levels of  moral development, termed pre-conventional, conven-
tional, and post-conventional. Each level is in turn divided into two stages. 
Beginning in early childhood and extending into adulthood, people move 
through these levels and stages, from  lower to higher. At some point, depending 
on such things as their cognitive abilities, level of  education, and the nature of 
their experiences, development ceases. 
At the pre-conventional level, people make judgments about how they 
3 3 The concept of  rightness is used here, following  Rest [1986]. He also uses the terms just and fair. 
Other concepts such as honesty, or the maximization of  social welfare  could be added as ethical cri-
teria. These are all different  ethical concepts and principles which would serve to justify  one's 
actions as being morally appropriate, i.e., as best or acceptable or not forbidden  (and therefore 
allowable). No particular importance should be placed on any one of  these concepts within the con-
text of  this paper, although the merits of  competing ethical theories are obviously critically impor-
tant in the larger scheme of  a general theory of  ethics for  the public accounting profession. 
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should act purely in terms of  their impact on their own self-interest.  The impact 
of  one's actions on others is relevant, if  at all, only to the extent that such conse-
quences have an impact on the individual. In the case of  contracts, stage 1 moral 
reasoning implies that an agent would act in accordance with a contract only if 
violating it would cause her to be punished. A stage 2 agent would violate or 
abide with the terms depending on which course of  action were in her self-inter-
est. The interests of  the principal would be taken into account only to the extent 
that it has an impact on the agent's own self-interest. 
At the conventional level (consisting of  stages 3 and 4), the interests of  oth-
ers are relevant to making moral judgments in a less direct way. In addition, it is 
possible (especially with stage 4 reasoning) that an individual would decide to 
carry out an action which is not in her self-interest  to perform.  At stage 3, it is 
important to the individual to obtain the approval of  other people (e.g., parents, 
friends,  colleagues, superiors and other associates). Thus, a stage 3 agent would 
act in accordance with the contract if  doing so would enhance the agent's image 
in the eyes of  the principal or other party whose approval the agent seeks. 
The fourth  stage is more "institutional." By this point in a person's moral 
development, an individual recognizes that her actions take place in the context 
of  a fabric  of  social institutions, and that they may either violate or be in accor-
dance with the norms of  those institutions. Furthermore, these institutions have 
social value and need to be reinforced  through one's actions. Thus, actions 
which violate the norms weaken an institution, while actions in accordance with 
them serve to strengthen them. So, according to stage 4 judgments, those 
actions should be taken which reinforce  the institutions. Thus, a stage 4 individ-
ual might decide to act in accordance with a contract on the grounds that con-
tracting is an important form  of  social arrangement, the success of  which 
depends on people actually carrying out the terms of  agreements which they 
have agreed to honor. 
Stage 4 is sometimes called the "law-and-order" stage, because (according to 
stage 4 reasoning) one should obey the law whatever it is, and it is right to obey 
the law since laws help to establish, maintain, and preserve social order. For 
example, an agent might decide to make truthful  reports of  her efforts  because 
doing so is consistent with the institutional practice of  truth-telling, and truth-
telling is an important practice to society. 
Individuals at the post-conventional level have developed a set of  basic prin-
ciples which may sometimes override the dictates of  the established social insti-
tutions. They recognize that social institutions are important, and that acting in 
accordance with them is important. Nevertheless, the post-conventional individ-
ual recognizes that there are occasions in which obeying the rules may not be 
the most appropriate thing to do. Two kinds of  reasons for  this are possible. The 
first  is that obeying the rule or practice would conflict  with more basic princi-
ples, such as a principle of  justice or fairness.  Second, it may be concluded in a 
particular situation that acting in accordance with the norms of  the institution 
(as one normally would do) would have negative consequences which are suffi-
ciently undesirable that the practice should be violated. For example, in an audit 
engagement, it would be expected that an auditor will become aware of  confi-
dential information  about the client's activities. Conventional norms of  practice 
imply that the agent should maintain their confidentiality.  Stage 5 reasoning 
presents at least the possibility of  violating the norm of  confidentiality  under 
sufficiently  extreme circumstances. 
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In conclusion, moral judgment as characterized by the theory of  moral devel-
opment is a plausible interpretation of  the concept of  moral expertise. In terms 
of  Frensch and Sternberg's definition,  people have an ability (in varying 
degrees) to make moral judgments qualitatively well, i.e., in a sophisticated 
manner. Furthermore, according to the theory, this ability is learned and varies 
in degree among individuals and develops within individuals over time. In order 
to treat the ability to make moral judgments as a form  of  expertise, a couple of 
qualifications  must be made. As noted above, the concept of  expertise involves 
a value judgment that certain forms  of  behavior are qualitatively superior to 
other forms  of  behavior. For this reason, consideration of  the theory of  moral 
development as a theory of  moral expertise requires making the normative judg-
ment that higher levels of  moral development are qualitatively better ways of 
making moral judgments. 
It should be pointed out that the Kohlberg theory of  moral development is an 
"impartialist" theory of  moral judgment, which focuses  on the resolution of  eth-
ical issues via such ethical considerations as principles of  justice, fairness,  or 
aggregate social welfare.  As such, it has been criticized on the grounds that it 
does not place sufficient  importance to alternative systems of  thought [Gilligan, 
1982; Blum. 1988; Adler, 1989; White, 1992]. Such critics would presumably 
deny that the stage theory of  moral development has much to do with the ability 
to make moral judgments in a qualitatively superior manner, i.e., that it ade-
quately captures the concept of  moral expertise.34 Nevertheless, the theory is 
consistent with a number of  ethical theories, and has a good deal of  empirical 
support [Rest, 1986; see also Derry, 1989; Weber, 1991].35 Gilligan's theory 
presents some very fundamental  questions regarding the structure of  profession-
al ethics, which are beyond the scope of  this paper. 
Second, it is essential to note that possession of  a higher level of  moral 
development is not the same as being a more "ethical" person. Since the theory 
of  moral development focuses  on the cognitive processes involved in moral 
behavior, it is not concerned primarily with either the specific  actions per-
formed,  specific  judgments made, or in ascribing the character of  individuals. 
Rather, it is concerned with the cognitive process of  making moral judgments. 
So, being a more expert (i.e., qualitatively superior) moral judge does not make 
one a morally superior person. 
The Measurement of  Moral Expertise 
Moral expertise has escaped the attention of  empirical researchers in audit-
34 They might also reject the idea of  moral expertise in the first  place. For example, some might 
claim that it separates out a favored  class of  moral judges. It doesn't do that, except to the extent 
that individuals who are at higher stages (according to the theory) are classified  as making them in 
an ethically more sophisticated way. The Kohlberg-Rest theory does not exclude the possibility that 
there may be other legitimate forms  of  ethical reasoning, and thus other forms  of  moral expertise. 
35 This topic requires more attention than can be given to it in this paper. For present purposes, it 
will have to suffice  to say that the Kohlberg theory has received a great deal of  empirical support. 
At the same time, it is not being claimed that it is a complete theory of  moral judgment, and that 
other approaches may be "equally" valid. With particular regard to Gilligan's [1982] claims that the 
ethical reasoning of  women is significantly  different  from  the justice orientation of  Kohlberg, stud-
ies in accounting have found  that female  accountants have higher scores than comparable males on 
the MJI [Ponemon, 1990] and on the DIT (both described below) than males [Shaub, 1992]. In a 
corporate setting, Derry [1982] found  no difference  between males and females;  virtually all sub-
jects who reported encountering ethical conflicts  at work used "justice language" to describe them. 
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ing. As has been frequently  observed [Bonner and Pennington, 1991; Davis and 
Solomon, 1989], a major obstacle in any study of  expertise is a valid measure of 
expertise for  the task in question. It might appear that the difficulties  would be 
even greater in a "'subjective" area such as moral judgment. In fact,  however, 
two different  measures of  moral development are available. One is the Moral 
Judgment Interview (MJI) [Colby and Kohlberg, 1987]. The MJI is a structured 
interview in which subjects are presented with an ethical dilemma, and asked a 
series of  questions, the answers to which are intended to reveal the nature of  the 
subject's ethical reasoning. The scoring system for  the MJI is a form  of  protocol 
analysis, the result of  which is a stage-score. The other measure is the Defining 
Issues Test (DIT) [Rest, 1979, 1986], The DIT is a paper-and-pencil question-
naire, which presents subjects with a set of  moral dilemmas and asks them to 
rank the four  most important reasons influencing  their choice of  the most appro-
priate action in the circumstance. These responses are used to construct a num-
ber of  scores, the most familiar  of  which is the P-score. The P-score expresses 
the importance (i.e., frequency)  of  principled (i.e., post-conventional) reasoning 
in her evaluation of  the dilemmas.36 None of  the scores obtained from  the test, 
including the P-score are intended to place subjects at a particular stage of 
moral reasoning. Instead, higher P-scores are indicative of  more sophistication 
with which the subject deals with ethical dilemmas. Thus, a higher P-score may 
be associated with a higher level of  moral expertise. 
Both the MJI and the DIT have been used recently in accounting research. 
Examples for  the MJI include Ponemon [1990], and for  the DIT, Armstrong 
[1987], Lampe and Finn [1993]. Ponemon [1991, 1992a, 1992b], Ponemon and 
Gabhart [1990], Ponemon and Glazer [1990], and Shaub [1992]. The existence 
of  the MJI and DIT, and the baseline measures and exploratory worked con-
tained in the studies just mentioned, may lead to interesting research on moral 
expertise. This is discussed further  in the next section. 
Implications 
Technical expertise in auditing has been the subject of  much research in the 
last few  years. In addition to its interest at an intellectual level, it has major ram-
ifications  for  the profession.  For, if  expertise can be better understood—e.g., 
what skills auditors are good at, what distinguishes an expert from  a non-expert, 
how do they become experts—then the practice of  auditing ought to be capable 
of  improvement. Progress is always important, but never more so than in the 
current situation of  increasing competition and increasing societal expectations 
about the nature and quality of  auditors' performance.  The concept of  moral 
expertise in auditing may be a nice idea, but it is sterile unless it has implica-
tions for  research and practice. This section suggests some possible implications 
for  academic research and for  the practice of  public accounting. 
Before  turning to some of  the specific  issues, it is helpful  to summarize very 
briefly  the small amount that is known about the moral expertise of  accountants. 
All of  the results reported should be considered preliminary, in view of  the rela-
tively early stage of  this area of  research. Only one study on the first  compo-
nent, i.e. the ability to recognize, analyze, and evaluate ethical situations has 
36 The DIT has been extensively validated in a number of  ways in a large number (over 500 as of 
1986) of  studies. The DIT has been described in a review as a paradigm of  measurement in-
struments [McCrae, 1985]. 
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been done [Shaub, Finn, and Munter, 1992]. Their study examined the effects  of 
personal ethical orientations, organizational commitment, and professional  com-
mitment on their ethical sensitivity, i.e., their ability to recognize an ethical 
issue in a professional  situation. If  it is assumed that an auditor with a higher 
ethical sensitivity is more expert (i.e., more skilled at recognizing and evaluat-
ing ethical issues), then the results are relative to moral expertise of  auditors. 
They found  that ethical sensitivity was not influenced  by either the professional 
commitment or organizational commitment of  the subject. However, an audi-
Figure 1 
DIT P-Scores of  Selected Groups 
65.2 Moral Philosophy and Political Science Doctoral Students Rest, 1986 
59.8 Liberal Protestant Seminarians Rest, 1986 
52.2 Advanced Law Students Rest, 1986 
50.2 Medical Students Rest, 1986 
49.6 Accountants (Female, Senior) Shaub, 1992 
49.5 Practicing Physicians Rest, 1986 
48.1 Accountants (Liberal Arts) Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
47.7 Accountants (Supervisors) Ponemon, 1992a 
46.8 Staff  Nurses Rest, 1986 
46.7 Accountants (Female, Management) Shaub, 1992 
45.1 Accountants (Female) Shaub, 1992 
44.9 College Graduates Rest, 1986 
44.7 Accountants (Staff) Ponemon, 1992a 
43.6 Accountants (Third-Year Staff) Shaub, 1992 
43.5 Accountants (Female, Staff) Shaub, 1992 
43.0 Accountants (Second-Year Staff) Shaub, 1992 
42.4 Accountants (Senior) Ponemon, 1992a 
41.9 Accountants (Managers) Lampe & Finn, 1993 
41.6 Navy Enlisted Men Rest, 1986 
41.4 Accountants (Senior) Shaub, 1992 
41.4 Accountants (Male, Staff) Shaub, 1992 
41.0 Accountants (First-Year Staff) Shaub, 1992 
40.0 Adults (General Population) Rest, 1982 
39.8 Accountants (Staff) Lampe & Finn, 1993 
39.8 Accountants (Manager) Shaub, 1992 
38.6 Accountants (Male) Shaub, 1992 
38.5 Accountants Armstrong, 1987 
38.1 Accountants (Public) Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
38.1 Accountants (Senior Manager) Shaub, 1992 
37.5 Accountants (Partner) Shaub, 1992 
37.1 Accountants Armstrong, 1987 
36.8 Accountants (Male, Management) Shaub, 1992 
35.7 Accountants (Managers) Ponemon, 1992a 
35.6 Accountants (Male, Senior) Shaub, 1992 
32.2 Accountants (Partners) Ponemon, 1992a 
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Figure 2 
DIT P-Scores of  Student Groups 
47.4 Accounting, Seniors, Liberal Arts 
45.9 College, Female 
45.8 Accounting, Female 
44.1 College, Male 
43.2 College 
42.8 Business, Graduate 
38.6 Accounting, Masters 
38.4 Accounting, Undergraduate 
37.4 Accounting, Senior, Public 
36.3 Accounting, Male 
34.5 Accounting, Undergraduate 
31.8 High School Seniors 
26.7 Accounting, Freshman, Liberal Arts 
25.3 Accounting, Freshman, Public 
20.0 High School Juniors 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
Ponemon, 1992b 
Ponemon, 1992b 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 
Shaub, 1992 
Lampe & Finn, 1993 
Rest, 1982 
Ponemon & Glazer, 1990 







tor's ethical orientation (i.e., idealism vs. pragmatism, and absolutism vs. rela-
tivism) were correlated with the ability to recognize ethical situations. 
Most of  the research to date has concerned the second component of  Rest's 
model of  moral development, i.e., the level of  moral development as measured 
by the Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining  Issues Test. The main results 
of  the studies of  moral judgment (i.e., the second component of  Rest's model) 
studies are shown in Figures 1 and 2.37 Figure 1 includes mean scores for  a 
number of  occupational groups, including professionals  and professional  stu-
dents. It reveals a distinctive pattern of  scores in which the P-scores of  public 
accountants are about the same as university students (Figure 2), but lower than 
university graduates—and much lower than a number of  other professional 
groups. Figure 1 also reveals a large amount of  unexplained dispersion in P-
scores among the study samples and sub-samples, centering roughly around the 
mean for  the overall adult population. In addition, they show that the scores of 
female  accountants are higher than those of  males, controlled for  rank in firm. 
The fourth  interesting finding  is that three cross-sectional studies have revealed 
a link between moral expertise (as measured by DIT P-scores in Ponemon 
[1992] and Shaub [1992], and by MJI scores in Ponemon [1990]) and rank in 
public accounting firms.  Specifically,  the relationship appears to be an inverted 
U, i.e., P-scores increase from  staff  to senior and supervisor, and then decline 
from  there to manager and partner. This raises the interesting possibility that 
partners may not be the most expert members of  the firm  (with regard to moral 
expertise). It also raises the issue of  whether (at least in the case of  moral exper-
tise) experience in a task is a good surrogate for  degree of  expertise [see, e.g., 
Davis and Solomon, 1989; Bedard, 1991; Bonner and Pennington, 1991]. 
37 There is some repetition in the scores reported in both figures.  For example, the scores for  female 
senior accountants, female  staff  accountants, and female  accountants as a group are all reported. 
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Since 20-25% of  the population is estimated to be post-conventional moral 
reasoners, the data from  a number of  DIT studies suggest that accountants are 
predominantly conventional moral reasoners. Whether they are stage 3 (seekers 
of  approval) or 4 ("law-and-order" types) is unclear at this point. On the one 
hand, the nearly ubiquitous presence of  rules in public accounting suggest that it 
might be "natural" for  public accountants to stabilize at stage 4. On the other 
hand, to the extent that public accounting firms  are highly organized entities 
with clear procedures and goals, and with a large amount of  interpersonal con-
tact, it might be suggested that they would stabilize at stage 3. The little evi-
dence which exists is equivocal. Ponemon [1992] found  a high frequency  of 
stage 3 responses, leading him to suggest that partners and managers (who, as 
noted, had lower P-scores than their subordinates) are predominantly stage 3 
(conventional) moral reasoners. Lampe and Finn [1991] found  a relatively high 
proportion of  stage 4 responses on the DIT. The scores for  students (Figure 2) 
show a similar pattern, i.e., that females  may score higher than males, and that 
accounting students have lower P-scores than other groups of  university stu-
dents (with the exception of  females  [Shaub, 1992] and seniors at a liberal arts 
college [Ponemon and Glazer. 1990]). 
Implications for  Research 
The account of  moral expertise in auditing presented above is really more a 
proposal for  a theory, requiring further  development. In spite of  its sketchiness, 
a number of  empirical research questions readily arise, a few  of  which are out-
lined below. They are grouped into three categories: those concerning the con-
cept of  moral expertise per se, those concerning the realization of  moral exper-
tise in actual behavior, and those concerning its relationships to other forms  of 
expertise. 
Studies  of  Moral  Expertise 
First, the level of  moral expertise of  auditors deserves closer attention. With 
respect to moral judgment, the spread of  P-scores of  the various samples of  both 
students and practicing auditors shows clearly that the factors  influencing  the 
stage of  moral development need to be clarified.  Second, expertise in the other 
components of  moral development, i.e., the recognition and evaluation of  ethi-
cal issues, and the factors  leading from  moral judgment to action, has received 
very little attention. Third, the existence of  an independent measure of  moral 
expertise may provide a way of  investigating some of  the basic relationships 
which underlie other expertise studies. For example, the relationship between 
consensus judgments and the level of  moral expertise (moral judgment) could 
be investigated directly, rather than via the surrogate variable, experience. This 
would be all the more interesting since (as discussed above) the relationship 
between moral expertise and experience appears to be more complicated than 
might have been thought. 
Another reason for  interest in the basic relationships is based on the observa-
tions of  Frensch and Sternberg [1989] and Bonner and Pennington [1991, pp. 
16-17 ] that experts tend to be very good at making decisions in common situa-
tions because they have been able to "routinize" the decision process, whereas 
they are less able to handle rarely found  situations. It may turn out on investiga-
tion that conventional (i.e., stage 3 and 4) moral judges exhibit a higher degree 
of  consensus, because they are more rule-oriented than post-conventional moral 
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judges. Thus, it is possible that some measures of  decision quality, such as con-
sensus and consistency with professional  and firm  standards [Ashton, 1983; 
Bedard, 1991] are an artifact  of  auditors' predilection for  following  rules, rather 
than being indicative of  a higher level of  expertise per se. 
Determinants  of  Moral  Expertise 
We do not know much about the factors  which affect  the moral judgment 
and moral behavior of  people (such as accountants) who make moral judgments 
and act within the context of  a) special occupational roles (such as that of  pro-
fessional  accountant) and b) rule-governed institutional structures (such as a 
professional  association, and employment in a public accounting firm).  To the 
extent that it is a "pure" cognitive developmental theory, the Kohlberg-Rest the-
ory does not help much in addressing these issues. The reason for  this is that it 
focuses  on developmental dynamics and its correlates, without a focus  on the 
organizational forces  and constraints faced  by people working in organizations 
or professions. 38 That is, the complications which people find  in their own lives, 
especially when they occupy roles which produce conflicts,  were given less 
attention at first.  For this reason, a broader theory, i.e., a theory of  moral judg-
ment in the context of  institutional (i.e., professional  and employment) settings, 
is needed. 
Three recent attempts to provide a richer theory of  moral judgment and 
behavior in an organizational setting show some of  the possibilities [Trevino, 
1986; Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; and Jones, 1991]. They build on the 
Kohlberg-Rest theory, which they regard as a basic theory of  moral judgment 
and behavior, by introducing additional factors  which might affect  individuals' 
moral judgments and actions. According to Trevino, moral behavior is the result 
of  moral judgments, but the effect  of  moral judgment is moderated by two sets 
of  factors.  One set consists of  situational moderators. Within this group there 
are three types of  moderators: the immediate job context, organizational culture, 
and characteristics of  the work. According to the theory, situational moderators 
affect  behavior both directly and indirectly by affecting  moral judgment.39 Jones 
[1991] identifies  a number of  factors  which he claims influence  all of  the com-
ponents leading up to moral behavior by affecting  the intensity with which the 
situation is perceived. These factors  of  moral intensity are: magnitude of  conse-
quences, social consensus, probability of  effect,  temporal immediacy, proximi-
ty, and concentration of  effect. 40 
Although their theories are not exactly unprecedented,41 these theories appear 
38 This is a simplified  view, since the theory has been tested in. e.g.. school settings and prisons: and 
the effectiveness  of  educational interventions has been an important stream of  the total research pro-
gram. Furthermore. Rest has stated [1986] that the study of  moral judgment in professionals  is likely 
to be a fruitful  avenue, because professionals  have explicit standards of  behavior to attain, and they 
often  are expected to explicitly justify  the moral judgments and actions they take. In this sense, the 
proposals presented here work out some of  the possibilities. 
39 The other set. called individual moderators, act directly to influence  action. Individual moderators 
consist of:  ego strength, field  dependence, and locus of  control. Because they do not affect  the moral 
judgment itself,  they are irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
40 In addition. Jones identifies  factors  which affect  only the third and fourth  components of  the Rest 
model. 
41 For example, without developing a more general theory. Rest [1986] describes studies relating to 
ego strength (pp. 15f)  and obedience to authority (pp. 12f),  and other personal and situational fac-
tors (chs. 4 and 5). 
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to have potential for  explaining moral judgment and behavior of  professionals, 
and could be given an interpretation specifically  focused  on public accounting.42 
For example, Lampe and Finn [1992] and Ponemon [1992] both suggest that 
one of  the factors  influencing  DIT P-scores is socialization. If  so, one would 
also expect a high degree of  consensus of  decisions among subjects. The exis-
tence of  some form  of  socialization and selection of  employees is quite plausi-
ble, especially in light of  the structure of  public accounting firms,  and of  the sit-
uational moderators identified  by Trevino [1986]. If  this is the case, then one 
might find  a firm  effect  in a sample of  subjects drawn from  multiple accounting 
firms. 
One of  the striking results of  DIT studies of  accountants is the significantly 
higher P-scores of  female  auditors and students described above. This is inter-
esting in light of  Gilligan's [1982] claim that females  will score lower (even 
though Kohlberg's theory that does not predict any difference  between males 
and females.)  This result, which may be explained by the types of  variables dis-
cussed above, clearly deserves more attention. This empirical finding  raises the 
possibility that females  might exhibit different  characteristics (e.g., degree of 
consensus) on tasks involving technical expertise. 
The  Relation  of  Moral  to Other Forms  of  Expertise 
The definition  of  expertise implies that expertise is domain-specific.  Indeed, 
Frensch and Sternberg [1989] reject the notion that there might be a unitary 
characteristic which underlies the various manifestations  of  expertise.43 This 
means that there is no a priori reason to believe that expertise in one domain 
would be highly correlated with expertise in another, except insofar  as the skills 
or domains "resemble" each other. Since technical expertise might be thought 
of  as very different  from  moral expertise, one could speculate that technical 
expertise and moral expertise might even be negatively correlated. 
On the other hand, since there appears to be a connection between expertise, 
consensus, and the existence of  explicit standards, there may be a connection 
between technical expertise and moral expertise. For moral expertise, the gener-
al theory predicts no connection between level of  expertise and consensus. 
However, one might expect that a group of  subjects (i.e., auditors) who are 
strongly attuned to the idea of  following  rules would exhibit high consensus— 
since one might expect them to be "better" at following  rules. Since the exis-
tence of  a multitude of  rules governing auditors indicates that they are extreme-
ly important, an ability to follow  them "well" should be regarded itself  as a 
form  of  expertise. Presumably, a low level of  expertise in "following  the rules 
well" involves being able to determine when a "black-and-white" situation 
clearly falls  within the range of  a rule, and then acting in accordance with it. 
Higher levels of  expertise, then, would involve such things as an ability to bal-
ance the requirements of  conflicting  rules, interpreting vague rules, or interpret-
4 2 For example, the Lampe-Finn study could be interpreted as a test of  a hypothesis related to one 
proposed by Trevino [1986]. Trevino's hypothesis is that people will make moral judgments at a 
lower level in their real work situations than for  the hypothetical dilemmas. If  the response items 
specified  for  the vignettes were coded according to levels of  moral judgment (thereby making the 
vignette questionnaire into something analogous to a DIT, only more realistic for  accountants), then 
one could compare the two scores. Likewise, Jones's theory that moral intensity could be tested by 
administering the vignette questionnaire to non-accountants. 
4 3 They make a comparison with the g construct in the psychology of  intelligence. 
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ing the rules in novel situations. Finally, one might expect that experts at fol-
lowing rules (whether "ethical" or "technical") would exhibit a fair  degree of 
consensus, as noted above. Although the theory of  moral development does not 
presume that subjects at a given stage will make the same choices, auditors 
(whether expert or novice) are a relatively homogeneous group in terms of 
training and occupation, and are all trained in a single set of  rules. So, it would 
not be surprising to find  that they would in fact  exhibit consensus. 
This line of  argument could even be extended to suggest that expertise (at 
least moral expertise) might be two-dimensional, in the following  sense: 
Auditors have both a level of  moral expertise as measured by the DIT or MJI, 
and also a level of  expertise in terms of  their possession of  a knowledge struc-
ture which allows them to make moral judgments "efficiently",  by helping to 
search for,  organize, and use information  efficiently  in a routine fashion.  The 
result of  this efficiency  or routinization may be high consensus and high consis-
tency with external standards of  behavior [Bedard, 1991]. Thus, moral expertise 
may be two-dimensional, in the sense that it is possible both for  conventional 
moral judges to have high consensus and high consistency with both technical 
and ethical standards, and for  post-conventional moral judges to have lower 
consensus and lower consistency with standards. Since the empirical data 
strongly suggest that most auditors are conventional moral judges, it might turn 
out on examination that auditors who are more expert than their (less experi-
enced) subordinates at technical tasks are less expert in the moral domain—be-
cause they are "efficiency  experts." 
Post-conventional moral reasoning, on the other hand, implies the ability to 
move beyond the rules to decide when rules ought to be broken, e.g., for  the 
welfare  of  society or because justice or duty demands it. Inflexibility  is a price 
of  expertise in the sense of  efficiency  [Frensch and Sternberg, 1989; Bonner and 
Pennington, 1991], and sometimes situations arise where one must recognize 
that the normal everyday habits and rules will not do the job, with respect to sat-
isfying  the demands of  the auditor's obligations to society. It may be the rare 
situations which the conventional auditor is less able to handle appropriately — 
and which land them in court on the wrong end of  a lawsuit, because "efficiency 
experts" would be less able to respond appropriately to such situations. From 
the moral development point of  view, their conventional approach to moral 
judgments traps them—even if  conventional reasoning works well most of  the 
time. 
Implications for  Practice 
The evidence from  studies on DIT P-scores reviewed above and summarized 
in Figure 1 indicate that the general level of  moral expertise of  auditors is not 
high, when compared to other groups. This might signal to some people that 
something is radically wrong somewhere in the institution of  auditing, including 
perhaps both the education system and the structure of  public accounting firms. 
For, if  auditors are members of  a socially important profession,  with explicitly 
agreed-upon obligations to act in the "public interest" (and ipso facto  to make 
professional  judgments from  the moral point of  view), then it might be discon-
certing that a number of  studies show that auditors are not particularly sophisti-
cated moral reasoners—and that partners have the lowest scores within their 
firms.  The low scores of  accounting students serve to show that the problem—if 
there is one—does not originate within accounting firms.  So, it is worthwhile to 
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examine briefly  some of  the issues that arise for  the profession,  once it is recog-
nized that moral judgment and behavior are subject to serious study and exami-
nation as a form  of  expertise. 
How  Expert  Must  Auditors  Be? 
If  further  studies of  the moral judgment and behavior of  auditors support the 
studies conducted so far,  some of  the assumptions about the role of  the auditor 
might merit re-examination. The social contract between auditors and society 
requires auditors to act from  the moral point of  view, which involves taking the 
interests of  all members of  society into account when making ethical judgments. 
One might conclude that the moral point of  view requires post-conventional 
moral judgment. But this is not the case. "Low" DIT P-scores do not necessarily 
indicate the existence of  a social problem, with respect to the social contract. 
For one thing, a post-conventional stage of  moral development means that an 
individual recognizes the importance of  rules and social institutions, and the 
importance of  acting in accordance with them. At the same time, situations arise 
in which "higher" principles indicate that the conventional behavior, i.e., 
actions in accordance with the rules, is not appropriate. Thus, a post-conven-
tional moral judge is capable of  "post-conventional" moral reasoning, but will 
reason in accordance with convention much, if  not most, of  the time.44 So, it 
appears that conventional moral judgment is compatible with the moral point of 
view, particularly insofar  as auditors do not face  "post-conventional problems," 
i.e., problems for  which conventional reasoning is inadequate. 
Rather, the question is this: What degree of  moral expertise is required by 
auditors, in order to carry out their professional  obligations? The answer is com-
plex, but it starts with the social contract. That is, the appropriate degree of 
moral expertise depends on the amount of  sophistication required in order to 
resolve the ethical issues actually confronted  by auditors, in a way that satisfies 
the interests of  all those interested parties to whom they owe a duty. One reason 
why most people do not reach post-conventional stages of  moral reasoning is 
that they do not (often  enough) face  situations in which conventional reasoning 
is insufficient. 45 So, it is (in a broad sense) an empirical question as to what 
level of  moral development is required of  auditors. 
The degree of  moral expertise required of  auditors is also a function  of  the 
set of  rules which they have to follow.  Acting in accordance with the moral 
point of  view can be accomplished (at least in many cases) if  one is acting in 
accordance with a set of  rules which satisfy  the moral point of  view [Ruland 
and Lindblom, 1992]. This is an essential feature  of  any rule-based theory of 
morality. Such theories hold that there are two tiers of  rational, or ethical, 
choice. One level concerns the choice of  rules, while the second concerns the 
choice of  actions within the constraint of  the previously specified  rules. Thus, 
the rules promulgated must satisfy  the requirements of  the moral point of  view. 
Individual actions, then, should be chosen which are in accordance with the 
rules. Indeed, if  the rules are ethically appropriate (e.g.. they satisfy  the moral 
44 At least this is true for  Rest's version of  Kohlbergian theory, in which higher stages incorporate 
the lower stages. [Rest. 1986] Even if  one believed that the stages are discrete, then an individual's 
judgments (and actions) will usually be the same as the actions performed  by a person at a lower 
stage of  development. 
45 In addition, the correlation between stage of  moral development (or DIT P-score) and intelligence 
and education suggest an intellectual component in addition to relevant experiences and challenges. 
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point of  view), then the judgments and actions of  individuals are morally justi-
fied  by appeal to those rules.46 Thus, stage 4 moral judges rely implicitly on the 
assumption that the rules and policies which already exist are a reliable guide to 
determining which actions benefit  the community as a whole, and its members. 
This suggests that as long as an auditor is an "expert" at following  the rules 
(i.e., is an expert in the "efficiency"  sense discussed above), she satisfies  the 
social contract.47 That is, perhaps society expects auditors to be good at follow-
ing the rules, but does not require them to be extremely sophisticated (i.e., post-
conventional) in moral reasoning skills. It should be noted that this argument 
presumes that conventional auditors are in fact  stage 4 moral reasoners, rather 
than stage 3. Moral expertise, i.e., skill at making ethical judgments, is still 
important, since no set of  rules can be expected to eliminate the necessity of 
judgment in applying it to real ethical problems, and the ability to follow  rules 
may itself  be a form  of  expertise. As long as the rules governing auditors 
(including generally accepted accounting principles, generally accepted auditing 
standards, and especially the principles, rules and interpretations in the codes of 
professional  conduct) are ethically "appropriate"48, then the auditor's ethical 
obligations are honored by acting in accordance with them. 
This may explain the otherwise puzzling observation of  Lampe and Finn 
[1993] that auditors have low P-scores, and yet auditors enjoy highly favorable 
public perceptions of  their moral standards. Low P-scores are not an indication 
that public accountants are unethical, nor that public trust in the behavior of 
public accountants is misplaced. Consistent with this, it may be that favorable 
public attitudes are not based on perceptions of  the sophistication with which 
public accountants address moral issues. Rather, it is quite possible that they are 
a function  of  perceptions of  the personal characteristics of  public accountants. 
For example, they may be held in high regard because of  perceptions that 
accountants have integrity, are honest, act in accordance with their public 
duties, recognize their fiduciary  responsibilities to other parties rather than act 
in their own self-interest,  and so on. In short, demonstrated commitment to their 
professional  duties, as contained in their codes of  conduct, may be the crucial 
variable [Frank, 1988]. Indeed, it is not entirely obvious that society wants or 
needs hordes of  post-conventional auditors—although there are surely ethical 
situations (presumably rarely occurring) where the ability and flexibility  to 
respond in a more sophisticated manner would be highly valued by both audi-
tors and society. 
4 6 Rule utilitarianism is an example of  such a theory. The various versions of  utilitarianism all share 
the principle that those actions should be chosen which are expected to maximize the amount of 
social welfare.  According to act utilitarianism, moral agents are supposed to choose each of  their 
actions by this criterion. According to rule utilitarianism, the rules are supposed to satisfy  the utili-
tarian criterion, while individual actions should be chosen which are in accordance with the rules. 
See. e.g., Harsanyi [1977] for  an argument in favor  of  rule utilitarianism. See also Gaa [1988]. Note 
that rule utilitarianism is only one form  of  "indirect" consequentialism; in addition, there are many 
rule-based ethical theories which are not based on the consequences of  actions [Sen and Williams, 
1982, Introduction], 
4 7 The point here is analogous to the suggestion of  Ashton [1983], and adopted by Bedard and Chi 
[1992], that complying with professional  and firm  standards be used as a criterion of  expertise. 
4 8 How one would distinguish the "good" rules from  the "bad" rules, and how firms  and professional 
organizations should proceed in order to promulgate "good" rules is an enormous topic which can 
only be mentioned here. This problem is addressed with regard to standard setting for  corporate 
financial  reporting in Gaa [1988, Chs. 8 and 10]. 
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Figure 3 
Framework For Ethical Decision (Adapted from  AAA, 1990) 
A Decision Model For Resolving Ethical Issues 
I. Determine The Facts 
(What, Who, Where, When, How) 
Including Legal, Professional,  Organization Rules And Regulations 
II. Define  The Ethical Issues 
A. Specify  The Problem (e.g., Conflicting  Rights, Rights vs. Welfare, 
Safety  vs. Rights) 
B. Whose Problem Is It? 
C. Identify  Stakeholders 
D. Identify  Major Principles, Rules, Values (e.g., Quality of  Life, 
Self-Determination,  Self-Respect,  Financial Responsibility, Fiduciary 
Duties, Honesty, Integrity) 
III. Specify  The Alternative Actions (This May Require Some Creativity) 
IV. Examine And Compare Alternatives With Respect 
To Ethical Considerations 
A. Vis  a vis Principles, Rules, Values 
Rights And Duties 
Fairness And Justice 
Virtues 
B. Vis  á vis The Consequences 
Positive vs. Negative 
Short Run vs. Long Run 
C. Vis  a vis Laws, Rules, Regulations 
V. Make Your Decision 
Can Moral  Judgment  be Learned? 
If  moral judgment is indeed a form  of  expertise, then the question arises as to 
whether it can be taught, either to students or to practicing auditors (as part of 
their training programs). If  the answer is "yes," and if  one were to conclude that 
auditors are not sufficiently  skilled at it, then it would be very important to 
implement ethics education into both university curricula and firm  training pro-
grams. According to Bonner and Pennington [1991, p.27], there is "a strong 
relation between the learning environment and performance,  which suggests 
that performance  is probably poor in some tasks because auditors have not had 
good opportunities to acquire knowledge." They conclude that such learning 
would involve both formal  instruction and practice. Presumably, education and 
training would be aimed at all relevant components of  Rest's four-component 
model of  moral behavior, including both the stage of  moral development, and 
the skills of  judgment in applying ethical principles and rules to specific  situa-
tions. It is also possible that the development of  suitable decision aids would in-
crease the ability of  auditors to make judgments, and to act, in accordance with 
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their obligations. The decision model in Figure 3 is a crude example, that may 
nevertheless be helpful. 49 
Empirical evidence does not exist for  the first  and fourth  components of 
Rest's model of  moral behavior. With respect to the second component, i.e., 
moral judgment, the evidence is somewhat mixed. In general, a large number of 
studies show that educational interventions do have an effect  on moral judg-
ment. Similar to Bonner and Pennington's [1991] conclusions regarding exper-
tise, Rest makes the following  conclusions regarding ethics education: 
Programs which involve either the discussions of  ethical dilemmas or involving 
personality development produce "modest but definite"  gains. Discussions of 
dilemmas do slightly better than personality development, while "academic" 
courses do not appear to have an effect.  Furthermore, there is weak evidence 
that programs involving adults have a greater effect  than programs for  younger 
subjects. In addition, programs lasting between 3 and 12 weeks seem to work 
best. In sum, these general results suggest that properly designed education and 
training programs of  relatively short duration may have a significant  positive 
impact on the ability of  auditors to make moral judgments [Rest, 1986, pp. 85f]. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of  this paper is to present the outlines of  an ethical theory for 
auditing, based on the fundamental  notion of  a social contract between auditors 
(and their professional  organizations) and the rest of  society. That contract 
enforces  on auditors certain obligations, which taken together constitute their 
role. Both technical and moral expertise are required. Auditors agree as part of 
their contract with society to be objective and independent. Definitions  of 
objectivity and independence recognize that, when providing professional  ser-
vices, more than one party has an interest in the way those services are per-
formed.  These parties include employees, clients, such third parties as investors 
and creditors, as well as accountants themselves. The interests of  these parties 
conflict  in a way such that the public accountant is unable to maximize the wel-
fare  of  all of  them simultaneously. That is, there will be at least sometimes 
"winners" and "losers" resulting from  the accountant's actions. An especially 
important aspect of  this situation is that the accountant may find  herself  in a 
conflict  of  interest, such that it is possible to act in her own self-interest  at the 
expense of  the interest of  others. 
In view of  this fact,  the principle of  objectivity says that the public accoun-
tant ought to act in a way that is fair  to all parties. By implication, fairness  does 
not imply that everyone will benefit  to the maximum by the accountant's 
actions. Since this is especially important and sensitive when a public accoun-
tant is performing  an attest engagement, special rules are necessary in order to 
assure that the existence of  a conflict  of  interest does not actually harm others. 
These principles reduce essentially to the following:  auditors are expected to 
4 9 This decision model is similar to the model in the materials developed by the American 
Accounting Association's Committee on Professionalism  and Ethics [1990], and in Arthur 
Andersen's materials for  teaching business ethics. The premise behind it is that such a model helps 
people to organize their analysis and decision making. Any decision aids developed for  practicing 
auditors would have to recognize that there is by definition  no mechanical way of  making ethical 
decisions, as there might be for  some technical issues, e.g., statistical sampling. Rather, they would 
probably resemble the more open-ended checklists used in other areas. 
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make ethical judgments in accordance with the moral point of  view, and in par-
ticular to avoid certain conflicts  of  interest. This means that an essential part of 
the auditor's role is to possess a "sufficiently  high" degree of  moral expertise. 
The concept of  moral expertise is presented and defined.  Its relationship to tech-
nical expertise is explored, and the problem of  measuring it is addressed. 
A number of  implications of  this analysis, for  both research and professional 
practice, are presented. Among other things, it is suggested that there may be a 
socially desirable degree of  moral reasoning which auditors are expected to 
have. This expertise presumably would involve both a desirable level of  moral 
reasoning ability, and sufficient  skill in following  professional  and firm  stan-
dards of  behavior. The analysis raises important questions about the education 
of  accounting students, firm  selection and retention policies, staff  training pro-
grams, and so on. How is a firm  to organize itself  in order to gain the efficien-
cies of  expertise (including possibly the efficiency  of  conventional, i.e., stage 4, 
moral reasoning) and still be able to respond adequately to the relatively rare 
ethical challenges that "don't fit  the rule book?" The importance of  this issue is 
obvious. On the one hand, there are tremendous economic forces  working on 
public accounting firms  to maximize efficiency,  and pressuring them to perform 
audits at "full  speed ahead." At the same time, there are ethical icebergs out 
there in the fog  waiting to sink the firm  if  the crew does not recognize and deal 
with them. 
The final  conclusion is an ethical dilemma, for  society: In many cases, no 
harm is done to society by auditors acting in a conventional manner, i.e., by fol-
lowing the rules. In fact,  society is presumably better off  to the extent that audi-
tors who follow  standards very well are more efficient.  Indeed, if  there were a 
correlation between high technical expertise and conventional (i.e., stage 4) 
moral development, society might (to this extent) want auditors who are also 
conventional moral judges. The problem is that sometimes situations arise 
where conventional reasoning is less likely to yield the decision that society 
would have wanted. The losses in the savings and loan industry are spectacular 
examples of  this, to the degree that auditors are part of  the "causal chain" [Gaa 
and Smith, 1985]. This indicates that the social contract between society and the 
profession  requires further  clarification.  If  it is too much to ask that auditors 
will be highly expert in both technical and moral matters (since, perhaps, such 
people do not in fact  exist in "sufficient"  numbers), which type of  expertise is 
more important? If  technical expertise is more important, then society should 
expect what might be regarded in hindsight as moral lapses, and re-consider the 
penalties (e.g.. through negligence suits) it places on them. On the other hand, if 
moral expertise is more important, then it should expect, ceteris paribus, that 
the audit industry will be less competitive, or at least less efficient  and therefore 
more costly. In short, the expectations gap looks a little different,  from  the 
moral point of  view. 
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Discussant's Response to "The Auditor's Role: 
The Philosophy and Psychology of  Independence 
and Objectivity" 
J. Donald Warren, Jr. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
After  reading Professor  Gaa's paper for  the third time, I continued to strug-
gle with the notions presented: 
• The role of  the auditor in society and his or her social contract to 
society. 
• The necessity for  the auditor to have an independent state of  mind in 
fulfilling  his or her responsibility to society. 
• The relationship of  moral "expertise" to the auditor's social contract 
with society. 
• The auditor's education and training and their impact on the interpreta-
tion of  ethical dilemmas. 
• The multiplicity of  rules imposed upon the auditor and the resulting 
barriers in assisting an auditor in arriving at "subjective" judgments in 
ethical situations. 
The conclusions reached in Professor  Gaa's paper lend themselves—as rec-
ognized by the professor—to  additional research on "moral expertise", which 
may result in a change in the accounting curricula. One observation in the paper 
that "academic research in the ethics of  the public accounting profession  hardly 
exists" certainly verbalizes the obvious. The public accounting profession  has 
dealt with the subject of  ethics as it has other issues facing  the profession:  when 
faced  with an issue in an area, the accounting profession  has a history of  being 
reactive. In other words, the profession  reacts by issuing detailed rules, particu-
larly in the ethics area. 
An Accountant as a Technician 
In addressing Professor  Gaa's paper, I believe it would be beneficial  to 
establish a framework  of  one possible view of  an "accountant". I will use the 
term "accountant" to represent a member in public accounting and frequently 
referred  to as an "auditor." The view presented is not intended to be all-
inclusive, but only to provide some perspective of  an accountant's background 
which may lend itself  to some of  the observations made by Professor  Gaa, par-
ticularly in the "Moral Expertise" section of  the paper. 
The accountant by nature is a technician and deals with a level of  preciseness 
not generally found  in other professions—the  double entry system for  book-
keeping and financial  statements that balance and articulate. The accountant's 
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education consists of  many courses in accounting which are technical in nature 
and have a level of  precision again not found  in liberal arts curricula. The ac-
countant's training is based upon detailed rules from  recording entries in the 
books of  original entry to the application of  generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. 
The public's perception of  the "accuracy" of  financial  statements likewise 
stereotypes the accountant as possessing a level of  precision which may be 
unwarranted. While the books of  original entry do balance and the resulting 
financial  statements may articulate, there are many management estimates and 
judgments which the accountant must consider in his or her examination of  the 
books and records of  a company. Because there are estimates and judgments, 
the level of  precision of  the resulting financial  statements lies in the "eye of  the 
beholder." For example, the opinion as to what is an adequate estimate for  an 
allowance for  doubtful  accounts may differ  between management and the 
accountant. Depending upon the materiality, there may or may not be an ad-
justment to the allowance which would, in turn, be reflected  in the financial 
statements. Moreover, the interpretation of  generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples is subject to the judgment of  an accountant. In some situations, two 
accountants will arrive at a different  application of  generally accepted account-
ing principles based upon the same facts  and circumstances. In other words, the 
age old argument as to whether accounting is a science or an art continues to 
haunt the accountant. 
The accounting profession,  as recognized by Professor  Gaa, may be unique 
in that it consists of  a multiplicity of  rules with which the accountant must be in 
compliance to be considered an "independent" accountant. Generally accepted 
accounting principles are not established within a framework  which lends itself 
to consistent results during their deliberative process by an authoritative body. 
This is evidenced by the number of  times that an accounting issue such as busi-
ness combinations or leases has been addressed by the authoritative bodies. The 
accounting profession  has various layers recognized as "GAAP" in the United 
States. The Auditing Standards change over time as a result of  events impacting 
the profession.  Ethics are consistently refined  based upon various facts  and cir-
cumstances (both internal and external) and the dynamics of  our profession.  For 
example, a recent change by the American Institute of  Certified  Public 
Accountants (AICPA) in the independence rules concerning loans from  clients 
has narrowed the loans that are permissible. This change was initiated due to 
media and regulatory reactions to a situation involving a financial  institution 
and partners of  its accountant. 
In summary, the accountant through his or her education, training and on-job 
experience deals with a set of  rules which have been characterized as "cook-
book"; however, the "so-called cookbook rules" are reflective  of  the accoun-
tant's ever-changing environment. This background may contribute to why an 
accountant may not score well on the P-score as discussed in Professor  Gaa's 
paper, because ethics are not subject to detailed rules and require subjective 
judgment. 
Integrity And Objectivity 
The notion of  the social contract between the accountant and public is perva-
sive in Professor  Gaa's paper. This contract places the accountant in a fiduciary 
role with the public. In other words, the accountant should act in the best 
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interest of  society, irrespective of  his or her self-interest. 
The public looks to the accountant to provide an "independent" examination 
of  a company's financial  statements and to express an opinion as to whether 
such financial  statements fairly  present the financial  condition of  the company. 
The public relies on the accountant's technical expertise in accounting and 
auditing and likewise relies on the "moral" expertise of  the accountant as well, 
i.e., the accountant is expected to execute his or her social contract in an impar-
tial, objective, honest and knowledgeable way. In essence, what the accountant 
is selling is his or her objectivity and integrity, i.e., independence. 
Objectivity and independence are addressed in the Code of  Professional 
Conduct of  the AICPA. They are discussed under Article IV—Objectivity and 
Independence as follows: 
A member should maintain objectivity and be free  of  conflicts  of  interest 
in discharging professional  responsibilities...[and] should be independent 
in fact  and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation ser-
vices. 
When one reviews the AICPA's ethics interpretations, such interpretations 
have evolved over time to focus  on the notion of  independence  in appearance, a 
subjective concept. This notion is also prevalent in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) independence requirements and the related SEC staff  inde-
pendence correspondence. In other words, the interpretations of  independence 
attempt to place the interpreter in the position of  an unbiased person who, when 
presented with the facts,  would arrive at the conclusion that the accountant 
would appear to be independent. While independence in fact  is considered, 
independence in appearance has clearly dominated the interpretations of  inde-
pendence since the early 1970's. 
AICPA Special Independence Committee 
The AICPA established a Special Committee on Independence in 1990. This 
Committee has focused  on the preponderance of  detailed rules dealing with 
independence and the past practice of  interpreting the AICPA and SEC indepen-
dence rules based upon appearance. The Committee has suggested that indepen-
dence be viewed from  the perspective of  a prudent  person given the facts  of  the 
situation. It recognizes that independence is both a state of  mind and a matter of 
character. These conditions can be interpreted as "moral" as contemplated by 
Professor  Gaa's paper. 
In a draft  of  the independence concepts, the Committee noted that detailed 
rules do not have a significant  influence  on an individual's state of  mind or 
character and are not effective  in motivating individuals to strive to meet the 
highest standards in their personal or professional  behavior. The Committee 
notes that detailed rules convey a negative message because their focus  is on 
proscribing specific  behavior. 
The Committee has recommended that the present independence rules and 
interpretations be replaced with three broad principles: 
• The audit firm  and the auditor should be financially  independent of  the 
client. 
• An auditor should not audit the results of  decisions that are those of  the 
auditor or the audit firm  and that were not reviewed, understood and 
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accepted by management. 
• The audit firm  and the audit client should not be adversaries in litiga-
tion that is significant  to the audit firm. 
The Committee envisions that some type of  broad statements would supple-
ment the three broad principles and that the focus  of  such statements would be 
on independence in fact. 
Conclusion 
In my prior comments, I have attempted to set forth  reasoning as to how the 
accountant's background (education, training and on-job experience) may result 
in the accountant attempting to apply in a particular situation detailed rules 
which he or she has applied over his or her professional  career. With the inter-
pretation of  each situation, an accountant will develop a database over time 
which will impact subsequent decisions on ethical matters such as indepen-
dence. 
I have also attempted to place the notion of  independence in some perspec-
tive, namely that the notion of  independence has evolved from  one that was 
based on fact  to one based on appearance. Appearance is much more subjective 
and does not lend itself  to detailed rules. It is based upon a person's life  experi-
ences. The education and training of  an accountant is not based upon subjective 
studies, but on procedures which do not generally lend themselves to subjective 
judgments. For example, the accountant is trained in the double entry system of 
accounting. 
Professor  Gaa's paper raises some interesting questions for  future  research 
and education and training in the area of  accountant's ethics. One might envi-
sion the accounting curricula including a course based upon case studies in 
ethics to broaden the accountant's perspective. These case studies may provide 
the accountant with a broader base to evaluate whether a situation is "morally" 
ethical and whether he or she is fulfilling  the social contract to the public. 
Before  pursuing the above course, it would be well to perform  research in the 
area of  "moral expertise" to determine its applicability to the accounting profes-
sion. Questions which might be addressed in research are: 
• How should "moral expertise" be defined? 
• How is "moral expertise" recognized in actual behavior? 
• How should concepts of  "moral expertise" for  accountants be related to 
concepts of  "moral expertise" of  others? 
• How expert must accountants be in the "moral point of  view"? 
• What are the implications for  education of  accounting students, firm 
selection and retention policies, and staff  training programs? 
In conclusion, addressing ethics, particularly objectivity and independence, 
is not an easy task. These are concepts which have been with the accounting 
profession  since its inception. Until parameters are established under which 
independence and ethics can be addressed, the multiplicity of  rules will contin-
ue to expand because each is written to address specific  facts  and circum-
stances. The AICPA Special Independence Committee's three broad principles 
are an effort  in the right direction. These principles would provide a basis for 




Litigation Risk Broadly Considered 
Jerry D. Sullivan 
Public Oversight Board 
There is little doubt that litigation risk associated with the audit of  financial 
statements, as well as other attestation assurances, is presently at a level that 
threatens the viability of  the public accounting profession  and is contrary to the 
public interest. A decade ago, it was infrequent  to encounter a report of  auditor 
litigation in the financial  press. Today, it is virtually a daily occurrence. 
A decade ago, when the Auditing Standards Board was debating and finaliz-
ing Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, Audit  Risk and  Materiality  in 
Conducting  an Audit,  an appropriate distinction was made between audit risk 
and audit exposure which is essentially litigation risk. The auditor was cau-
tioned that when litigation risk was assessed as low, less extensive procedures 
should not be performed  than would be otherwise required under generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Today, litigation risk is never assessed as 
low and the aforementioned  cautionary note might be better restated to suggest 
that the auditor would be well advised to consider performing  more extensive 
procedures than might otherwise be required by GAAS when auditing public 
companies. 
The Current Environment 
Small firms  are divesting themselves of  attest engagements, large firms  are 
performing  risk assessments of  their clientele and resigning from  "risk engage-
ments" and curtailing many attest services, such as assurances on prospective 
financial  information.  Senior executives of  the Big Six firms  lament the fact  that 
divesting themselves of  smaller, lesser developed and more risky small public 
companies is contrary to the public interest as these entities are often  in need of 
the most sophisticated assistance in producing reliable financial  information. 
The actual cost of  litigation involving the accounting profession  has not been 
calculated, but it has reached proportions that threaten the solvency of  even the 
largest firms.  Spokesmen for  the Big Six firms  (those firms  are involved in most 
of  the litigation involving public companies) claim its aggregate cost is second 
only to human resources. Costs of  defense  on some cases have exceeded 
$15,000,000. Document reproduction alone is often  in excess of  $2,000,000 a 
case. The projected costs of  defense  for  many cases have reached a level that 
indicate settlement is economically prudent even when the firm  believes it has 
adequate defenses. 
Two recent highly publicized cases, the MiniScribe Corp. litigation involv-
ing Coopers & Lybrand and the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association litiga-
tion involving Ernst & Young, illustrate the level of  stakes involved and the 
incentive for  firms  to settle. 
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A recent editorial in the Wall  Street  Journal 1 reported: 
The Texas King of  Torts did it again, just as the Vice President was 
renewing his campaign to reform  the lawyers. 
Mr. Jamail's latest spin at the lottery wheel of  American justice is a 
good example of  the excesses. He won a $550 million judgment against 
MiniScribe Corp., $530 million of  it in punitive damages, from  a 
Galveston jury last week. This 25-to-1 ratio of  punitive to actual damages 
is typical of  a legal system out of  control, which is why Mr. Quayle wants 
states to limit punitives to an amount equal to the actual harm. 
MiniScribe is in bankruptcy, so much of  the ruinous judgment would 
be paid by its former  accountants at Coopers & Lybrand and former 
investment bankers at Hambrecht & Quist—who point out they were also 
defrauded,  for  much more than Mr. Jamail's bondholder clients. It's also 
an irony that it was an internal investigation by MiniScribe that uncovered 
the falsifying  of  records by some of  its employees. So whom is the legal 
system punishing for  what by assessing punitive damages? The jury, by 
the way, decided Mr. Jamail should get some $8 million for  his labors. 
The MiniScribe verdict was later overturned by the state judge presiding 
over the case to facilitate  a settlement among Coopers & Lybrand, Hambrecht 
& Quest and the plaintiffs  for  an undisclosed amount, thus avoiding a costly 
appeals process. 
In another recent Wall  Street  Journal  article2 the following  was reported: 
The nation's second largest law and accounting firms  agreed to pay a 
total of  $87 million to settle investors' fraud  claims arising from  the col-
lapse of  Lincoln Savings & Loan Association.... 
The investors' lawyers said in opening statements to a jury that they 
would claim $350 million in losses. Under Arizona's racketeering statutes 
and California's  punitive damages laws, both of  which could be applied in 
the case, potential liability could be tripled. 
That prospect led in part to the settlements, lawyers for  the two firms 
said. "The taint that affects  anyone who had any dealings with Charles 
Keating is so black that it is asking a great deal for  a jury to understand 
that auditors, too, can be victim," said Laurence Popofsky,  a San 
Francisco lawyer for  Ernst & Young. 
A coalition of  securities firms,  insurance companies, accounting firms,  law 
firms,  corporate directors, and other business organizations is working to seek 
litigation reform,  involving such matters as proportionate liability, fee  shifting, 
and discovery procedural reforms.  Tort reform  efforts,  even if  ultimately suc-
cessful,  are likely to move slowly. 
The large accounting firms  are presently accumulating aggregated cost data 
relating to litigation costs to support their efforts  for  reforms.  However, much 
more may be needed. For example, firms  are reporting that the existing litiga-
tion environment is having an adverse impact on entry level recruiting and their 
ability to retain competent partner level personnel. However, no empirical evi-
1 Amy Williams, "Ernst & Young and Jones Day Law Firm to Pay $87 Million in Lincoln Savings 
& Loan Case," The  Wall  Street  Journal,  March 31, 1992, p. A3. 
2 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 561, "Subsequent Discovery of  Facts Existing of  Date 
of  Report." 
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dence has been gathered to substantiate or refute  their claims. 
There are other areas where it may be possible to develop empirical evidence 
to augment the proposition that the current level of  litigation risk the accounting 
profession  faces  is not in the public interest. I would like to suggest one area. 
My hypothesis is that the accounting profession's  litigation risk does not corre-
late to substandard performance  (audit risk). The data and arguments I present 
in support of  my hypothesis suffer  from  the same shortcomings academic 
research on auditor litigation has encountered—incomplete data for  analysis 
because of  the high incidence of  settlement before  adjudication. Nevertheless, I 
hope that this paper will suggest the need for  further  research and identify  areas 
that might be further  explored by those of  you who are more expert in research 
methodology than I. 
Both the peer review process and the investigation of  allegations of  audit 
failure  involving public registrants by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee 
(QC1C) provide an opportunity to identify  some data relevant to the quality of 
audits performed  by member firms  of  the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of  the 
American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants (AICPA). 
Peer Review Results 
As part of  the peer review of  member firms  of  the SECPS, engagements are 
selected and reviewed to determine whether they comply with professional  stan-
dards and the firm's  quality control system. The engagement selection involves 
a consideration of  risk factors  related to the firm,  such as industry concentration 
of  clients, new engagements, partner workload and experience, and other con-
trol risk and inherent risk factors  related to the firm's  practice. The engagement 
reviews are in sufficient  depth, and the Public Oversight Board's oversight 
process is sufficiently  vigorous, to provide reasonable assurance that they lead 
to a consistent and objective identification  of  audit failures  when they exist 
among the engagements reviewed. 
During the peer review of  engagements, an audit is determined to be substan-
dard if  the peer reviewer concludes (1) that one or more auditing procedures 
considered necessary at the time of  the audit in the circumstances then existing 
were omitted3 or (2) that the audited financial  statements are materially mislead-
ing, or the auditor's report inappropriate, thus requiring recall and revision.4 
This forensic  dissection of  engagements as part of  the peer review process 
provides an indication of  the incidence of  audit failure  among firms  that are 
members of  the SECPS. Table 1 summarizes the results of  engagements 
reviewed during the most recent three peer review years (1989-91). While the 
data relating to 1991 peer reviews is incomplete, that year completes the current 
cycle for  the peer review of  large firms  and the partial data summarized to date 
about substandard engagements is somewhat enlightening. 
When analyzing substandard performance  in the context of  litigation risk, it 
is necessary to distinguish between AU Section 390 failures  and AU Section 
561 failures.  Substandard engagements summarized as AU Section 390 failures 
are only those engagements in which, after  performance  of  the omitted proce-
3 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 325, "Communication of  Internal Control Structure 
Related Matters Noted in an Audit." 




SECPS Peer Review Engagement Review Results (1989 - 1991) 
Big Six Other 
Total Firms Firms 
1989 Engagements Reviewed 1497 340 1157 
Engagements Determined to be 
Substandard: 
AU 390 12 2 10 
AU 561 8 - 8 
1990 Engagements Reviewed 1909 298 1611 
Engagements Determined to be 
Substandard: 
AU 390 10 - 10 
AU 561 11 1 10 
1991 Engagements Reviewed 114 
Engagements Determined to be 
Substandard: 
AU 390 30 - 30 
AU 561 18 - 18 
* The Peer Review Committee has not yet processed all 1991 peer reviews and 
the data relating to other than Big Six firms  is incomplete. 
dure(s) by the practitioner, it was determined that neither the financial  state-
ments were materially misleading nor was the auditor's report inappropriate. 
Therefore,  those relying on the auditor's report were not misled and damaged. 
Thus, only substandard performance  summarized as an AU Section 561 failure 
should, in an ideal world, correlate with litigation risk, since only in those 
instances could a financial  statement user be misled and damaged. 
Over the three year period (1989-91) involving 742 engagement reviews of 
Big Six firms,  only one engagement was identified  as an AU Section 561 failure 
(.13% of  the engagements reviewed). During 1989 and 1990, a total of  2,768 
engagement reviews of  non-Big Six firms  were conducted and twenty such 
engagements were identified  as AU 561 failures  (.7% of  the engagements re-
viewed). Many of  the substandard engagements involving audits conducted by 
non-Big Six firms  during 1990 and 1991 were by firms  having their initial peer 
review as a result of  the AICPA bylaw change mandating SECPS membership 
for  all firms  that audit SEC registrant companies (sixteen of  twenty-one sub-
standard engagements identified  in 1990 and forty-five  of  the forty-eight  sub-
standard engagements identified  to date in 1991). 
The conclusion that can be drawn from  an analysis of  the incidence of  audit 
failure  identified  in the peer review program is that litigation risk should be 
much lower than the profession  presently experiences. It is estimated that the 
Big Six firms  report on approximately 12,000 public companies annually. The 
sole substandard engagement identified  in the 942 engagement reviews of  Big 
Six firms  was a small eleemosynary institution audit that was not subjected to 
the same quality control procedures applied to public company audits (for 
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example, concurring partner review). Therefore,  a "worst case" projection of 
audit failure  involving public companies would be sixteen (.13% of  12,000 
audits), whereas the actual number of  complaints filed  against Big Six firms 
involving their audits of  public companies annually is approximately three 
times that number. The only reasonable conclusion to be reached is that litiga-
tion risk does not correlate to substandard performance  by the profession. 
QCIC Investigations 
When a lawsuit involves the audit of  a public company (or an entity where 
there may be a public interest, such as a savings and loan institution), it is the 
QCIC's responsibility to determine if  the allegations suggest an aberrational 
error, a shortcoming in the firm's  quality control or its compliance with them, or 
a shortcoming in professional  standards. Member firms  must report to the QCIC 
all litigation or regulatory proceedings involving audits of  public companies or 
regulated financial  institutions within thirty days of  receiving a complaint. 
The QCIC's proceedings, conducted in strict confidence,  do not determine 
the merits of  a case or the culpability of  any party. Rather, their purpose is a 
review of  the firm's  policies and procedures to assure that, when appropriate, 
the firm  takes measures to upgrade its controls and compliance with them. In 
conducting its proceedings, the QCIC may interview firm  personnel, inspect 
firm  policy and guidance material, and examine selected workpapers to deter-
mine the need for  corrective action by the firm  or by standard-setters. 
QCIC cases are not closed until the committee is satisfied  that a firm  has 
properly addressed any weaknesses discovered in its quality control system and 
that matters that require consideration by the accounting and auditing standard-
setting bodies have been reported for  their consideration. The Public Oversight 
Board oversees all QCIC inquiries into alleged audit failures.  Its staff  reviews 
both the plaintiff's  allegations and the QCIC staff's  analysis of  them. Board 
members and/or its staff  attend meetings between firms  reporting litigation and 
QCIC task force  members, and participate in discussions about committee 
recommendations. 
Table 2 
QCIC Cases Reported 
Cumulative 
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Table 2 presents a tabulation of  the number of  cases reported to the QCIC since 
its inception. Because of  the sensitivity of  QCIC proceedings and concerns 
about their threat to "live" litigation, most documentation is destroyed shortly 
after  a case is closed. The only documentation retained is a copy of  the com-
plaint and the staffs  analysis of  the allegations. Since most cases are not adjudi-
cated, it is impossible to accumulate data relating to the outcome of  reported 
cases, particularly data relevant to a determination of  audit failure.  However, an 
analysis of  the complaints provides some data relevant to the environment in 
which litigation occurs and an understanding of  what areas of  financial  report-
ing plaintiff's  counsel believes to be deficient.  Ninety cases reported to the 
QCIC during the period 1989 through 1991 were selected for  analysis. Forty of 
the cases selected for  analysis involve the audits of  financial  institutions. Table 
3 summarizes data found  from  a review of  the complaints about the parties 
involved in the litigation and actions taken by the auditor. Table 4 summarizes 
data about the allegations in those cases. 
Table 3 
Analysis of  Ninety Cases Reported to QCIC 




Total Cases 40 50 
Auditor: 
Big Six Firm 35 42 
Second Tier 4 3 
Other 1 5 
Financial statements restated 
or auditor withdrew opinion 5 7 
Auditor resigned or was terminated 11 8 
Auditor reported modified  opinion on 
financial  statements: 
Ability to continue as going concern 11 5 
Other 9 9 
Company condition when complaint was filed 
or end of  class period: 
Bankruptcy 23 15 
Severe decline in earnings and security value 13 35 
Plaintiff: 
Security holder 27 38 
Company management 4 4 
New management 3 4 
Creditor 3 1 
Government agency 4 1 
Insurer 1 2 
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Table 4 
Analysis of  Ninety Cases Reported to QCIC 




Total Cases 40 50 
Existence of  Management Fraud 11 14 
Internal Controls: 
Material weakness not identified  by auditor 1 18 
Weaknesses not adequately considered 
when performing  the audit 16 8 
Weaknesses not communicated by auditor 6 2 
Principal Financial Statement or Auditor 
Report Defect: 
Revenue recognition 3 13 
Valuation of  assets 12 26 
Adequacy of  loan loss reserve 26 
Disclosure 3 3 
Fraudulent transaction 2 6 
Report not modified  for  continued existence 2 1 
Not obvious 6 6 
Litigation Risk Does Not Correlate to Audit Risk 
In the QCIC cases analyzed, all of  the non-financial  institution cases and 
ninety-six percent of  the financial  institution cases involved bankrupt entities or 
entities experiencing severe declines in their security values. The implication is 
that auditors' substandard performance  correlates to financial  difficulty  of  the 
entity being audited, i.e., the profession  can perform  well in profitable  and 
financially  successful  environments, but not so in financially  troubled environ-
ments. This is of  course a ludicrous proposition, but is easily explained. The 
objective of  plaintiff's  lawyers litigation directed at auditors is settlement, not 
adjudication of  the allegations. 
Most cases are resolved through settlement. Cases are settled at a "going 
rate" of  approximately one quarter of  the potential damages claimed.5 Plaintiffs' 
lawyers are sophisticated in identifying  potential class actions. Armed with 
computers they identify  potential class actions where a decrease in security 
price produces a market loss sufficient  to support an adequate level of  fees.  In 
discussing this phenomenon Alexander explains: 
Twenty million dollars is about the lowest potential recovery (damage 
claim) that could be expected to generate an attorney's fee  sufficient  to 
justify  maintaining a complex securities class action on a contingent fee 
5 Janet Cooper Alexander, "Do the Merits Matter? A Study of  Settlements in Security Class 
Actions," Stamford  Law Review, Volume 43:497, February 1991, pp. 513-14. 
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basis. Assuming that settlements can be expected to be approximately 
25% of  the claimed loss...attorneys fees  can be expected to be about 20-
30% of  the recovery. (Page 513) 
Alexander's research shows that most suits are filed  when a fee  in the range 
of  $1.25 million or more could be expected. Critics can find  degrees of  imper-
fection  in virtually every audit. The sufficiency  and competence of  evidential 
matter influencing  the auditor's judgment about the reporting entity's financial 
statements is not only a matter of  professional  judgment but it is also fact-de-
pendent and will vary from  audit to audit. These judgments about the sufficien-
cy and competence of  evidence, particularly relating to the valuation assertion, 
are focused  on by plaintiff's  counsel and most often  underlie allegations charg-
ing auditors with substandard performance,  when in fact,  the litigation is moti-
vated by the "plaintiff's  bar settlement model." 
Among the financially  troubled and bankrupt population of  companies, there 
are no doubt occasional instances of  substandard performance  by the auditor. 
There are other situations involving highly sophisticated management fraud 
where both the auditor and third parties have been deceived where the auditor's 
responsibility for  material irregularities in financial  statements is less obvious. 
Damaged parties will always contend that the auditor should have detected 
fraud  and this expectation gap is fueled  by occasional highly publicized cases 
where, based on the reported facts,  it appears that an alert, experienced audit 
team should have identified  related "red flags."  When conducting QCIC investi-
gations directed at evaluating the adequacy of  and compliance with firms'  quali-
ty control systems, we occasionally suspect a "busted audit." However, far  more 
often  the investigations lead us to the conclusion that the litigation is "frivo-
lous." 
Other Observations About QCIC Cases 
Continued Existence 
Among the fifty  non-financial  institution QCIC cases examined, sixteen 
entered into a form  of  bankruptcy proceedings. The auditors for  five  of  the six-
teen bankrupt entities modified  their opinion for  concerns about the ability to 
continue as a going concern during the financial  reporting year preceding bank-
ruptcy. The auditors for  seven of  the thirty-four  non-bankrupt entities modified 
their opinions on the financial  statements for  concerns about the ability to con-
tinue as a going concern. 
The above suggests that the auditor's "red flag"  identifying  going concern 
problems in the audit report may have little utility because of  the inherent 
inability to identify  entities that will become insolvent in the volatile market-
place and economy in which business operates. Further, it is interesting to note 
that the plaintiff's  attorney alleged failure  by the auditors to provide a "red flag" 
in only one of  the eleven bankruptcies that was not accompanied by an auditor's 
opinion modified  for  substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a 
going concern. 
Audit Evidence 
None of  the ninety QCIC cases examined suggest that the auditor did not 
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identify  evidence relating to the allegations, with the exception of  the identifica-
tion of  "side agreements" related to a number of  financial  institution audits. 
This suggests the sufficiency  of  audit procedures applied by the profession  for 
identifying  evidential matter about which an audit judgment must be made. The 
allegations, for  the most part, call into question the auditor's judgment about the 
evidence identified  in the audit, particularly valuation judgments and income 
recognition matters. Table 4 summarizes the allegations. 
As firms  in recent years have revised their audit approaches to be consistent 
with the SAS No. 47 risk model, similarities in audit methodology are more 
apparent than differences.  An example of  this is that all of  the large firms  now 
use non-statistical sampling plans to the virtual exclusion of  statistical sampling 
plans. During the most recent cycle of  Big 6 firm  peer reviews that have includ-
ed 742 engagement reviews, we do not recall seeing one statistical sampling 
application. The most plausible reason for  this is that non-statistical sampling 
plans are less expensive and experience has demonstrated the sufficiency  of 
audit evidence identified  by them. 
Statistical sampling plans are still used for  a limited number of  special pur-
pose applications, usually involving the requirements of  governmental agencies. 
These applications are usually planned and assisted by specialists in the firms. 
Academics, when planning their research projects and class syllabi, should con-
sider the limited use of  statistical sampling, and quantitative techniques general-
ly, in the audit of  financial  statements. 
Management Integrity and Internal Control 
In fourteen  of  the fifty  non-financial  QCIC cases examined, there was an 
allegation of  management fraud.  Among the fourteen  cases involving an allega-
tion of  management fraud,  eleven allegations related to entities with revenues of 
less than $100 million (six of  which had revenues of  less than ten million dol-
lars). Most of  the smaller entities involved owner-manager dominance. 
The Internal  Control—Integrated  Framework,  Revised  Draft  (February 
1992), of  the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of  the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), indicates that management integrity and ethical values 
are an integral component of  internal control. Unfortunately,  these attributes 
cannot be evaluated based on any known objective criteria. They are personal 
qualities, not processes like risk assessment, and reasonable men can differ 
greatly about their acceptability. Public reporting on the adequacy of  internal 
controls, including attributes of  management integrity and ethical values in the 
control structure, is both questionable and dangerous. It is not reasonable to 
expect that management will ever evaluate its members as lacking in these per-
sonal attributes, nor will it be possible for  others to do so, except in the most 
egregious situations-and well after  the fact. 
In discussing its application to small entities, the draft  COSO report states, 
for  example: 
Although small and even mid-size companies may find  it difficult  to 
bring outside directors on to the board, absence of  such directors (or an 
audit committee) does not necessarily create a weak control environment. 
A board that consists solely of  an entity's officers  and employees who 
report to the owner-manager can adequately perform  necessary gover-
nance, guidance, and oversight responsibilities.... 
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Thus, the draft  COSO report suggests that not only can management of  small 
companies evaluate objectively their own integrity and ethical values, as well as 
the adequacy of  other components of  the entity's control system, they can do so 
and report to the public without the oversight of  an independent audit commit-
tee. Owners of  smaller companies, once choosing to raise capital in the public 
markets, should be required to have audit committees with independent mem-
bers to assist in safeguarding  the interests of  absentee equity and debt stake-
holders. A failure  of  a public company to do so should be regarded as a serious 
deficiency  in its internal control structure. 
COSO recommends that the threshold for  modifying  the report should be an 
uncorrected material weakness. Many of  the components of  internal control 
identified  by COSO, such as integrity, ethical values and an absence of  audit 
committees, do not easily lend themselves to the concept of  a material weak-
ness. The likely result of  management reporting following  the COSO guidance 
is that reporting entities will routinely provide "clean reports," and auditors will 
be called upon to provide assurance on these reports, even when there are 
numerous significant  deficiencies  in the control structure identified  as 
"reportable conditions."6 This suggests that the plaintiff's  bar in future  litigation 
will more routinely allege that the management of  various companies and their 
auditors have misled and damaged third parties because of  assertions about the 
adequacy of  internal controls where significant  deficiencies  have been identi-
fied.  To minimize this danger, there should be an acknowledgment in public 
reports that weaknesses in internal control have been identified  and are being 
addressed by management. 
The Auditor's Opinion 
After  years of  controversy, criticism and deliberation, the Auditing Standards 
Board revised the auditor's standard report in 1988, the first  revision in thirty-
eight years. The revision was directed primarily at more clearly explaining the 
elements of  an audit and the degree of  assurance being provided by the auditor. 
The nature of  allegations in auditor litigation suggests another revision may be 
in order. 
The sufficiency  and competence of  evidential matter available to assess man-
agement's assertions about sensitive valuation judgments often  do not reduce 
audit risk sufficiently  to justify  the degree of  assurance being provided in the 
auditor's report on historical financial  statements. The following  is an example. 
The evidential matter available to the auditor to support a judgment about the 
carrying value of  a financial  institution's loan or equity participation in a real 
estate project under development is limited primarily to an evaluation of:  (a) the 
developer's reputation and financial  stability, the latter usually being highly 
dependent on the success of  the project being considered; (b) assumptions re-
lating to market feasibility;  and (c) costs incurred to date related to percentage 
of  completion estimates and additional development funds  available. 
If  the auditor was requested to provide assurance to a third party in a separate 
financial  presentation related to the real estate project, the presentation would 
be cast as a financial  forecast  and the auditor's report would include a caveat 
6 AICPA Professional  Standards, AU Section 325, "Communication of  Internal Control Structure 
Related Matters Noted in an Audit." 
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that the prospective results are dependent on assumptions that may not be 
achieved. Yet, the same assets included in a historical financial  statement would 
result in the auditor expressing a clean opinion on the valuation assertion related 
to the project. 
This dichotomy in auditor assurance cannot be theoretically justified  nor 
rationally supported. It should be no surprise that the auditing profession  is 
being held culpable for  the savings and loan debacle by the financial  press, 
Congress, investors and government agencies, and more recently for  the failure 
of  many banks. The financial  collapse of  many of  these entities resulted directly 
from  their equity participation in and loans to real estate projects. The auditor's 
assurances about the valuation assertions related to these projects was at the 
same level as assurance provided on the carrying value of  the cash account. 
Conclusion 
The accounting profession  has a unique role in society as a provider of  third 
party assurances on the reliability of  client-prepared financial  information.  In 
meeting this responsibility, the profession  has found  itself  beset with increasing 
litigation risk that more directly correlates to the financial  difficulties  of  some 
clients than to its own substandard performance.  Unlike the statistical dispersion 
of  malpractice actions against other professionals,  the accounting profession's 
litigation risk is concentrated among a limited number of  firms  that audit most 
public companies. While the litigation risk of  these firms  is increasing, audit 
risk appears to be managed in a way that limits substandard performance  to a 
reasonably low level, particularly in firms  that have mature quality control sys-
tems meeting the membership requirements of  the SEC Practice Section. 
The accounting profession  must continue to strive to even further  lower the 
incidence of  substandard performance.  However, it is unreasonable and, in the 
long run, contrary to the public interest in reliable financial  reporting for  the 
legal system to operate in a way that encourages plaintiffs'  attorneys to bring 
actions against accountants on the basis of  a calculation of  loss in client security 
values necessary to support a profitable  settlement. This results in accounting 
firms  being penalized for  the financial  troubles of  their clients rather than sub-
standard performance  and leads to an unwarranted erosion of  confidence  in the 
profession  as well as its financial  viability. 
This paper identifies  a few  facets  of  the accounting profession's  litigation 
risk relating to attest performance  and reporting that may warrant research by 
the academic community; there are undoubtedly others. Research and other 
scholarly inquiries may assist in bringing about reforms  to our legal system or 
minimizing the profession's  exposure to it. 
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Discussant's Response to "Litigation Risk 
Broadly Considered" 
Lawrence A. Ponemon* 
State University of  New York at Binghamton 
The paper presented by Jerry Sullivan [1992] provides a thought-provoking 
essay dealing with the ever-increasing occurrence of  litigation risk in the audit-
ing profession  in the United States. The author provides some preliminary evi-
dence on the nature and extent of  alleged audit failures  gathered from  peer 
reviews of  SEC Practice Section (SECPS) member firms  over a three year pe-
riod and 90 QCIC cases reviewed by the Public Oversight Board (POB). His 
findings  imply that the recent wave of  alleged audit malpractice, especially law-
suits against Big Six firms,  may not be caused by substandard audit work. 
Rather, Sullivan intimates that much of  the present-day litigation alleging audit 
failure  may be baseless and without merit. Despite judicial reality, innocent 
firms  may choose to make out-of-court  settlements to avoid the high cost of  a 
proper litigation defense  and the peril of  punitive damages as, for  example, 
experienced by Coopers and Lybrand in the MiniScribe case [see The  Wall 
Street  Journal,  February 18, 1992, p. C-11]. 
As posited by the author, a direct consequence of  increasing litigation cost is 
a commensurate reduction in the profession's  reputation and ability to provide 
quality independent audits of  client companies. Given recent negative economic 
events in the United States caused, in part, by recessions in global financial 
markets and the crisis in the national Savings and Loan industry, the public's 
positive perception of  the independent auditing profession  may be dwindling. 
This, in turn, could lead to clients and financial  statement users alike placing 
less faith  in audit opinions and placing greater reliance on legal or contractual 
arrangements. As the demand for  public accounting services declines, govern-
ment authorities may become more actively involved in the regulation of  the 
profession.  Loss of  the public trust and resulting governmental interventions can 
cause the demise of  the public accounting profession. 
Admittedly, it is difficult  to engage in an intellectual debate when you agree 
with the fundamental  arguments raised by your opponent. My discussion, how-
ever, will attempt to provide a critical analysis of  Sullivan's contentions as well 
as a reinterpretation of  his results. The remainder of  my paper is organized into 
two parts. First I will comment on what I believe are the most salient aspects of 
the several excellent points raised by the author. In particular, I will touch upon 
* At Babson College at the time of  this presentation. The author acknowledges the many helpful 
comments provided by Abraham Akresh, Richard Mandel and Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, and appreci-
ates the editorial assistance provided by Joan Grossman. 
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the possibility of  abuses in the legal system, the importance of  self-regulatory 
controls in mitigating substandard audit work, and the significance  of  the find-
ings on peer review and QCIC investigations presented. Then I will provide a 
critique of  four  general claims made by the author, which are: 
• that the recent wave of  litigations against auditing firms  does not serve 
the public interest; 
• that auditors are generally victims of  a litigious society; 
• that the stringent process of  self-regulation  imposed on SEC Practice 
Section firms  of  the AICPA should reveal and ultimately weed out 
substandard work in the extant auditing domain; and 
• that SAS 59 going concern disclosures and the new COSO report 
requirements will exacerbate litigation risk for  auditors. 
An Emphasis of  Major Points 
Abuse in the Legal System 
As noted by Lawrence A. Weinbach, managing partner of  Arthur Andersen 
& Co., in a recent interview by The  Wall  Street  Journal  [September 1, 1992, p. 
B-8], "Out-of-court  settlements over malpractice litigation are costing the six 
biggest accounting firms  nine percent of  their audit fees."  Based on an estimate 
for  U.S. audit fees  of  the Big Six accounting firms,  the article further  suggests 
that annual litigation costs average about $56,000 per partner. To corroborate 
this point, consider the reluctance of  most major insurance companies to pro-
vide malpractice coverage to various professional  and occupational groups such 
as physicians, engineers, lawyers and accountants. While there may be instances 
of  egregious behavior in the auditing community, it would be absurd to believe 
that the present-day level of  contributory negligence or fraud  in the accounting 
profession  approached $56,000 per partner each year. What are the conse-
quences of  litigation assuming that this figure  is correct? Apropos the point 
raised by Sullivan, I too believe that the considerable sums paid by audit firms 
to defend  or settle malpractice lawsuits may provide evidence of  an abuse of 
legal process that, if  allowed to continue, could severely cripple the accounting 
profession  as we know it today. 
Has society become too litigious? Some legal scholars and political experts 
believe it has, arguing that the significant  rise in practicing attorneys within the 
United States over the past two decades has resulted in a commensurate 
increase in the number of  lawsuits filed  against individuals and business firms. 
Walter Olson [1991], in his recent book entitled The  Litigation  Explosion,  notes 
that malpractice lawsuits have risen as much as 300-fold  in some sectors of  the 
economy in about twenty years. Quoting the results of  a Harvard Law School 
study, he further  suggests that only about one in five  malpractice claims have 
something to do with genuine negligence. This exponential increase in court-
room docket activity has severely limited the court's ability to deal effectively 
with and respond to a plethora of  civil malpractice cases. Legal experts now 
believe that chaos in the American courtroom is causing the legal system to 
become increasingly bureaucratic and grossly inefficient.  This fact,  coupled 
with the general difficulty  in defending  any malpractice action, may explain 
why it is becoming increasingly difficult  to dispose quickly of  lawsuits against 
public accounting firms  that are known to be frivolous  or without legal merit. 
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Importance of  Self-Regulatory  Controls 
In response to increasing litigation risk and the threat of  governmental inter-
vention, the public accounting profession  as well as individual firms  have insti-
tuted formal  control mechanisms to ensure audit quality. For example, audit 
firms  belonging to the AICPA undergo a peer review if  they provide attestation 
services to client organizations. A peer review is a detailed, independent in-
vestigation of  a public accounting firm,  including certain selected client engage-
ments, by an independent body of  accounting practitioners from  another quali-
fied  firm  or by a team of  experts assembled by a professional  body such as the 
AICPA. The purpose of  the review is to ensure that member firms  comply with 
the standards, rules and regulations required by the profession. 
The peer review is remedial rather than punitive. Very rarely does a peer 
review seek to uncover the unprofessional  or unethical actions of  an individual 
practitioner or an entire firm.  If,  however, in the course of  their investigation, a 
breach Of  the ethics code is revealed to members of  the review team, such a 
finding  could possibly result in a referral  to the ethics division of  the Institute. 
In certain cases, very negative findings  could lead to civil or criminal liability 
on the part of  the firm  under investigation. In actuality, this occurs only rarely 
and in most cases the firm  judged to be in noncompliance will receive a private 
reprimand by the review team and the AICPA. It is still asserted that the con-
sternation and embarrassment caused by a potentially negative peer review, in 
some situations, will motivate a firm  and its employees to comply with various 
professional  and technical standards. 
Comprehensive peer reviews are also performed  by a special investigation 
unit of  the AICPA when audit firms  are implicated in alleged audit failure.  As 
explained in a recently published monograph entitled Evolution of  the Quality 
Control Inquiry Committee by Mautz and Evers [1991], QCIC reviews are con-
ducted on SECPS member firms  to determine the nature and probable causes of 
the allegations contained in pending litigation. If  instances of  substandard audit 
work are discovered, the committee makes recommendations to the audit firm 
so that it can take the necessary steps to avoid similar problems on future 
engagements. 
The profession  also employs a detailed set of  work guidelines known as 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) to ensure a consistent and rea-
sonable application of  professional  judgment. Although the exact nature of  audit 
judgment varies according to a multitude of  factors  including the auditor's com-
petence, integrity and ethical values, these standards serve as examples of  how 
one should behave in a wide variety of  situations and circumstances in the 
course of  professional  practice. 
In recognizing the possibility for  substandard work despite a detailed set of 
professional  standards, public accounting firms  have established an internal sys-
tem for  reviewing the quality of  all audit work completed by the firm  (e.g., in 
accordance with the AICPAs' Statement on Quality Control Standard No. 1 
entitled System  on Quality Control  for  a CPA firm).  Such control systems 
attempt to validate the reliability of  active attestation engagements within the 
firm  on an ongoing basis. These often  include a quality control review of  select-
ed workpapers to ensure the consistency and completeness of  all auditing work 
performed  and an internal examination of  post-audit adjusting entries recom-
mended by the audit team. In addition, when difficult  or ambiguous technical is-
62 
sues are encountered, firm  specialists are often  brought in to participate on an 
ex-post basis. 
Working in concert, peer reviews, detailed audit standards and internal con-
trols within the audit firm  tend to mitigate the possibility of  litigation risk 
caused by an auditor's erroneous judgment or unethical acts in practice. Some 
argue that the nature of  self-regulation  is corrective and, therefore,  it cannot pre-
vent egregious judgmental errors or audit failure  from  happening in the first 
place. Even with the best system of  total quality management, it may be diffi-
cult, if  not impossible, to identify  audit failure  soon after  it happens. As will be 
mentioned later, the chances for  detection are especially problematic when the 
unscrupulous auditor knows the detailed workings of  the quality control system 
used to prevent such action. Others, however, argue that the mere existence of 
quality controls discourages potential unethical behavior. While such controls 
are far  from  perfect,  I believe that they do act, to some extent, as a deterrent to 
audit failure  as well as unethical behavior in the accounting profession. 
Sullivan's Presented Findings 
As Executive Director of  the Public Oversight Board, Jerry Sullivan has 
access to internal statistics for  SEC Practice Section member firms  gathered 
from  peer reviews and QCIC investigations. These data clearly support the 
claim that the extent of  substandard audit work is a minuscule proportion of  the 
total activity evaluated by the Institute. In particular, peer reviews of  thousands 
of  audit engagements over a three year period (as reported in Table 1 of 
Sullivan's paper) revealed only thirty-seven instances of  substandard audit work 
that, according to AU section 561, could have resulted in material error to a 
client's financial  statements and a change to the auditor's opinion. Only one 
such incident pertained to the work of  a Big Six accounting firm. 
Sullivan provides additional data pertaining to ninety selected cases of 
alleged audit failure  reported to the QCIC during the period 1989 to 1991. 
Substantially all lawsuits dealt with client organizations that had experienced 
financial  distress or bankruptcy during or after  the class action period. The 
author uses this fact  to support his claim that litigation does not necessarily 
mean a "busted audit". Rather, by virtue of  a so-called "deep pocket" for  set-
tling alleged malpractice, he intimates that blame is often  cast onto the largest 
accounting firms.  Along these lines, Sullivan writes [1992, p. 55], 
The implication is that auditors' substandard performance  correlates to 
financial  difficulty  of  the entity being audited, i.e., the profession  can per-
form  well in profitable  and financially  successful  environments, but not so 
in financially  troubled environments. This is of  course a ludicrous propo-
sition, but is easily explained. The objective of  plaintiff's  lawyers litiga-
tion directed at auditors is settlement, not adjudication  of  the allegations 
[emphasis added], 
Sullivan [1992, p. 56] also points out the inconsistent application of  SAS 59 
audit report modifications  in the sample of  selected companies investigated by 
the QCIC, suggesting that going concern disclosures may be of  little benefit  to 
security holders for  forecasting  financial  distress or bankruptcy (e.g., poor hit 
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rates)1. Sullivan also found  that none of  the ninety cases of  alleged audit failure 
examined by the QCIC showed that the auditor failed  to identify  evidence relat-
ing to the allegation in the lawsuit—indicating that audit procedures for  the dis-
covery of  evidential matter must have been sufficiently  applied. In summary, 
the findings  presented by Sullivan provide some indication of  a potentially seri-
ous problem facing  the public accounting profession  in the United States, where 
allegations of  audit failure  and actual incidents of  poor quality audits may not 
be highly correlated. Although litigation reform  is probably warranted, my cri-
tique, as provided in the next section, is based on the premise that litigation can 
serve a useful  purpose in society. 
A Critique to Four General Claims 
Does Litigation Serve the Public Interest? 
To address this question, consider the framework  depicted in Figure 1, illus-
trating a relationship between actual audit quality (AAQ), perceived audit quali-
ty (PAQ) and litigation (LIT).2 As can be seen, using a Venn diagram, perceived 
audit quality and litigation are two mutually exclusive (disjoint) domains. 
Litigation risk, defined  as the intersection of  actual audit quality and litigation, 
is very small when perceived audit quality and actual audit quality nearly over-
lap. This is because, in an economic sense, the client and the auditing firm  enter 
into and realize an audit contract specifying  a given level at a given price. The 
domain of  litigation risk increases substantially when perceived audit quality 
does not equal actual audit quality because the client may believe that the audit 
firm  has shirked on its contractual obligation to the organization and its key 
stakeholders. Clearly, litigation risk becomes more salient as the gap between 
actual and perceived audit quality widens. 
Irrespective of  audit quality problems, however, litigation risk can be influ-
enced by a multitude of  other factors  defined  within a triad of  social, political 
and economic forces  that are determined by public demand. Factors that may be 
important include the nature of  self-regulation,  the level of  firm  profitability  and 
the proverbial expectations gap between users of  financial  statements and inde-
pendent auditors. The social-political-economic triad serves as a unique mecha-
nism for  ensuring audit quality and for  containing litigation problems within the 
boundary of  the public interest. In this regard, litigation has a dual role. First, it 
serves as a change agent through which the opinions of  the general public are 
communicated to the auditing profession.  Second, and perhaps most important-
ly, it acts as a deterrent to substandard auditing. Here, audit quality is defined  by 
the public's eye in the context of  what auditing ought to he. 
1 Prior research on the information  content of  audit opinions corroborate Sullivan's [1992] findings. 
Accordingly, studies show that less than 49 percent of  bankrupt companies received a going concern 
opinion one year prior to bankruptcy [Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler, 1989, p.32]. In addition, 
Altman [1982] found,  for  an eight year period, that 25 percent of  companies receiving a going con-
cern opinion ultimately went bankrupt. It is important to note, however, that at the time of  these 
studies, auditors were not required to predict clients' ability to stay in business. 
2 Palmrose [1988] also proposes a causal relationship between a firm's  litigation activities and the 
audit quality perceived by the stakeholders of  a client organization. 
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FIGURE 1: AUDIT QUALITY AND LITIGATION RISK 
Public Interest 
Political Economic 
The apparently spurious association presented by Sullivan between substan-
dard audits and allegations of  audit failure  for  QCIC cases may have been 
brought about by a growing rift  between the public's belief  as to what auditing 
ought to be versus the reality of  what auditing is. Despite the severity of  eco-
nomic damages in recent years and the possible lack of  causality between audit 
and litigation risks, I hold the very unpopular view that malpractice litigation in 
auditing can and often  does serve a useful  role in society. 
To illustrate my point, consider the following  scenario. Suppose audit firms 
could predict with perfect  certainty the financial  condition of  a client company. 
Further, imagine that the firm  made all audit findings  publicly available to all 
interested parties. Would perfect  prediction and full  disclosure eliminate mal-
practice litigation in the profession?  I believe that the answer is yes. That is, 
aside from  the occasional harassment lawsuit, cases alleging audit failure  would 
invariably be avoided by plaintiff's  attorneys for  lack of  fee  potential or would 
be dismissed prior to trial. In this hypothetical situation, the value of  settlement 
and the cost of  defense  would be nominal. 
Assuming that the root cause of  litigation in any profession  is at least one 
dissatisfied  plaintiff,  perhaps the significant  rise in audit malpractice claims is 
due to the profession's  inability to understand and respond to the needs of  its 
constituency. For example, we may believe that by simply issuing the so-called 
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expectation gap auditing standards (e.g., SAS 52 to SAS 61) we could virtually 
eliminate substantive performance  problems in auditing. In reality, however, 
these standards may have done little to change the perceptions of  financial  state-
ment users and other key exchange partners about the audit opinion or the client 
organization. Perhaps the only viable solution to reducing litigation risk is to 
substantially increase the scope of  audit services in ways that will provide 
greater comfort  to end-users of  financial  statement information.  This solution, 
however, has been ruled out by many on the basis that it would be too costly to 
provide higher levels of  assurance on auditing engagements. Taking this one 
step further,  perhaps the reduction in statistical sampling applications among 
Big Six firms,  as indicated by Sullivan, reflects  the belief  that cost is more im-
portant than quality. 
Are Auditors Culpable? 
Because public accounting is a legitimate profession,  to address the issue of 
culpability one needs to understand first  the role of  the legal system in profes-
sional self-regulation.  As a starting point, consider the early sociological litera-
ture, where theorists have attempted to categorize occupations as either profes-
sional or non-professional  based upon the presence of  several social or political 
attributes [Greenwood 1957; Montagna 1974; Wilensky 1964]. Sociologists 
generally agree that autonomy is perhaps the most significant  attribute that dis-
tinguishes professions  from  other occupations. Greenwood [1957], for  example, 
asserts that the only truly important distinction between professions  and other 
occupational groups is that the professional  possesses legitimate control over 
his or her work environment. The state grants autonomy, including the exclu-
sive right to determine who can legitimately do the work and how the work 
should be done. Professional  autonomy is not absolute, however, since the state 
has ultimate sovereignty. As Freidson [1971, p. 44] suggests, a profession  has 
within the state-protected environment sufficient  power to control virtually all 
facets  of  its work without serious interference  from  any lay group. Through a 
process of  political negotiation and persuasion, society is convinced that it is 
desirable to grant an occupation professional  stature. To be given autonomy, a 
profession  must demonstrate a high level of  specialized knowledge and skill, 
and, perhaps most importantly, trustworthiness. 
While professional  rules, standards and codes of  conduct may be important 
devices for  persuading the general public to believe that members of  a profes-
sion possess good qualities (e.g., competence and integrity), it does not guaran-
tee public support. As noted by Friedson [1971], standards of  conduct may be 
also viewed as manipulative because they attempt to influence  public opinion 
without directly affecting  behavior in the extant professional  domain. Although 
a profession  has the power of  self-determination,  it should recognize that auton-
omy is conditional, rather than absolute, since the public has ultimate sovereign-
ty. Consequently, if  a profession's  service, work product or behavior is not 
consistent with societal expectations, the public can reclaim its power in two 
ways: first,  by exercising political control and second, by seeking legal action. 
Society's mistrust of  political (governmental) forces  in the United States may 
explain, at least in part, the lawsuit craze over the past decade against various 
professional  groups, including accountants. 
Does the rash of  malpractice litigation mean that the auditing profession  has 
fallen  victim to the unreasonable demands of  society or does it mean that mem-
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bers of  the profession  have breached the public trust by engaging in nefarious 
business practices? Strong arguments can be made either way. As a starting 
point, consider the many egregious cases of  audit failure  arising from  the audi-
tors' participation in, or failure  to report incidents of  fraud  or fraudulent  finan-
cial reporting. On the other hand, there are many less publicized cases where 
auditors seemingly sacrificed  income potential and reputation by voluntarily 
disclosing incidents of  wrongdoing or fraud  within the client organization to the 
general public. 
There is another class of  malpractice stemming from  a shift  in standards of 
responsibility concerning due professional  care. For example, should the audi-
tors who failed  to acknowledge the possibility of  an understated loan loss 
reserve for  the first  financially  distressed Savings and Loan (S&L) be held to 
the same legal standard of  gross negligence as those who failed  to consider sim-
ilar audit evidence for  the 900th bankrupt S&L? All in all, I believe that the 
auditing profession  has experienced a soiled reputation caused, in part, by a rel-
atively small number of  egregious cases of  audit failure  that have been the basis 
for  many feature  stories in the press [Palmrose, 1991]. 
Does this mean that a few  bad apples are spoiling the barrel? Not according 
to four  studies on CPA audit quality conducted by the United States General 
Accounting Office  (GAO). Consider, for  example, a 1985 study in which the 
GAO reported that the federal  inspector general's office  found  one out of  four 
audit reports for  governmental units needing corrective action. To paraphrase 
the GAO (p. 2), in about one in five  audits ". . . the required audit work was not 
performed,  or the audit documentation was inadequate or unclear, after  review-
ing the auditors' working papers supporting the audit." In a 1986 study involv-
ing the audits of  governmental units requiring federal  assistance, the GAO 
found  that CPAs did not comply with governmental auditing standards in about 
thirty-four  percent of  the audits performed  by them. Over half  of  these audits 
involved a severe violation of  professional  standards. In 1988, the GAO studied 
the quality of  external audits completed for  participants in federal  guaranteed 
and insured loan programs. According to the GAO in their report (p. 3) ". . . 
seven of  twenty-eight loan program audits did not satisfactorily  comply with 
auditing standards. The problems included working papers that did not ade-
quately show the CPA appropriately tested financial  transactions, evaluated 
internal controls, or tested compliance with laws and regulations." More recent-
ly, the GAO conducted an investigation of  eleven out of  twenty-nine failed  sav-
ings and loan associations in the Dallas Federal Loan Bank District. In this 1989 
report, the GAO concluded that (p. 1) 
For six of  the eleven S&Ls, CPAs did not adequately audit and/or report 
the S&Ls' financial  or internal control problems in accordance with pro-
fessional  standards. The CPAs' problems involved (1) inadequate audit 
work in evaluating loan collectibility and (2) inadequate reporting on 
S&Ls' accounting practices, regulatory compliance, and internal controls. 
The nature of  the audit reporting problems was significant  enough to war-
rant referring  the CPA firms  performing  the audits to regulatory and pro-
fessional  bodies for  their review. 
In summary, drawing from  the findings  of  all four  GAO reports, I believe it 
is fair  to conclude that audit quality is far  from  perfect  — at least with respect to 
the audits of  governmental units, participants in federal  loan programs and sav-
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ings and loan associations. Taking these findings  one step further,  perhaps the 
low error rates found  by Sullivan in his review of  peer review and QCIC cases 
may not be representative of  the true state of  audit quality that exists in the 
accounting profession  today. 
Does Self-Regulation  work? 
According to Sullivan, the low occurrence of  substandard audit work found 
in his peer review data suggests that self-regulation  is working well. These same 
data, however, can be used to support an alternative claim; that is, the process of 
self-regulation  may be ineffective  at detecting audit failure.  This claim may be 
valid for  a variety of  reasons. First, poor audit quality is typically framed  as 
consensus to an existing body of  auditing standards rather than the auditor's 
ability to render the highest possible caliber of  auditing services. To clarify  this 
distinction, consider the now famous  opinion by U.S. Appellate Court Judge L. 
Hand in the T.J.  Hooper  (1932) decision in tort law. 
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact  common prudence; 
but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly 
lagged in the adoption of  new and available devices. It never may set its 
own tests, however, persuasive be its usages. Courts  must in the end  say 
what is required;  there are precautions so imperative that even their uni-
versal disregard  will  not excuse their omission (emphasis added). 
Applying Judge Hand's reasoning to the arena of  auditors' legal liability, when 
assessing the quality of  audit work the peer review team should attempt to 
determine whether or not the audit firm  exercised a reasonable standard  of 
care, which may or may not be defined  by existing auditing standards or accept-
ed auditing practices. 
A second related problem concerns the reliability of  the peer review process 
itself.  For instance, firm-on-firm  reviews are commonly performed  among the 
largest public accounting firms  on a three year cycle. Given the small number of 
large firms  that could be chosen at any point in time to perform  a comprehen-
sive review of  another large firm,  it is not beyond the realm of  possibility that 
negative review findings  can be suppressed by members of  the review team for 
fear  of  retribution by the firm  under review since it too will someday serve in 
the capacity of  reviewer. Beyond self-interest  issues, peer review teams may be 
motivated to stifle  findings  of  egregious audit error to maintain the illusion that 
everything is "ok" in the auditing profession  today, thus ensuring the continua-
tion of  a system of  self-governance. 
Because client engagements are never selected randomly by the peer review 
team, their findings  may not be representative of  the entire population of  audits 
completed by the firm  under review. In addition, the review is often  limited to 
workpaper evidence, thus making it virtually impossible to gauge source credi-
bility or to detect people-related problems that may have caused audit quality 
reduction on the job, such as premature sign-off  or shirking on audit tasks. In 
essence, given these problems, and because the purpose of  a peer review is 
remedial rather than punitive, this form  of  self-regulation  may do very little to 
mitigate substandard audit work. For similar reasons, QCIC investigations may 
not lessen audit failure  because the QCIC operates under a veil of  total secrecy 
and does not have the authority to apply disciplinary measures, even to audit 
firms  or individuals who knowingly engaged in deceptive or fraudulent  activi-
ties [Mautz and Evers 1991, pp. 48-49]. 
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Will the Going Concern Audit Opinion and Management 
Reports on Internal Control Expose Auditors to Increased 
Litigation Risk? 
Sullivan's analysis of  QCIC cases involving fifty  non-financial  business 
firms  revealed that for  sixteen companies going bankrupt, only five  firms 
received SAS 59 [ AICPA, 1988] audit report modifications.  In addition, seven 
of  the remaining thirty-four  non-bankrupt companies also received a going con-
cern audit report modification.  Perhaps one reason for  auditors' difficulty  in 
issuing a modified  audit report, as noted by Elliott and Jacobson [1987], is that 
the issuance of  a going concern opinion itself  may serve as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy for  failure.  A second reason may be that the notion of  substantial 
doubt about the client organization's ability to continue operations as required 
by SAS 59 is not well defined  in the accounting or auditing literatures 
[Ellingsen, Pany and Fagan, 1989], thus causing ambiguity and possible error in 
auditors' going concern judgments [Solomon and Krogstad 1988]. Although 
auditors are not and have never been responsible for  forecasting  future  events, 
many believe that audit report modifications  for  going concern may be a prime 
source of  present and future  litigation for  public accounting firms.  On the other 
hand, Sullivan found  only three legal actions in his QCIC sample of  ninety 
firms  pertaining to an alleged failure  to provide a "red flag"  for  a company's 
insolvency. 
The relatively low bankruptcy prediction rate suggested by Sullivan's analy-
sis may indicate that the requirements brought about by SAS 59 are nearly 
impossible to attain. These same findings,  however, may have resulted from  the 
auditor's inability to accurately frame  predictions of  the client's financial  dis-
tress caused, in part, by ineffective  auditing procedures that do not consider 
important factors  within and outside the client organization. For example, based 
on the theory of  organizational decline, Ponemon and Schick [1991] found  that 
six qualitative factors  explain actual going concern problems in client organiza-
tions. In short, using these factors  in concert with financial  indicators, Ponemon 
and Schick [1991] suggest that auditors may be better able to frame  reliable pre-
dictive judgments of  client organizations and their managements.3 
The low incidence of  legal action caused by failure  to modify  an audit report 
for  continued existence may indicate that the additional paragraph required by 
SAS 59 may be of  little consequence to security holders and their attorneys 
when filing  suit against a firm.  Drawing from  Sullivan's reported findings,  how-
ever, I believe that a very different  story can be presented. As illustrated by the 
author's Table four,  eighty-six of  ninety QCIC cases of  alleged audit failure 
examined by Sullivan related to organizations that were either bankrupt or had 
experienced severe decline in earnings. One could reasonably conclude that 
allegations of  audit failure  and resulting litigations were greatly influenced  by 
the auditor's inability to predict the client's impending bankruptcy or financial 
distress. The complaint, as drafted  by lawyers, however, may be grounded on 
3 In a recent study by Schick and Ponemon [1993], auditor's assessments of  audit risk were related 
to their perceptions of  a client's rate of  growth or decline. Here auditors perceived the most risky 
clients as those that were experiencing very rapid growth or very rapid decline. These findings  may 
suggest that auditors are tacitly incorporating their perceptions of  organizational decline in their 
assessment of  the client organization's financial  well-being. 
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other related facts  that the plaintiff's  attorney believes will stand a greater 
chance of  being proven in court or that will generate a larger settlement sum. In 
other words, given Sullivan's data, it may be nearly impossible to assess the 
extent to which proper assessment of  going concern problems by the auditor 
would have mitigated a wide array of  litigation claims against audit firms. 
Furthermore, Palmrose [1991] found  that the auditor's inability to predict a 
client's impending financial  distress may have a profoundly  negative impact on 
the reputation of  an audit firm  because such allegations of  audit failure  are more 
likely than other incidents to be reported by the financial  press. 
According to Sullivan, a second area of  potential future  litigation risk con-
cerns the draft  report entitled Internal  Report— Integrated  Framework  pub-
lished in 1992 by the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of  the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). The COSO report deals with management's role in eval-
uating and reporting on the adequacy of  internal controls within the orga-
nizational setting. The report states (p. 8) that ethical values, integrity and com-
petence of  management are essential components to a well-functioning  system 
of  internal control. While these qualities are impossible to assess, and because a 
company's management would rarely disclose ethical problems to the public, it 
is possible that uncorroborated assertions about internal controls will be report-
ed by management. If,  however, internal control problems related to incompe-
tent or low integrity management are revealed to the public after  the fact,  audi-
tors may find  themselves victims of  lawsuits alleging that they failed  to proper-
ly consider management assertions about internal controls. 
While the report does not expressly require independent verification  of  man-
agement's reports on internal control, Sullivan intimates that a potential by-
product of  COSO recommendations when implemented may be increased litiga-
tion for  auditing firms.  Again I disagree with Sullivan's prediction because, if 
implemented properly, the COSO recommendations are intended to reduce inci-
dents of  undetected material weaknesses in an organization's internal control 
system. These improvements, in turn, should result in a commensurate re-
duction in lawsuits based on the auditor's failure  to detect or report on internal 
control problems. To corroborate my point, consider Sullivan's analysis of 
QCIC cases in which fifty-one  of  ninety allegations of  audit failure  involved 
internal control related problems in client organizations. 
Increasing malpractice litigation against audit firms  may be a sign that the 
public is demanding more from  the profession.  It appears that the so-called 
"expectations gap" between financial  statement users and auditors may be 
widening. Many auditing practitioners and researchers alike argue that the com-
plexity of  client organizations and the extent of  competition in the auditing ser-
vices market make it increasingly difficult  to render quality audit services at a 
reasonable price. Perhaps user demands for  attestation services beyond a level 
of  reasonable assurance make it imperative that independent audits be treated as 
public goods. While litigation is a form  of  social control over the profession,  if 
it has become needlessly excessive or abusive, efforts  to minimize legal expo-
sure are most definitely  warranted.4 On the other hand, however, increasing liti-
4 Robert Mednick [1987], partner of  Arthur Andersen & Co., makes a cogent argument for  tort 
reform.  He claims that limiting joint and several liability and restoring the privity standard should 
be the two top priorities of  the auditor litigation reform  efforts. 
70 
gation may well be indicative of  a reduction in the public trust, in which case 
other forms  of  social control may be necessary. 
At the risk of  opening a Pandora's box, in conclusion allow me to suggest 
that some sort of  external regulation may be the only solution acceptable to an 
increasingly mistrustful  public. In this respect, accountants are likely to be 
joined shortly by their counterparts in the legal and medical professions.  If  this 
is not acceptable, then attention must be paid to the real-world needs and con-
cerns of  the general public instead of  investing time and effort  in the protection 
of  "turf."  Self-regulation  can only work if  everyone affected,  rather than merely 
those being regulated, agrees that it is working and is satisfied  with the outcome 
of  the process. 
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Auditors' Judgments and Decisions Under Time 
Pressure: An Illustration and Agenda For Research1 
Ira Solomon 
Clifton  Brown 
University of  Illinois-Urbana 
Time limitation when acquiring and processing information  (i.e., time pres-
sure) is a structural feature  of  many judgments and decision contexts. In emer-
gency situations, for  example, physicians must process a variety of  information 
within critically small time spans to make diagnoses and identify  appropriate 
courses of  treatment. Similarly, after  leaving a huddle, a football  quarterback 
must appraise the formation  of  the defensive  team within no more than thirty 
seconds to determine if  a change in the planned offensive  play is warranted. 
Likewise, traders working within investment banking houses often  must decide 
within a highly constrained period of  time whether to buy, sell or hold specific 
securities based on a variety of  data about economic and political events. 
Various types of  time constraints are present in auditing contexts [AICPA, 
1978]. For example, auditors are required to perform  audit procedures within 
prescribed time limits (e.g., vouch a specified  number of  transactions to sup-
porting documents within a given period of  time). Consistently, auditors must 
meet various client-imposed (e.g., allow earnings to be released within six 
weeks of  the client's year end) and non-client-imposed deadlines (e.g., file  a 
10-K with the SEC by a specified  date). Although such time constraints have 
always been present within the audit context, it has been argued that recently 
they have increased as competition in the market for  audit services has 
increased [National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987]. 
While often  identified  as deleterious [AICPA, 1978; Alderman and Deitrick, 
1982; Kelly and Margheim, 1990], very little actually is known about the judg-
ment and decision effects  of  time pressure in audit and other applied contexts. 
Interestingly, in non-audit contexts, time constraints in the form  of  time budgets 
sometimes have been found  to enhance efficiency  [Pachella, 1974]. Although it 
has been argued that some time pressure may stimulate auditors to work harder 
and otherwise strive for  efficiencies  [Kelly and Seiler, 1982; Kermis and 
Mahapatra, 1985], no systematic evidence exists on functional  consequences of 
time pressure in auditing. Rather extant audit studies almost exclusively have 
1 The study described herein was funded  by KPMG Peat Marwick through a Research Opportunities 
in Auditing Grant. The authors also acknowledge the assistance of  John Naughton and personnel in 
the Chicago office  of  KPMG who have generously shared their insights on the issues upon which 
this paper is focused.  An earlier version of  this paper was presented in an accounting workshop at 
the University of  Florida. 
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addressed "audit quality" reductions as a consequence of  time pressure using 
one of  two research methods. 
In particular, surveys have been used by various researchers [Alderman and 
Deitrick, 1982; Kelly and Margheim, 1990] who primarily have focussed  on 
extreme time pressure and attendant auditor responses. Laboratory experimenta-
tion has been used by other researchers [McDaniel, 1990; 1992; Choo and Firth, 
1992] and, because auditor-subjects and audit tasks were employed, the experi-
mental studies have greater potential to elucidate audit time pressure effects 
than psychology studies which primarily have employed student subjects per-
forming  "generic" tasks. Experimental studies also have the usual advantage 
(vis-à-vis  audit time pressure survey studies) of  greater control and the con-
comitant advantage of  enhanced power. Unfortunately,  as is argued below, 
common features  of  the experimental studies limit what actually can be dis-
cerned about time pressure effects  in natural audit settings. As discussed later, 
the primary feature  of  concern is the restrictive way in which the experimental 
tasks have been defined  which, in turn, has restricted opportunities for  experi-
mental subjects to adapt  strategically to time pressures. In our view, this char-
acteristic of  prior research has constrained the experienced auditor from  demon-
strating an ability to cope with time pressure and, in turn, may have resulted in 
an overstatement of  the deleterious effects  of  audit time pressure. 
The purpose of  the present paper is to describe how research efforts  devoted 
to elucidating the effects  of  time pressure can be more profitably  spent. This 
objective is accomplished by describing the results of  an illustrative time pres-
sure experiment designed to mimic the features  of  the aforementioned  experi-
mental studies, developing a taxonomy for  analyzing audit time pressure ef-
fects,  and based on that taxonomy, describing an embryonic agenda for  future 
research on time pressure in audit contexts. We begin by describing the results 
of  the illustrative experiment which is focused  on the effects  of  time pressure on 
auditors' judgment policies. This experimental study is described first  so that it 
can serve as a vehicle for  highlighting the shortcomings of  extant audit time 
pressure research. In the subsequent section, using psychology research on 
adaptive judgment formulation  and decision making [Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson, 1988; 1990], we present and discuss a rudimentary taxonomy of  time 
pressure effects  in audit contexts. This taxonomy then is used to characterize 
extant research and, in the next section, to suggest how future  audit time pres-
sure research efforts  profitably  could be redirected. Following presentation of 
the resultant research agenda, concluding remarks complete the paper. 
An Experimental Illustration 
To illustrate how time pressure has been investigated in prior audit studies, 
we introduced time pressure into the experimental setting of  a recently pub-
lished paper [Brown and Solomon, 1990]. The focus  of  Brown and Solomon 
was auditor patterned (configural)  information  processing while assessing inter-
nal control risk. Introducing time pressure into such a study might be motivated 
by the simple recognition that time pressure is present in auditing and has been 
shown in psychology studies to cause judges and decision makers to: 1) be more 
erratic in usage of  their judgment policies [Rothstein, 1986], 2) restrict their 
focus  to a subset of  available information  cues [Wallsten and Barton, 1982; 
Wright, 1974; and Christensen-Szalanski, 1980], 3) alter global judgment and 
decision policies [Billings and Scherer, 1988], 4) access less relevant informa-
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tion [Bowden, 1985] and 5) make less risky choices [Ben Zur and Brenitz, 
1981]. To facilitate  comparison with non-time pressured results, the same mode 
of  analysis, analysis of  variance (ANOVA), is used to represent each auditor-
subject's information-processing  strategy. The specific  research question to be 
investigated is: 
Time pressure will have an inverse impact on the extent of  auditors' con-
figural  information  processing. That is, the proportion of  judgment vari-
ance attributable by an ANOVA judgment model to expected interactions 
will decrease (increase) as time pressure increases (decreases). 
The Audit Judgment Task 
The experimental task, more fully  described in Brown and Solomon [1990], 
is assessment of  interrelated internal controls in clients' information  and busi-
ness control systems. The specific  control system component is cash disburse-
ments and, in particular, assessment of  the risk that cash disbursements are 
materially misstated as a result of  checks being written and/or disbursed for  im-
proper (unauthorized/invalid) purposes. Within control systems, a weakness 
(i.e, increased risk of  misstated financial  statements) caused by the absence of  a 
control (e.g., separation of  duties such as check signing and cash disbursement 
processing/recording) may be at least partially offset  by the presence of  another 
control (e.g., an independent, second check signer). Further, strengths due to the 
presence of  a control (e.g., the separation of  cash disbursements duties) may be 
amplified  by the addition of  another control (e.g., internal audit of  payments). 
The information-processing  strategies appropriate for  evaluating such an 
internal control system component is configural  in nature (also see Hitt and 
Barr, [1989]). In particular, this strategy involves the fully  conditional question, 
"Is the primary separation-of-cash-disbursements-duties  control present?" 
When the auditor's answer to this question is "yes," another question must be 
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asked: "Are other controls present that amplify  the primary control's effective-
ness?" When the auditor's answer to this other question is "yes," the risk of 
improper cash disbursements is lower than when the answer is "no." However, 
when the auditor's answer to the first  question is "no," a different  question must 
be asked: "Are other controls present that compensate for  the weakness caused 
by the primary control's absence?" When the auditor's answer to this question 
is "no," the risk of  improper cash disbursements should be judged to be higher 
than when the answer is "yes" (when the answer is "yes," the risk could be as 
low as when the separation-of-cash-disbursements-duties  control is present). 
When this judgment strategy is modeled using ANOVA, a significant  portion 
of  improper-cash-disbursement-risk judgment variance will be accounted for  by 
ordinal interactions between the primary and secondary internal controls (see 
Panels A and B in Figure 1 for  graphic representations), as well as by the main 
effects  for  the controls that are involved in those interactions. Further, these 
interactions, because of  their ordinal forms,  will account for  less judgment vari-
ation within the described judgment strategies than the main effects  for  the 
interactions' component controls. 
Subjects 
The initial subject pool consisted of  seventy-four  CPAs with three to four 
years of  experience in financial-statement  auditing (in addition to having col-
lege degrees with majors in accounting), and were employed by the same large, 
international CPA firm.  Auditors with three-four  years of  experience have per-
formed  as part of  actual audits the task employed in this study. Further, drawing 
the subjects from  those with similar extent of  experience should, at least in part, 
control for  differences  in task knowledge between subjects. 
The subjects participated either in one of  the firm's  offices  (twelve subjects) 
or while attending a technical training school run by the firm  (sixty-two sub-
jects). Based upon a pre-test (described below), twenty-three of  these subjects 
participated in the current study. 
Variables 
The research design was a completely randomized one-factor  design involv-
ing a pre- and a post-test. The single factor  was time pressure which was manip-
ulated at two levels: self-regulated  (i.e., no time pressure) and a per-judgment 
time limit (i.e., time pressure). Because other constructs can differ  between sub-
jects that could affect  information  processing abilities (e.g., reading compre-
hension of  task materials and task familiarity),  time pressure was defined  rela-
tive to each individual. Under time pressure, therefore,  a subject's per-judgment 
time limit was defined  to be one-half  of  the average per-judgment time taken for 
his (her) last eight pre-test judgments (see below).2 
Nested within both the pre- and post-test is a within-subjects one-half  frac-
tional replication of  a 25 factorial  manipulation of  task information  cues. This 
factorial  manipulation involved five  information  cues specific  to the internal 
control assessment task, each cue at two levels. An example of  the task stimuli 
is presented in Exhibit 1. One control question (D) contains three related sepa-
2 A number of  time-pressure "fractions  were examined in a pilot test using CPAs. The fraction  "one-
half  was selected based on a desire to induce an effect  but to not overwhelm the subject's ability to 
perform  meaningfully  the task. 
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Exhibit 1 
An Example of  a Cash Disbursement Internal Controls Questionnaire 
Control Question Yes No 
A. Are protective writing devices used to inscribe amounts on checks? X 
B. Are properly approved vouchers required for  check preparation? X 
C. Are all check signers designated by the Board of  Directors? X 
D. Are the primary check signers independent of: 
1. Purchasing and those requesting expenditures? X 
2. Persons approving vouchers? X 
3. Persons processing and recording cash disbursements? X 
E. Is an independent second check signer required who carefully 
scrutinizes the supporting documentation? X 
F. Does internal audit investigate payments made to payees not on 
an independently approved payee listing? X 
Given the controls as represented above, assess the RISK that cash disbursements could be 
materially misstated AS A RESULT OF checks being written and/or disbursed for  improper 
(unauthorized and/or invalid) purposes. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
NO MAXIMUM 
RISK RISK 
ration-of-cash-disbursements-duties  controls. Another control question (E) is a 
preventive cash disbursements control, and still another control question (F) is a 
detective cash disbursements control. The remainder of  the control questions (A 
through C) were intended to be cash disbursements controls not highly related 
to the stated cash disbursements control objective. Five of  the six control ques-
tions (A, C, D2 and D3 jointly, E and F) were factorially  manipulated at two 
levels each (Yes or No), and two questions (B and D1) were held constant 
(Yes). Subjects were asked to assess the risk of  a material misstatement in cash 
disbursement accounts. The risk assessments were elicited on a 100-point scale, 
where zero was no risk and 100 was maximum risk. Consistent with Brown and 
Solomon [1990], the predicted effects  are interactions involving two pairs of 
control questions (D2/D3 and E; and D2/D3 and F). 
An ANOVA judgment-model was computed for  each auditor's risk assess-
ments. Although each auditor judgment-model estimated all main effects  (5) 
and two-way interactions (10), the higher-order (three, four  and five-way)  inter-
actions were aliases of  the estimated effects  and thus, were assumed to be negli-
gible. In addition, because each auditor-model has only one observation per 
cell, such models are determined fully  and no error estimate exists. The judg-
ment variance attributed to each term within an auditor-model, therefore,  was 
computed by dividing the sum of  squares for  the term by the total sum of 
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squares for  the model. Further, an arbitrary criterion of  greater than or equal to 
four  percent of  total judgement variance was used to determine significance 
(i.e., terms with less than four  percent of  total judgment variance are assumed to 
have been caused by random variation rather than systematic effects). 3 
The following  dependent measures were determined for  each individual: 
M i j 1 = V i j 2 - V i j 1 , 
where V i j n is the proportion of  judgment variance that the ith individual's 
model attributed to the jth dependent variable of  interest determined both from 
the pre-test (n=1) and the experiment (n=2). The dependent variable (M i j 1) is 
further  categorized into each individual's random assignment to the time pres-
sure (1=1,2) variable. The dependent variables of  interest were expected inter-
actions, main effects  of  expected interaction component controls, all above-cri-
terion main effects,  all above-criterion interactions, and below-criterion judg-
ment variance. 
Procedures 
The laboratory session consisted of  three sections: training, pre-testing and 
testing. All sections were presented on personal computers, and subjects com-
pleted the sections at their own pace (other than the time-pressured condition in 
the testing section). The training section began with brief  instructions on the 
personal computer, and was followed  by a practice case involving the general 
task but set in a context different  from  the pre-testing/testing case. The practice 
case was intended to allow subjects to gain familiarity  with the response scale 
and the decisions aids available in the subsequent sections. The decision aids 
were intended to reduce subject memory load and to control extraneous vari-
ance.4 The training section continued with presentation of  the internal control 
case, and was followed  by a blank copy of  the task stimuli and additional 
instructions (see Appendix A).5 The subjects then responded to a series of  ques-
tions designed to stimulate prior thought about each item listed in their stimuli 
and its relation to the specific  audit objective for  which they were being asked 
to make risk assessments. 
In the pre-testing section, the subjects were presented sequentially with the 
sixteen judgment trials (internal control questionnaires) from  one of  the half-
replications (randomized over subjects). The order of  the judgment trials (i.e., 
information  combinations) within each half-replication  was randomized for 
each subject. In addition, the order of  the stimuli items in the judgment trials 
was counter-balanced; one-half  of  the subjects received one order and the other 
one-half  received a second order. Upon completion of  the pre-test half-replica-
3 Results of  a pilot study (n=12) employing a full  twenty-five  factorial  design and earlier versions of 
the cases, indicated that effects  > 2 percent of  total risk assessment variation were significant  when 
using the higher-order (three-, four-,  and five-way)  interactions as error estimates. 
4 The two decision aids were an electronic file  and a logical consistency checker. When assessing 
risk, the subject had access to an electronic file  of  judgement trials that he or she had already evalu-
ated (previous evaluations could not be changed). As the subject worked through the judgment tri-
als, the computer reviewed their assessments for  logical consistency (i.e., dominance conditions). If 
the computer detected an apparent logical inconsistency, that fact  was displayed, and the subject had 
the option of  either changing or maintaining his or her assessment of  the current judgement trial. 
5 The subjects were instructed 1) to ignore the temporal sequence of  the judgement trials and 2) that 
the trials would represent a mixture of  possible situations. Further, the subjects were told that, 
although some situations may occur less frequently  than others in practice, they should not allow 
such frequency  to affect  their risk assessments. 
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Table 1 
Mean Risk Assessments Over Levels of Expected Interaction Terms Within Judgment Models 
Interaction Time 
Pre-Test 
Expected Interaction levels' 
Post-Test 
Expected Interaction Levels' 





7 32.20 52 00 54 30 60 70 
5 13.50 49 80 64.00 70 50 
8 20.10 27.10 38.10 68.70 
6 16.40 26.70 31.20 62.30 
30 40 42.10 49 80 58 20 
15 00 48 50 62 00 73.50 
20.40 28.00 49 90 63.30 
15.70 28.50 32.90 60.20 
*The expected interaction levels are labeled as follows: variable 1 (variable 2) is the first (second) element in a 
label, and "+" and"-" is the variable level. Both the variable and variable levels are the same as identifed in 
tion, the percent of  judgment variance attributable to the appropriate interaction 
was calculated for  each subject.6 When this percent was less than the four  per-
cent of  total judgment variance criterion, the subject's participation in the ex-
periment was ended. Alternatively, when this percent was greater than the crite-
rion, the subject continued to the testing section of  the experiment. Using this 
pre-test to filter  those subjects who had not yet learned the appropriate judg-
ment strategy should at least partially control for  task knowledge differences 
between subjects. 
Continuing subjects next were randomly assigned to one of  the two levels of 
the time pressure variable (i.e., either no time pressure or time pressure). 
Subjects assigned to the time pressure condition were informed  of  their per-
judgment time limit (as well as the basis for  determining such limit). Following 
this, subjects were presented sequentially with the sixteen judgment trials from 
the other half-replication.  Procedures for  these trials were the same as for  the 
pre-test, except for  those subjects with judgment time limits. After  completing 
these judgment trials, the subjects responded to a post-experimental question-
naire. 
As a validity check, each subject's expected pre-test interaction was inspect-
ed. Table 1 presents the mean risk assessments across the levels of  the expected 
interactions for  each level of  time pressure. Since two possible ordinal interac-
tion forms  (compensating and amplifying)  were expected for  the internal con-
trol evaluation task, the means for  both forms  are presented. The inspections 
disclose that each subject's pre-test interaction was in a form  consistent with the 
expectation (see Figure 1 for  the expected forms). 
Time pressure had a significant  effect  on changes in proportion of  judgment 
variance attributed to the expected interactions. The proportions of  judgment 
variance attributed to the expected interactions exhibited greater changes from  a 
non-time pressured pre-test to a post-test when subjects' post-tests were time 
pressured. When the post-test was not time pressured, the mean change (from 
pre-test to post-test) in the proportion of  judgment variance attributed to the 
expected interactions was -1.56 (from  8.68 to 7.12 percent of  judgment vari-
ance, see Table 2). When the post-test was time pressured, however, the mean 
change was -5.76 (from  8.13 to 2.46 percent of  judgment variance, see Table 2). 
The decline in judgment variance attributed to the expected interactions was 
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significantly  greater when the post-test was time pressured than when it was not 
time pressured (t(21) = 2.85; p<0.002). 
Time pressure also had significant  effects  on changes in the amount of 
below-criterion judgment variance (i.e., judgment error). The proportions of 
below-criterion judgment variance exhibited greater changes from  a non-time 
pressured pre-test to a post-test when subjects' post-tests were time pressured. 
When the post-test was not time pressured, the mean change (from  pre-test to 
post-test) was -0.71 decreasing from  9.28 to 8.57 percent of  judgment variance. 
When the post-test was time pressured, however, the mean change was 4.44 
increasing from  6.49 to 10.94 percent of  judgment variance. 
In sum, auditor-subjects' information  processing strategies as captured by 
ANOVA judgment models were affected  significantly  by the imposition of  time 
pressure. Generally, time pressure resulted in a decrease in configural  informa-
tion processing (as captured by the sum of  all above-criterion interaction terms 
as well as the expected interaction terms). Furthermore, this decrease in config-
ural information  processing was accompanied by an increase in both non-
configural  processing (as captured by the sum of  all above-criterion main 
effects)  and in judgment instability (as captured by the sum of  below-criterion 
terms). 
Discussion 
To the extent that configural  information  processing is believed to be appro-
priate in connection with the experimental task, time pressure would be viewed 
as having had a deleterious effect  on the auditor-subjects' performance.  Such a 
conclusion would be consistent with expectations based on: 1) audit studies 
reporting survey data concerned with pathological time-pressure responses such 
as premature sign-off  [Kelly and Margheim, 1990; Alderman and Deitrick, 
1982], 2) psychology studies using student subjects who generally would be 
expected to have little knowledge of,  or experience in, managing the time pres-
sures created in their experimental tasks [e.g., Rothstein, 1986; Wright, 1974], 
and 3) the few  extant experimental studies using auditor subjects. 
Elaborating on the experimental auditing studies, Choo and Firth [1992] 
described a study in which auditor-subjects assessed the risk that recorded 
accounts receivable did not exist under one of  three levels of  time pressure. The 
auditor subjects were given evidence from  specified  audit procedures (e.g., con-
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firmation,  inspection of  subsequent collections, etc.) as the basis for  their risk 
assessments.7 This task is the same as that of  experiment one in Brown and 
Solomon [1991], and although both studies were focussed  on configural  pro-
cessing, Choo and Firth introduced time pressure in an effort  to increase exter-
nal validity. The results of  Choo and Firth were consistent with those of  the 
experimental illustration—configural  processing was reduced by time pressure. 
Other recent experimental studies of  time pressure effects  in audit settings 
include the two related studies by McDaniel [1990; 1992]. In these studies, 
auditor-subjects performed  an experimental task related to the year-end invento-
ry audit procedures for  a hypothetical auditee. Her subjects, assigned to one of 
two levels of  time pressure in McDaniel [1990] and one of  four  levels of  time 
pressure in McDaniel [1992], were required to identify  and document seeded 
pricing and omission errors relevant to finished  goods inventory and the related 
reserve account. For each of  four  objectives (completeness and valuation for  the 
inventory asset and reserve accounts), the auditor-subjects determined which 
audit procedure to apply, the sample selection method and sample size to 
employ, and the conclusions to be reached based on the resultant evidence. 
McDaniel's [1990] results were that time pressure decreased audit effective-
ness, enhanced audit efficiency  only when the time pressure manipulation was 
extreme, and had enhanced auditor consistency by eliminating overly large sam-
ple sizes. Although McDaniel [1992] used the same task as McDaniel [1990], 
the focus  of  the later study was different.  For present purposes, the most ger-
mane of  her results was that when faced  with time pressure, auditors may 
change the decision-making strategy they employ. 
The results of  these studies generally are consistent-time pressure had a 
largely deleterious effect  on auditor judgment and decision making. Before 
etching this general proposition in stone, however, it is instructive to consider 
some of  the features  of  the experimental illustration and the other experimental 
studies of  auditor judgments and decisions under time pressure. In particular, 
notice that in both the illustrative experiment and Choo and Firth [1992], time 
pressure was unknown to the auditor until he/she was to perform  a specific  task. 
Further, these tasks were rather rigidly defined  such that the auditor could only 
adopt limited tactical measures (e.g., work faster).  Specifically  precluded, there-
fore,  were strategic measures to negate the effects  of  time pressure, such as 
bringing more resources to bear on the task, altering the audit strategy, and re-
defining  the scope of  the task.8 
While some additional tactical measures could be adopted, constraints on 
strategic responses also were effectively  imposed on the auditor-subjects in the 
7 Choo and Eggleton [1982] also investigated time-pressure effects  using auditor-subjects. The 
results of  that study are similar to that of  the present illustrative study with the exception that con-
figural  processing seemed to be greater under time pressure than under no time pressure. This result 
should be interpreted with caution, however, because configural  processing was measured on an ex 
post basis as the sum of  all two- and three-way interactions rather than on an ex ante basis for  pre-
dicted interactions. In addition, the time pressure manipulation in Choo and Eggleton was between-
subjects and there only were five  subjects in each condition. 
8 In this paper strategic responses are considered to be the establishment of  audit goals and objec-
tives as well as management control required to implement such goals and policies (e.g., audit pro-
gram planning, audit work assignments, and review of  audit work). Tactical responses, on the other 
hand, are considered to be the methods and procedures employed to effectively  and efficiently  per-
form  the planned audit tasks. These definitions  are similar to those employed by the management 
control literature [Anthony. Dearden and Govidarajan, 1992]. 
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McDaniel [1990; 1992] studies. Nevertheless, McDaniel [1992], did report 
some evidence that auditors' behavior may be contingent upon task and context 
features  such as time pressure. Consistently, a study by Kermis and Mahapatra 
[1985] also reported evidence suggesting that auditors take various tactical steps 
to cope with time pressure depending upon its severity. For example, it was 
reported by Kermis and Mahapatra that the amount of  time devoted to some 
audit procedures may be reduced while the time allocated to other procedures 
may be increased.9 Although some audit time pressure studies have permitted 
limited tactical responses to audit time pressure, no study has investigated 
strategic responses. Because various strategic options are available to auditors 
in the field,  this is a serious limitation of  audit time pressure research which 
may have caused both an overstatement of  the deleterious effects  of  time pres-
sure on auditor judgments and decisions and constrained the experienced audi-
tor from  demonstrating a superior ability (e.g., relative to students) to cope with 
such pressure. 
The Adaptive Audit Decision Maker: 
A Time-Pressure Taxonomy 
For many years, psychology researchers have argued that judgment and deci-
sion processes as well as the judgments and decisions themselves are influenced 
by a variety of  considerations. More recently, psychology researchers began to 
recognize that judgment formulation  and decision making may be characterized 
by a two-stage process in which the goal of  the first  stage is "deciding how to 
decide" while the second stage goal is to execute the chosen judgment and deci-
sion process [Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1988; 1990]. The conventional wis-
dom has become that during the first  stage of  this process (deciding how to 
decide), the judge/decision maker selects an approach which he or she perceives 
to be most appropriate for  the task at hand [Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Payne, 
1982]. Perceptions of  the appropriateness of  judgment and decision strategies 
have been shown to be influenced  by a variety of  factors  including justifiability 
[Tversky, 1972] and cognitive effort  considerations [Simon, 1955]. Since time 
pressure can be directly related to cognitive effort  (i.e., constrained time gener-
ally requires increased cognitive effort),  the perspective of  people as strategic 
and adaptive decision makers has important, but heretofore  largely unrecog-
nized, implications for  investigating time pressure effects  in audit settings. 
In considering potential time pressure effects  within the auditing environ-
ment it is useful  to employ the taxonomy shown in Figure 2. This taxonomy is 
structured around three variables: whether time pressure was anticipated by the 
decision maker (operationalized as either "yes" or "no"); the extent of  the deci-
sion maker's knowledge about the potential time- pressure effects  within the 
specific  tasks being performed  (operationalized as either "high" or "low"); and 
the nature of  the time-pressure phenomena (either deadline or budget). 
A structural feature  of  audit-engagement time pressure is the nature of  the 
phenomena. That is, time pressure can be manifest  either as "deadline" or as 
9 Kermis and Mahapatra [1985] was an experimental investigation in which time pressure was 
manipulated bewteen-subjects at four  levels (ranging from  no pressure to a 30% reduction from 
prior year's actual hours). The experimental materials, however, were mailed to the subjects. This 
procedural dimension differentiates  the Kermis and Mahapatra study from  the laboratory ex-
periments mentioned earlier. 
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Figure 2 
Time Pressures in Auditing: A Taxonomy 
Anticipation of Pressure 
Yes no 
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"budgetary" pressure. The increasing levels of  competition within public audit-
ing has resulted in substantial pressure to perform  within increasingly stricter 
limits on audit resources allocated to an engagement. The most significant 
(costly) audit resource is auditor labor. Auditors, therefore,  are not only given 
constrained amounts of  time to perform  tasks but are required to account on a 
task-by-task basis for  the amount of  time they actually take to complete each 
major portion of  a task. Thus, budgetary pressure may arise because of  con-
straints on the resources to be allocated in accomplishing particular tasks. For 
example, a requirement that a client's annual audit engagement be completed 
using no more than 200 staff  hours would represent a budgetary pressure. On 
the other hand, deadline pressure may arise when there is a particular point in 
time by which specific  tasks must be complete. For example, a requirement by 
the client that the annual audit opinion be delivered within six weeks of  the fis-
cal year-end may create deadline pressure. These two time-pressure manifesta-
tions, however, may not be entirely independent. For example, one strategy for 
dealing with an unanticipated deadline would be to bring additional audit 
resources to bear in completing the required tasks which, in turn, may create a 
budgetary pressure. 
Within the auditing environment, the extent to which time pressure can be 
anticipated is a critical feature  that separates coping mechanisms into strategic 
and tactical responses. That is, when they are able to anticipate time pressure, 
auditors can strategically modify  the planned audit program to cope with such 
pressure. For example, an expected budgetary pressure could be met with a re-
duction of  substantive tests-of-details  in favor  of  analytical procedures within 
certain areas (e.g., a retailer's fixed  assets) such that sufficient  resources are 
maintained for  other areas (e.g., the retailer's cash receipts and inventories). On 
the other hand, when the time pressure has not been anticipated, many strategic 
responses are precluded and coping may be restricted to tactical responses of  a 
more immediate nature. In the previous illustration, for  example, having per-
formed  planned substantive procedures in a given area precludes reduction of 
such procedures to cope with an unanticipated pressure that arises during the 
execution of  the audit program. When such pressure is an unanticipated dead-
line (e.g., the underwriter of  an IPO wanting the stock issue to be effective  a 
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month earlier than planned) the only effective  response may be to bring addi-
tional audit resources to bear (again, potentially inducing unanticipated bud-
getary pressure). 
Another feature  critical in determining the extent and nature of  time-pressure 
effects  is the auditor's knowledge concerning the dysfunctional  effects  that can 
be caused by the pressure and his or her knowledge of  effective  strategies and 
tactical responses that can be employed to mitigate such effects.  Such knowl-
edge may be more affective  in nature, learned through abstraction and general-
ization of  audit experiences, than learned as a set of  principles within a struc-
tured educational environment. If  so, practicing auditors who have more experi-
ence with audit engagement time pressures should have greater knowledge of 
both time-pressure effects  and coping strategies and tactics. Audit situations in 
which auditors' time pressure-related knowledge was low, therefore,  would not 
be expected to occur frequently.  It is true that junior-level auditors may not 
have acquired sufficient  knowledge with which to understand fully  potential 
time-pressure dysfunctionalities  and to know appropriate responses for  coping 
with such problems. However, viewing audit planning and performance  as a 
team-based technology, senior-level members of  the audit team should have 
sufficient  knowledge (although some audit failures  may have been due, in part, 
to a lack of  such knowledge within the team-as-a-whole). Thus, adequate super-
vision should facilitate  appropriate responses to all but the most rapidly occur-
ring time pressures. The inclusion of  "low" knowledge cells in the taxonomy is 
to facilitate  discussion of  extant academic research involving time pressure. 
Such research largely has employed subjects who, arguably, had low knowledge 
concerning time pressure effects  and appropriate coping mechanisms within the 
experimental tasks in which they were required to perform. 
Analyzing the earlier experiment and Choo and Firth [1992] in terms of  the 
taxonomy presented above, the nature of  the time pressure was budgetary. In 
particular, the amount of  time that could be allocated to making the judgments 
required by the experimental task was limited physically. Since the possibility 
of  time pressure was not known by the subjects until it was imposed, these 
experiments involved unanticipated time-pressure. Additionally, the subjects 
were audit seniors with significant  auditing experience. Given the pre-test in 
which such subjects were filtered  based on their ability to configurally  process 
the information,  all subjects in the illustrative experiment could be assumed to 
have high knowledge of  the underlying phenomena (i.e., controls effective  in 
ensuring that the objectives of  cash disbursements authorization and validity are 
being met). In Choo and Firth, no such pre-test was employed. With respect to 
the subjects' knowledge about appropriate mechanisms for  coping with the spe-
cific  form  of  budgetary pressure employed in the experiment, neither study pro-
vided any evidence. Consequently, we consider the illustrative experiment and 
Choo and Firth to fall  in cell No.7 of  Figure 2, although we acknowledge that a 
case could be made for  cell No. 8. 
In the McDaniel [1990; 1991] studies, the time pressure was budgetary and 
the subjects were audit seniors who should be experienced at performing  the 
experimental tasks. While not specifically  tested in the studies, it is reasonable 
to assume that subjects had sufficient  knowledge of  the underlying phenomenon 
(i.e., substantive testing in connection with the inventory asset and reserve 
accounts) as well as limited experience in coping with the budgetary pressure 
introduced into the experiment. In these respects the McDaniel studies were 
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similar to the illustrative study and to a somewhat lesser extent, Choo and Firth 
[1992]. Also similar, time pressure was not known by the subjects until it was 
imposed. In one important respect, however, the McDaniel studies were differ-
ent from  the other studies. That is, the auditor-subjects were given a little more 
opportunity to use tactical measures to cope with time pressure than in the other 
studies. For example, in the McDaniel studies, the auditors could elect to per-
form  procedures in a specified  order or adjust the order in which they were per-
formed  so that those procedures thought to be more important could be accom-
plished within the allotted time. Nevertheless, the best placement of  the 
McDaniel studies would seem to be cell No. 7 of  Figure 2. 
Audit Time Pressure: An Agenda For Research 
In the preceding section, because the auditor-subjects in each of  the experi-
mental studies reviewed were unaware of  the time pressure until it was 
imposed, it was argued that they were able to adopt some tactical measures 
(e.g., accelerate decision-making, filter  information,  reduce or eliminate more 
complex, and thus more time consuming, configural  cue processing), but were 
effectively  precluded from  employing virtually all strategic mechanisms for 
coping with the pressure. It is our contention that while such situations may be 
of  interest (especially to those interested in applying theories of  harassed deci-
sion making in the audit setting; see Wright, [1974]), to the extent that the goal 
is to paint an objective picture of  the affect  of  time pressure on audit judgments 
and decisions, audit researchers would seem to have over-invested in these 
types of  studies. Further, we contend that one potential consequence of  such 
over-investment is that little presently is known about how and  how well  audi-
tors use strategic  measures in situations for  which time pressures are anticipat-
ed.  A second-order consequence, therefore,  as noted earlier, is that audit re-
search may have overstated the negative consequences of  time pressure. 
Our agenda for  audit time pressure research has both descriptive and evalua-
tive foci  and thus, will address the following  general questions: 
1. What strategies are adopted by knowledgeable auditors to cope with 
anticipated budgetary time pressures? 
2. In what situations do knowledgeable auditors consider these potential 
strategies to be more or less appropriate? 
a. How are such strategies related, if  at all, to the nature and timing of 
the tasks being performed  (e.g., planning audit procedures versus 
executing planned procedures)? 
b. How effective  and efficient  are these strategies (i.e., what are their 
relative costs and benefits)? 
3. To what extent do knowledgeable auditors, when they anticipate bud-
getary time pressure, select the most appropriate strategies? 
To illustrate how these general questions might be operationalized within 
specific  audit contexts, in the remainder of  this section, we identify  select exam-
ples from  the perspective of  cell No. 5 of  Figure 2. Importantly, we also will 
argue that different  research methods (e.g., laboratory experiments, field  experi-
ments, fields  studies) should be employed depending upon the question to be 
addressed and the current state of  knowledge with respect to that question. We 
have selected cell No. 5 because it provides a striking contrast with the cell 
(No. 7) in which the extant research would appear and because it represents 
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frequently  occurring circumstances. Cell No. 5 would arise, for  example, if  an 
audit firm  were to secure a new or continuing engagement through a competi-
tive bidding process which resulted in a relatively low audit fee.  In turn, this 
low audit fee,  is assumed to create budgetary time pressure which is known at 
the onset. Additionally, the auditors are assumed to have the requisite minimum 
task knowledge and are assumed to be experienced in such task performance 
under time pressure. 
An interesting starting point is to consider that if  time pressure were antici-
pated early in the audit, it may be possible for  the auditor to deal with it during 
audit planning by making strategic  administrative  assignments.  That is, in 
assigning auditors to the engagement, it may be possible to substitute more 
experienced and knowledgeable auditors for  less experience/knowledgeable 
auditors in various facets  of  the engagement. Such substitution would seem to 
have at least two potential benefits.  First, to the extent that more experienced/ 
knowledgeable auditors take less time to perform  audit procedures, a direct time 
savings may result. Second, to the extent that more experienced/knowledgeable 
auditors perform  more effectively,  it may be possible to subject their work to a 
somewhat less exhaustive review process. Consistently, even if  the review 
process itself  were not modified,  it would seem reasonable to expect that more 
experienced/knowledgeable auditors would spend less time clearing review 
notes etc. Although strategic administrative choices would seem to be an obvi-
ous mechanism for  coping with audit time pressure, little presently is known 
about the staff  assignment process within audit organizations either in the 
absence or presence of  time pressure. Both descriptive and evaluative research 
of  this type, therefore,  would seem to be of  value. 
Another strategic aspect of  audit planning and administration concerns the 
extent to which audit technology is to be used on an engagement. For example, 
it may be possible to cope, at least partially, with anticipated budgetary time 
pressure by using sophisticated technology such as expert systems. It also may 
be possible to use technology to perform  more extensive and powerful  analyt-
ical procedures [Bailey, Graham and Hansen, 1988]. Closely related to such 
technological options is the choice among the various approaches to producing 
sufficient,  competent audit evidence. That is, as is well known, audit evidence 
may be produced using various mixes of  audit procedures. For example, under 
anticipated budgetary time pressure, auditors may be less likely to plan to per-
form  extensive tests-of-details  or more or less likely to attempt to rely on the 
client's control structure. Auditors also may be more or less likely to use statis-
tical approaches to planning audit sampling. While descriptive research on these 
potential time pressure coping mechanisms would be of  considerable value, it 
also should be obvious that there are attendant audit effectiveness  implications. 
We next shift  our focus  from  strategic planning and administration to strate-
gic execution of  audit activities. For reasons of  expositional parsimony, we 
restrict our focus  to one class of  audit procedures— analytical procedures. This 
class was chosen because performing  analytical procedures requires the auditor 
to perform  the various component judgment and decision activities (i.e., prob-
lem representation, hypothesis formulation,  information  search, information 
processing and hypothesis testing, action choice) found  elsewhere in the audit. 
Consequently, much of  what is presented may be readily generalized to other 
procedure classes. 
The shift  from  planning to an execution perspective, makes salient a variety 
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of  fundamental  questions. In particular, descriptive research on the impact of 
time pressure on each of  the component judgment and decision activities would 
seem to be of  value. For example, how does anticipated budgetary time pressure 
impact auditors' information  search activities and hypothesis-testing strategies? 
At a more basic level, questions like the following  might be posed about auditor 
behavior when faced  with anticipated budgetary time pressure relative to non-
pressured situations: (1) Are auditors more or less pre-disposed to employ sta-
tistical approaches to analytical review? (2) Are auditors more or less pre-dis-
posed to employ decision aids to facilitate  hypothesis formulation?  (3) Do audi-
tors plan to test hypothesis sets which are truncated to a greater or lesser extent? 
(4) Do auditors plan to sequentially test hypotheses and are they predisposed to 
focus  first  on those hypotheses which are more favorable  to the client (e.g., non-
error explanations for  analytical review fluctuations)?  (5) Do auditors make 
greater use of  positive-test strategies? and (6) To what extent are the answers to 
questions like those just posed dependent upon client-specific  factors  (e.g., in-
dustry, risk level etc.)? Again, these are but a few  of  the questions which might 
be addressed to shed light on strategic audit execution under time pressure. 
Shifting  from  execution to the perspective of  a strategic  audit  review 
process, illustrative research questions would seem to be manyfold,  but two are 
most salient. First, how and to what extent do auditors vary the nature and 
extent of  their review activities as a consequence of  time-pressured audit plan-
ning and execution? To elaborate, as previously noted, if  especially experi-
enced/knowledgeable auditors were assigned to the engagement because of  the 
anticipation of  budgetary time pressure, a strategic reviewer might perform  a 
less exhaustive analysis of  portions of  the working papers. In such situations, 
descriptive research documenting the nature of  the strategic review process 
modifications  would seem to be of  value. Second, to what extent does the audit 
review process result in the addition of  audit procedures etc., which may have 
been trimmed during initial execution due to time pressure? 
Before  concluding this section, a few  comments are in order about research 
methods for  investigating questions like those just described and motivations 
for  incorporating time pressure into research contexts. With respect to the for-
mer issue, because different  research methods have different  comparative 
advantages, it would seem to be a mistake to rely to the same extent as prior 
audit time-pressure research on surveys and laboratory experiments. Rather, we 
believe that field  surveys and experiments are appropriate methods to use dur-
ing theory building to investigate many of  the descriptive questions just speci-
fied.  As is the case for  research focussed  on other issues, such methods would 
seem to have the comparative advantage of  facilitating  identification  of  relevant 
variables. In addition, when investigating the audit effectiveness  implications of 
identified  time-pressure coping mechanisms, field  studies would seem to be 
invaluable. For example, field  studies could be conducted to determine the fre-
quency with which audit failures  arise from  time-pressured audit engagements 
as well as the strategic actions taken, if  any, which failed  to effectively  over-
come the time pressure. Only after  the resultant theory has been sufficiently 
developed would laboratory experimentation be efficient. 
Lastly, it recently has been argued that greater representation within research 
contexts of  important audit contextual features  will be critical to the next gener-
ation of  audit judgment and decision research studies [Solomon and Shields, 
1993]. Because time pressure is an ubiquitous feature  of  audit contexts which 
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can have a pervasive impact on auditor judgment and decision making, 
researchers may want to incorporate time pressure into studies designed to 
investigate other audit-judgment and decision-making issues. To illustrate, con-
siderable research has been reported in which the focus  was auditor expertise 
and/or experience effects  [e.g., Davis and Solomon, 1989]. With a few  excep-
tions, those studies have been unable to identify  systematic experience or exper-
tise effects.  But the contexts of  these studies have been rather undeveloped, 
generally not incorporating features  like multi-person interaction, review 
process feedback,  accountability, and time pressure which, in concert, distin-
guish auditing from  other judgment and decision making contexts. One possibil-
ity is that contextual features  like time pressure interact with other aspects of 
judgment and decision making such that the presence of  time pressure is a nec-
essary (or sufficient)  condition for  such aspects to be revealed. Thus, it may be 
that in the presence of  time pressure experienced auditors' judgment and deci-
sion making will exhibit some characteristics often  associated with expertise but 
not (or less so) when time pressure is absent. For example, auditors under time 
pressure may exhibit some parallel information  search and processing strategies 
whereas only serial strategies may be evident when time pressure is absent. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have reviewed extant judgment and decision research on 
the effects  of  time pressure in auditing, described a representative time-pressure 
experimental study, critically analyzed the extant research (including our illus-
trative study), provided a taxonomy for  investigating audit time-pressure effects 
and, based on the taxonomy, described an embryonic agenda for  redirecting 
audit research efforts.  While this agenda was fleshed  out on an illustrative, but 
not exhaustive, basis only for  one of  the cells in the taxonomy, generalization to 
other issues and other cells should be facilitated.  Critical themes in our discus-
sion have been that extant research has not done a good job of  depicting how 
and how well auditors cope with time-pressure effects  in natural settings. This 
critical conclusion rests on the argument that most extant research has precluded 
the auditor from  taking any strategic actions in the presence of  time pressure 
and many tactical actions also have been precluded. Often,  the only available 
options have been to work faster  and when extreme time pressure has been 
introduced, the predictable deleterious effects  were discerned. 
Our approach has been to assume that although in concept extreme time 
pressure may be present, it may be precluded by the various audit organization 
controls. In addition, we have noted that extant research has already document-
ed the obvious—when given no other options except to work harder and when 
this is not enough, work less is what auditors do. However, we also have argued 
that such research can tell us very little about the more common and interesting 
situation in which time pressure is present but less extreme and such time pres-
sure has been anticipated by a knowledgeable and experienced auditor (or audit 
team). Focussing on such situations amounts to a re-direction of  audit time-
pressure research to how and the extent to which the auditor  works  smarter  in 
the presence of  time pressure? 
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Appendix A 
Cash Disbursements Internal Control Case 
Assume you are a senior-level auditor and that one of  your clients is Nortack, 
Inc. Nortack, a large processor and merchandiser of  agricultural commodities, is 
a privately-held company that has debt covenants requiring audited financial 
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. The company has not presented 
significant  auditing problems during your firm's  five-year  tenure as its public 
auditor. Nortack's management is actively involved both in designing the com-
pany's internal controls, as well as reviewing existing internal controls. The 
employees who administer Nortack's internal controls are well trained and 
supervised, with clearly defined  responsibilities. Nortack has relatively 
autonomous internal audit department that is adequately staffed  and supervised; 
the department head was a manager for  a Big Eight CPA firm,  and most of  the 
internal auditors have CPA certificates.  During the past five  years, Nortack has 
been computerizing its accounting and information  systems. 
Currently, you are planning Nortack's 1988 audit engagement and are evalu-
ating its internal controls to determine the extent to which you will rely on them 
in planning the year-end audit work. For sixteen randomly ordered cases, you 
will be presented with a portion of  a cash disbursement internal control ques-
tionnaire completed by an auditor on your staff.  For each case, you will be 
asked to assess the risk that the specified  controls could give rise to a material 
misstatement of  cash disbursements as a result of  checks being written and/or 
disbursed for  improper (unauthorized and/or invalid) purposes. Additional cash 
disbursement controls information: 
A. The authorization for  approving expenditure requests has been designated 
by the Board of  Directors at various management levels, depending upon 
the nature and amount of  the request. Expenditure authorization is indicat-
ed on purchase orders. 
B. The cash disbursement department has the responsibility for  verifying  the 
propriety of  expenditures and for  recording them in the voucher register. 
The original copy of  the voucher has a copy of  the vendor's invoice, 
receiving report and purchase order attached. 
C. Primary check signers carefully  scrutinize vouchers and supporting docu-
mentation at the time checks are signed. 
D. When they exist, second check signers are independent of  all other expen-
diture and cash disbursement functions. 
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Discussant's Response to "Auditors' Judgments/ 
Decisions Under Time Pressure: An Illustration and 
Agenda for  Research" 
Richard Kreutzfeldt 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
This is an excellent paper, and I completely support the efforts  by these 
authors to expand the research agenda regarding time pressure in auditing. My 
comments will offer  insights from  auditing practice on the nature of  time pres-
sures and auditors' responses to these pressures as well as how these matters 
might be addressed in a broader research agenda. 
Time Constraints in Auditing 
One of  the critical issues that should be covered by a broader research agen-
da is the nature of  time pressure in auditing. Much of  the prior research and 
many comments in this paper treat time pressure in auditing as an "on-off 
switch." Time pressure is present in some situations and not present in others. 
This premise is not consistent with actual practice. In my experience, time pres-
sure is present in virtually all audits. The real issue is the intensity of  the pres-
sure, and particularly changes in the intensity. In practice, the degree of  time 
pressure that is present in a particular audit differs  according to factors  such as 
client size, industry, and other client-specific  factors.  Some of  this pressure may 
be self-imposed  by the audit team itself  and some is imposed by the client. In 
any event, some degree of  time pressure is an ever-present factor  in auditing. 
The prior research on time pressure dealt with the differences  in auditor 
responses when time pressure was present versus not present. A more realistic 
approach would be to analyze auditor responses when the degree of  time pres-
sure changes. Over time, auditors adapt to a certain amount of  time pressure. A 
critical question is how they revise their approach when the degree of  this pres-
sure changes. With a more "field  based" approach, researchers should be able to 
study the degree of  pressure that is present in various situations, factors  which 
change the degree of  time pressure, and how auditors respond to these changes. 
Time Pressures Are Increasing 
The authors indicate that time pressures are increasing due to competition 
within the profession.  I agree with this comment. However, there are other 
forces  at work that are also serving to increase time pressure. For instance, vir-
tually all companies today are under increasing pressure to reduce costs in all 
parts of  their operation. In turn, they are placing pressures on various vendors to 
reduce their costs through efficiencies  or other measures. Auditors are being 
asked to do their part in helping reduce costs. 
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The authors discuss two types of  time pressure in the article. The first  is 
pressure to reduce the absolute amount of  time incurred (budget pressure). The 
second is to complete the work at an earlier time (deadline pressure). The 
above-noted examples are of  the first  type. No examples are provided of  the 
second type, although this type of  pressure is probably also increasing. A con-
tributing factor  is that improvements in information  systems are enabling com-
panies to close their books faster.  In turn, they are looking for  quicker sign-offs 
by their auditors. 
Time Pressure May Reduce Audit Quality 
In various parts of  this paper, the authors comment (and refer  to prior 
research) that a major concern with time pressure in auditing is that it may lead 
to reductions in audit quality. This is a valid issue and an appropriate topic for 
further  audit research. The question is whether time pressures on auditors cause 
non-compliance with auditing standards, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
Research that would shed some light on these issues would be welcome. 
Prior Research 
A basic premise of  this paper is that prior research has not been a good 
reflection  of  the real world. I completely agree with this premise. Prior research 
essentially used a laboratory approach where auditors were required to simply 
work faster.  In most instances, there was no change in the basic nature of  the 
work. The authors indicate that often  auditors have "strategic choices" that are 
available to them. I agree with this. Choices such as arbitrarily reducing the 
amount of  time by one-half,  as in one of  the research experiments, would almost 
never be suggested as a realistic alternative in a real situation. On the contrary, 
when auditors are faced  with significant  increases in the degree of  time pres-
sure, they would consider revisions in the nature, extent, or timing of  the work. 
Essentially, these are "strategic choices." 
Another Option: Not Adhering to the Pressures 
In much of  the laboratory-style research conducted to date, the auditors did 
not have a choice in adhering to the time pressures. They were required to com-
plete their tasks within a constrained amount of  time. However, in real situa-
tions, auditors have choices about whether they will adhere to the limits 
imposed by the situation. In many situations, it is simply not possible to adhere 
to the time constraints or deadline constraints. In these situations, the auditor 
needs a certain amount of  time to complete the audit work that is necessary 
under the auditing standards. It is simply not possible to adhere to the limits 
imposed by the client, and additional time must be incurred. 
In these instances, the key question becomes: Who pays for  this additional 
time? In my experience, there are three possible answers. The first  is where the 
client pays for  the additional time. If  the additional work is legitimately required 
by the circumstances, this is a logical result. Another possibility is where the 
audit firm  pays for  the additional time. This may be the case where the audit 
firm  has a fixed  fee  arrangement for  the audit, or where the firm  chooses to 
make an investment in the client relationship. A third and more subtle alterna-
tive is where the individual auditor, or staff  member, pays for  the additional 
time. Staff  members are under increasingly intense time pressure, often  without 
significant  opportunities to modify  the scope of  work to be performed.  These 
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pressures are generated by the client, other members of  the audit team, or by the 
staff  member's own high standards. A phenomenon that seems to have 
increased in recent years is where the staff  member incurs the additional time to 
do the work, often  on an overtime basis, but does not report the additional time 
incurred. In these instances, the staff  member pays in the form  of  lost compen-
sation, although the audit firm  also pays through lost opportunity for  billings. 
The expanded research agenda should deal with issues where the auditor 
does not adhere to the limits. 
Strategic Choices 
The authors make the comment that little is known about the strategic choic-
es available to auditors, such as staffing  decisions. This seems like a strange 
comment in that the audit firms  themselves know a tremendous amount about 
the strategic choices. Perhaps the comment is intended to mean that little has 
been provided in the auditing research on strategic choices. This is probably the 
case. It also indicates the appropriateness of  expanding the research agenda to 
deal with strategic choices. It would seem appropriate to begin with descriptive 
studies of  the strategic choices. For example, there are many rich variables con-
sidered in staffing  decisions. An interesting research project would be to inter-
view staffing  directors at various firms  to learn about the considerations that go 
into staffing  decisions—considerations such as the risk level of  the engagement, 
industry experience of  the individuals, auditing experience, continuity on the 
engagement, availability of  personnel, leveling of  schedules between individu-
als and over the year, etc. Once this descriptive information  is obtained, it could 
be used in further  studies of  time pressure. 
An Alternative Agenda 
Figure 1 outlines the nature of  issues that have been considered in the previ-
ous research on time pressures in auditing. 
Figure 1 
This research imposes time pressures of  various types and studies auditor 
responses to these pressures. Figure 2 is a wider agenda for  research on time 
pressure. This research would also begin with time pressure, but deal in particu-
lar with changes in this pressure. It would also be important to study the causes 
of  these increases. In turn, the broader research would deal with auditor 
responses, but would expand beyond the existing research to deal with strategic 
responses. An important aspect here is to consider the conditions that exist in 
the different  areas being audited to determine how these conditions will influ-
ence the responses that auditors have available to them and in fact  exercise. An 
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important added dimension of  the research is to deal with the audit quality 
implications of  various types of  auditor responses to these pressures. The under-
lying implication of  much of  the research is that audit quality is being impacted. 
An expanded research agenda should study actual impacts on audit quality. 
Further, this research should deal with impacts on the various stakeholders to 
the audit, such as management, stockholders, regulators, etc. 
Increasing Time Pressure Auditor Responses 
Audit Quality 
Implications 
Causes? Conditions? Stakeholder Impacts? 
Figure 2 
Proposed Taxonomy 
The authors propose a taxonomy of  time pressure issues including several 
key variables. I believe this is an excellent means to frame  the issues for  future 
research. However, the comments above indicate these issues should be framed 
in the context of  changes in the intensity of  time pressure, rather than time pres-
sure as an "on-off  switch." 
Whether Time Pressure Was Anticipated 
One of  the key variables in the taxonomy is whether time pressure was antic-
ipated. I believe the real issue is whether the change in pressure is known at the 
beginning of  the engagement or arises during the engagement. The authors actu-
ally cover this in the paper. They comment that the inability to anticipate pres-
sure at the beginning of  the engagement may preclude certain actions by the 
auditor. In other words, certain audit procedures may have already been com-
pleted, and thus the auditor simply may have fewer  options and less reaction 
time when the change in pressure occurs during the course of  the audit. 
Extent of  Knowledge 
One of  the variables included in the taxonomy is whether the auditor has 
knowledge for  establishing strategic responses to the time pressure situation. In 
my experience, there is always some knowledge present on the audit team on 
how to react to changes in circumstances. Thus, I do not believe including this 
item in the taxonomy will produce much insight about auditor decision-making, 
as all the instances will likely be in one category. While I would suggest delet-
ing it from  the taxonomy, this is really a matter of  preference. 
Deadline or Budget 
A key item in the taxonomy is whether the time pressure is due to a change 
in the deadline or an increase in budgetary pressure. I agree that these are two 
key elements, but another variable should be added consisting of  a combination 
of  both deadline and budget pressure. 
Proposed Research Agenda 
The authors propose a research agenda that focuses  on understanding strate-
gies adopted by knowledgeable auditors to deal with anticipated budget pres-
sure. I was surprised to see this rather narrow research agenda. It covers only 
one branch of  the authors' proposed taxonomy. It appears that the authors are 
only choosing this as an example. However, there are rich issues to be covered 
in other parts of  the taxonomy as well, and this research should be encouraged. 
Issues about unanticipated pressures (i.e., not known at the beginning of  the 
engagement) will be equally as interesting as anticipated pressures (i.e., known 
at the beginning of  the engagement). Issues involving deadline pressure will be 
equally as interesting as issues involving budget pressures. Research should be 
strongly encouraged on all of  these factors.  It is important to study the causes of 
these pressures, the other conditions that exist in these situations, the types of 
responses that auditors make to these pressures, etc. In each of  these parts of  the 
taxonomy, these issues will be considerably different. 
Possible Response to Time Pressure 
The authors outline several possible responses that auditors can make to time 
pressure. These items represent a good discussion of  possible responses. 
However, as a guide to future  research, what will be needed is a structure for 
thinking about these possible responses. The following  are some questions that 
could be used to guide some thinking about possible responses: 
• What is done? (i.e., alternative audit procedures) 
• How is it done? (e.g., use of  technology or other tools) 
• How much is done? (i.e., variations in extent) 
• Who does it? (i.e., degree of  experience and expertise) 
• When is it done? (i.e., preliminary or final) 
• Where is it done? (e.g., client office,  remote locations, etc.) 
Each of  these questions would yield multiple options to be considered by 
auditors. The examples provided by the authors would fit  within these ques-
tions. 
Assigning More Experienced Personnel 
One of  the possible responses to time pressure that is laid out by the authors 
is to assign more experienced personnel to the engagement. This suggestion 
ignores certain realities of  audit engagements. It seems to assume that time is 
the most important issue. In reality, the important issue is cost. It has both a 
short-term aspect (i.e., cost on the engagement) and a long- term (i.e., failure  to 
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develop people is a cost). There is a long running debate about whether partners 
could do the job faster  and cheaper than less experienced people. Regardless of 
the outcome of  this debate, this is not the way to run a professional  practice. It 
is essential that investments be made to develop people, both through formal 
training as well as on-the-job experience. Thus, a suggestion of  assigning expe-
rienced personnel to an engagement in order to meet time pressures is not a 
realistic solution. 
The other issue not considered by this suggestion is the difference  in rates 
between experienced and inexperienced personnel. In fact,  it would often  be 
more expensive to have experienced personnel perform  certain tasks. The key 
on any engagement is to assign the right level of  person to each task. In auditing 
firms  today, there is increasing sophistication of  personnel structures, with sev-
eral levels of  personnel as well as specialists of  various types. All of  this is 
intended to get the right level of  experience and skill assigned to each task. 
Thus, as a near-term solution, simply assigning more experienced personnel 
may not in fact  reduce costs. 
Use of  Advanced Technology 
The authors also suggest that auditors could use advanced technology such 
as expert systems as a way to reduce time when time pressures arise. In my 
experience, technology is already deployed to an optimum level on any given 
engagement. Because of  the time pressure that is ever-present in auditing, audi-
tors are constantly seeking means to be more efficient.  One of  these means is 
the use of  technology. Technology is increasingly used in audits of  all types. 
Any innovation in the use of  technology is quickly deployed on virtually all 
audits. Thus, as a short-term method to reduce time, the additional use of  tech-
nology would seldom be an option. 
However, technology might be a technique that could be deployed in order to 
meet a quicker deadline established by the client. Certain tools might be 
deployed that would enable the auditor to sign off  faster  at year-end, although 
the total cost of  the audit would probably be somewhat higher. 
Experience to date with expert systems is somewhat mixed. Expert systems 
are in their early stage of  development and deployment in auditing contexts. 
Many of  the useful  systems are in the audit planning stage rather than in the 
execution of  audit procedures. For these reasons, expert systems would seldom 
be an option for  reducing time on any given engagement. 
Use of  Different  Approaches to Produce Audit Evidence 
The authors also suggest another means of  dealing with increased time pres-
sures is to use different  approaches to produce audit evidence. Again, because 
of  the ever-present time pressures on audits, the auditor would probably already 
have selected the least costly approach. Thus, use of  a different  approach would 
seldom be available as a short-term solution to dealing with time pressures. 
The use of  a different  audit approach would, however, be a viable technique 
to use when there is a change in the deadline. In this case, the auditor may select 
an approach that would enable him to complete the work at an earlier stage, 
although the total cost would probably be somewhat higher. An example would 
be to move certain work to a preliminary date with an update at year-end versus 
having the work performed  entirely at year-end. 
97 
An Alternative Taxonomy 
In light of  the above comments, Figure 3 includes an alternative taxonomy 
for  considering auditor responses to time pressure in auditing. It considers fac-
tors raised by the authors in their taxonomy as well as matters noted in my com-
ments. In this model, it is important to identify  the cause of  the increase in time 
pressure. If  it is subsequently determined that the auditor will not adhere to the 
limit, the cause of  the increase in pressure will be important in determining who 
pays. For example, if  the client is the cause for  the pressure (i.e., changes in cir-
cumstances require additional effort),  then it is logical that the client could be 
asked to pay for  the increase. It is also important to understand the conditions of 
the account being audited. This will affect  the types of  responses that will be 
available. It is also likely that there would be some interplay between the choic-
es of  adhering to the limit and not adhering to the limit. In other words, the 
auditors may partially adhere to a limit that is being imposed and would then 
need to consider who pays for  the remainder. 
Change In Timing of  Nature of 
Intensity of  Change In Change In Overall Specific 
Time Pressure Pressure Pressure Responses Responses 
F i g u r e 3 
Future Research Approaches 
In closing, the authors suggest that future  research needs to involve more 
field  surveys and experiments. I strongly agree with this comment. This will 




























Self-Evaluative  Privilege 
Thomas E. Powell 
Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc. 
As the Director of  Professional  Practices with the Institute of  Internal 
Auditors (IIA), I respond to many, and duck some, questions from  practitioners 
and others regarding all manner of  issues with which practitioners are confront-
ed daily. In recent years one question seems to be asked more frequently.  The 
question is: 
How can we protect our workpapers and reports from  access by parties 
other than those for  whom they were prepared? 
External auditors are familiar  with both protecting their workpapers from 
access and having their reports used by third parties. Auditing students learn 
early that Ultramares  v. Touche  & Co. [1931] means third parties need to be 
carefully  considered in the audit process. Internal auditors usually aren't con-
cerned about that sort of  thing. After  all, their work is only for  the use of  their 
organization and they are a part of  that organization. Or are they? 
How Internal Auditors See Themselves 
Internal auditing is defined  in the Statement  of  Responsibilities  of  Internal 
Auditing [IIA, 1990] as follows: 
Internal Auditing is an independent appraisal function  established within 
an organization to examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the 
organization. The objective is to assist members of  the organization in the 
effective  discharge of  their responsibilities. To this end, internal auditing 
furnishes  them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations, counsel, and 
information  concerning the activities reviewed.1 
It is this position that allows an internal auditor to use his or her detailed 
knowledge of  the entity's policies, procedures, and environment to appraise the 
function  and apprise management of  existing or potential problem areas. 
In earlier versions of  the Statement  of  Responsibilities of  Internal  Auditing 
[1947, 1957, 1971, 1976] the wording was more narrow and implied a stronger 
allegiance to management: "Internal Auditing is an independent appraisal activ-
ity within an organization for  the review of  operations as a service to manage-
ment." 
In 1981 and subsequent versions "service to management" was changed to 
"service to the organization." This new broad allegiance provides a professional 
basis for  departing from  the interest of  management. It also provides a basis for 
1 The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., Statement of  Responsibilities of  Internal Auditing 
(Altamonte Springs, Florida: The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., 1990). 
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others to view the internal auditor's work product as fertile  ground for 
homing in on the organization's problem areas as identified  by an objective 
professional. 
How External Auditors See Internal Auditors 
Last year the Auditing Standards Board of  the AICPA wrapped up a two-
year project to update Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) Number 9: The 
Effect  of  an Internal  Audit  Function  on the Scope of  the Independent  Audit.  SAS 
Number 65: The  Auditor's  Consideration  of  the Internal  Audit  Function  in an 
Audit  of  Financial  Statements  superseded SAS 9. 
One of  the most hotly debated topics was the concept of  internal auditor 
independence. It was finally  decided to point out in SAS 65 that the two profes-
sions define  independence differently. 2 Rather than concentrate on indepen-
dence, externa] auditors are directed in SAS 65 to look at the internal auditor's 
objectivity and competence, among other things. Based on their assessment they 
can then determine the degree to which the work of  internal auditors might be 
used to supplement or reduce some of  their own work. 
Although this professional  recognition was more subtle than some internal 
auditors would have desired, it was viewed very positively by others. However, 
the point was made once again that internal audit workpapers have a broader 
audience than the entity's management. This recognition is a continuation of  the 
changes that have occurred primarily in the last twenty years. 
Recent Changes 
The stature of  internal auditors has changed dramatically in the last two 
decades. One milestone was the establishment of  the CIA Program.3 Although 
not a license, the CIA credential has afforded  a means of  recognizing those 
internal auditors who have attained professional  status through education, expe-
rience and examination. As internal auditors were working on improving their 
own abilities to provide professional  service, legislation was being forged  to 
increase the demand for  such service. The passage of  the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977 was another visible milestone in the profession.  Since that 
time the increased expectations of  the profession  are obvious. 
Internally, the work product of  internal auditors has always been viewed by 
management as one of  the best sources of  independent appraisal within an orga-
nization. In 1987, the Treadway Commission [Report  of  the National 
Commission on Fraudulent  Financial  Reporting,  1987] underscored that view 
and encouraged an internal audit function  as a means of  strengthening corporate 
integrity. 
In the United States the issue of  corporate integrity obviously has many 
sides. Recently we have had some spectacular examples of  fraud  and misman-
agement which undermined the public's confidence  in everyone and everything 
from  ministers to gambling casinos. Individuals have been damaged and litiga-
tion has inevitably followed.  In this climate people do search for  someone to 
blame when things go wrong. Sometimes the search is eleemosynary and some-
2 SAS 65 defined  independence for  external auditors and indicated in a footnote  that IIA Standards 
use the term differently. 
3 The Certified  Internal Auditor Program requires completion of:  a two-day, four-part  written exam-
ination: two years of  qualifying  experience; and, a degree which equates to the U.S. baccalaureate 
degree. The exam is offered  in French, English and Spanish at sites around the world. 
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times it's for  profit.  One of  the places that people found  to search was internal 
auditors' workpapers. Being popular is not something internal auditors are used 
to, so it is understandable that they are uncomfortable  when unforeseen  third-
party clients suddenly appear. 
A Call For Help 
The call I receive is frequently  from  a director of  internal auditing or a mem-
ber of  an organization's legal staff,  either anticipating or responding to work-
product access by third parties. Unfortunately  the question usually doesn't come 
up until the circumstances have progressed too far  for  the organization to deal 
effectively  with the situation. I usually ask a few  questions to see if  the situation 
is similar to any of  the ones I have heard before.  But it seems that there are 
enough differences  to make a general answer difficult. 
Sometimes the access is sought by a local, state, or federal  regulatory author-
ity. Typically the caller says: "We are not concerned about the issues they are 
raising but our workpapers contain a lot of  other unrelated subjective data that 
we don't want them to see." The caller sometimes asks: "How will I avoid 
scope restrictions when word gets out that my workpapers are an open book? I 
am trying to help my company correct and avoid problems, not punish them." 
I usually share some basic information  and references  starting with the 
Codification  Of  Standards  for  the Professional  Practice of  Internal  Auditing. 
The Standards  state that "Audit working papers are the property of  the organi-
zation." Furthermore they warn that "there are circumstances where requests for 
access to audit working papers and reports are made by parties outside the orga-
nization other than the external auditor. Prior to releasing such documentation, 
the director of  internal auditing should obtain the approval of  senior manage-
ment and/or legal counsel."4 
Based on my own experience it appears that most organizations have not 
anticipated these outside requests. They do not document internal memos and 
reports anticipating external publication. Since the main purpose of  these 
reports is to get action, the wording is usually devoid of  all of  the caveats 
designed to avoid liability or shift  blame. My caller is usually playing catch up 
and needs help immediately. So I, at this point, am forced  to suggest that they 
balance their check book, unless they have privileges similar to U.S. congress-
men, and call an attorney. 
These calls started coming so regularly that I called our own attorney and 
asked for  some sort of  informational  memo that I could share with our mem-
bers. I also suggested to our Professional  Issues Committee that they draft  a 
position paper that would give further  guidance to all internal auditors who 
were faced  with access issues. 
The question is a difficult  one because there are good arguments on every 
side except the one I usually happen to be defending.  The Professional  Issues 
Committee did prepare an advisory report5 in an attempt to be responsive to the 
4 The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., Codification  of  Standards For The Professional  Practice of 
Internal Auditing: No. 420 (Altamonte Springs, Florida: The Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., 
1989). 
5 The Professional  Issues Committee of  the IIA, just released a subcommittee report which provides 
guidance including a sample access policy statement for  use by organizations in preparing for 
access requests. 
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problem. In the report they identified  the basic concerns. The issues they 
defined  go to the heart of  our profession: 
• Independence. 
• Objectivity. 
• The right of  the public to know versus the right of  an individual or an 
organization to privacy. 
• The constitutional protection from  self-incrimination. 
• Whether the public interests are best served by openness or by confi-
dentiality. 
• The role of  the internal auditor serving management as well as the 
board of  directors in the private sector, and the role of  the internal 
auditor as a public servant in the governmental sector. 
The committee's report points out that in order to be effective  as an indepen-
dent appraisal function,  internal auditing must be able to objectively evaluate 
high-risk activities and frankly  communicate the results to management and the 
board. Unlimited access to internal auditing work-products by outside parties 
would have a chilling effect  both on the scope of  activities reviewed and the 
frankness  with which results were communicated. 
If  this sounds like a plea for  privileged communication or protection from 
self-incrimination,  many would argue that it should be that way. But others 
might say that most organizations being called to report are simply too big and 
too public to demand privacy. 
The Internal Auditor's Code 
The Code  of  Ethics  of  the Institute of  Internal Auditors, Inc., states in Article 
VIII [IIA, 1988]: 
Members and CIAs shall be prudent in the use of  information  acquired in 
the course of  their duties. They shall not use confidential  information  for 
any personal gain nor in any manner which would be contrary to law or 
detrimental to the welfare  of  their organization. 
Article II states [IIA, 1988]: 
Members and CIAs shall exhibit loyalty in all matters pertaining to the 
affairs  of  their organization or to whomever they may be rendering a ser-
vice. However, Members and CIAs shall not knowingly be a party to any 
illegal or improper activity. 
Now when the interests of  owners, managers, regulators, and other interested 
parties are the same there is no problem. When those interests diverge, whose 
interests come first?  The Board of  Directors? Owners (members)? The public? 
Regulators? The auditor? 
Self-Evaluative  Privilege 
I mentioned earlier that I asked our attorneys to outline this concept of  the 
"self-evaluative  privilege." Our attorney provided me with the following  memo-
randum dated March 1990: 
The self-evaluative  privilege is a judicially recognized doctrine which 
provides that, under certain circumstances, documents created pursuant to 
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a critical self-analysis  by a company should not be subject to compelled 
disclosure in private litigation. The rationale for  the privilege is relatively 
simple: Company self-evaluations  are beneficial,  most immediately to the 
company and ultimately to society, and the fear  of  public disclosure of  the 
results of  self-evaluations  would discourage such efforts.  Unlike some 
privileges recognized by the law (e.g., the attorney-client privilege) the 
self-evaluative  privilege is not well-defined,  nor has it achieved broad 
acceptance. This situation is exacerbated by the fact  that the privilege is 
currently being formulated  almost exclusively by trial court judges, not 
appellate courts, and this leads to inconsistent application of  the 
privilege.6 
A few  courts have subscribed to the self-evaluative  privilege, including 
Bredice  v. Doctors Hospital  Inc.,  50 F.R.D. 249 [D.D.C., 1970], affirmed  479 
F. 2d 920 [D.C.Cir., 1973], The  Washington  Post Co. v. U.S.  Department  of 
Justice,  No. 84-3581 [D.D.C., Sept 25, 1987], and Federal  Trade  Commission 
v. TRW,  Inc.,  628 F. 2d 207 [D.D.C., 1980], However as pointed out in the 
above memo, this is not uniformly  recognized. 
Internal auditors have battled the reputation of  being an adversary rather than 
an ally of  management. If  the internal auditors' workpapers become regularly 
accessed by true adversaries, the auditors may have more difficulty  locating 
problem areas for  early detection and correction. 
In an unofficial  IIA informational  publication, the legal issues faced  by inter-
nal auditors were explored and auditors were warned that [Fargason, 1992, p. 
27]: 
Workpapers can be exposed during any legal proceeding, including inter-
rogatories, motions/request for  documents, depositions, subpoenas, etc. 
Internal auditors should be aware of  the fact  that their reports and work-
papers may be the foundation  for  a lawsuit. 
Unless internal workpapers can be protected by either the attorney-client privi-
lege or the work-product privilege, they are likely to be discoverable [Fargason, 
1992, p. 28]. 
This is not always the case. In United  States  v. Newport  News  Shipbuilding 
and  Dry Dock Company, CA 4 No. 87-3832 (Newport News I) the Fourth 
Circuit Court of  Appeals affirmed  the district court's order denying the enforce-
ment of  a DCAA subpoena for  internal auditing work-products. In this case, the 
workpapers contained data that was not "closely connected." 
Some of  the calls I receive suggest that they are being placed under the direc-
tion of  the legal department for  certain investigations in order to come under the 
umbrella of  "attorney-client" privilege. Is this in the best interest of  the profes-
sion? 
An example of  this type of  posture is described in a forthcoming  book from 
the IIA written by James Fargason. "In Pritchard-Keang  Nam  Corporation  v. 
Jaworski,  751 F. 2d 277 (8th Cir. 1984) the issue before  the court was whether 
the attorney-client privilege should be applied to documentation prepared by an 
attorney for  the audit committee of  the corporation. International Systems and 
6 Internal memorandum to The Institute of  Internal Auditors from  the law firm  of  Webster, 
Chamberlain & Bean, (Washington, D.C., March 1990). 
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Controls Corporation (ISC) directed its audit committee to investigate allega-
tions that individuals within the corporation were paying bribes to government 
officials  of  foreign  countries. In order to facilitate  the investigation, the audit 
committee hired an outside accounting firm  and an outside law firm.  The law 
firm  completed its assigned investigation and issued a report to the audit com-
mittee for  review." Fargason [1992, p. 30] points out that the court upheld the 
attorney-client privilege. The court pointed out that not privileging this informa-
tion would have a chilling effect  on individuals who seek legal advice. Clients 
would be less likely to be completely candid and honest with their attorneys. 
Recent U. S. legislation seems to be increasingly directed toward compelling 
internal and external auditors to report problem areas directly to regulators. For 
internal auditors this further  exacerbates an already tenuous hold on their 
desired recognition as "team players" who want to correct existing problems as 
they are found.  But now, internal auditors, having fought  long and hard for 
recognition as objective professionals,  are finding  that "objective" means differ-
ent things to different  people. Internal auditors are supposed to be objective 
advisors, not managers. They cannot usurp management's decision-making 
responsibility. At the point they cross the line and begin to make the decisions 
and direct activity (manage) they are no longer independent of  the activity. 
However, there are others who see that quite differently  and suggest that the 
auditor should be a "whistle-blower." Where the lines between legal and illegal 
are distinct, the answers are clear. But in many complex issues the lines are less 
distinct. 
At the AICPA's Annual Conference  on SEC Developments held January 8, 
1992, attendees were warned to anticipate enforcement  action against internal 
auditors and other in-house officials.  SEC Associate Enforcement  Director 
Bruce Hiler and former  SEC Enforcement  Director Gary Lynch suggested that 
the 1990 Securities Enforcement  Remedies and Penny Stock Act gave the 
Commission broader authority to go after  mid-level executives who "cause" 
violations of  the securities laws either by negligence or by failure  to perform  an 
act. Hiler discussed a 1985 enforcement  action against the controller and trea-
surer of  a company for  aiding the chief  executive officer's  alleged financial 
fraud.  The case is known as the "good soldier" case (SEC  v. Oak Industries  Inc., 
DC SCalif,  6/25/85; 17 SRLR 1199). 
According to Lynch this new legislation allows cease-and-desist orders to be 
used in a way that will make it easier for  the SEC to win its cases. Previously in 
order to get a permanent injunction, the SEC had the burden of  proving in court 
that the defendant  had the propensity to commit the violation again. Lynch 
pointed out that cease-and-desist orders can be handled administratively and do 
not require proof  that violations could recur. 
Another promulgation that professionals  are trying to understand is the new 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines7 which became effective  on November 1, 
1991. These guidelines provide for  restitution, probation, and fines;  with the 
fines  appearing to be the primary instrument of  punishment. Base fines  range 
from  $5,000 for  the lowest offense  to $72,500,000 for  the highest. The base fine 
is then adjusted by minimum and maximum multipliers based on culpability 
7 In May of  1991 the U.S. Sentencing Commission sent to Congress proposed sentencing guidelines 
for  companies convicted of  federal  crimes. These guidelines became law on November 1, 1991. 
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scores. A company with a $72,500,000 fine  could have its fine  reduced to 
$3,600,000 or increased to $290,000,000 based on its culpability score. 
Organizations are encouraged through enormous guideline incentives to 
investigate and report employee misconduct. However, this "voluntary" disclo-
sure may waive any attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine protec-
tion. This in turn opens the organization up to the potential for  civil and admin-
istrative action which may result from  shareholder, competitor, and/or employee 
lawsuits. The documentation for  all of  this may be the internal auditors' work-
papers. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I don't have solutions to offer  but rather challenges to 
researchers, educators, and practitioners alike. Recently I have had the opportu-
nity to work directly with a number of  groups seeking to address reporting 
issues. My observation has been that most of  the time we are in a reactive rather 
than proactive mode. As accounting and auditing professionals  we should be in 
a position to foresee  more of  these problems instead of  dealing with the solu-
tions handed to us by legislators and courts. One of  the basic tenets of  true pro-
fessions  is self-subordination  and a devotion to the welfare  of  those served. 
The legislative efforts  that are increasing our professional  liability have been 
annealed in a crucible of  distrust. We all find  ourselves living in glass houses 
and will have to be ready for  inspection at all times. For auditors that means 
documenting circumspectly. For educators that means teaching critical thinking 
and instilling ethical pride. For researchers that means finding  new solutions to 
keep the professions  in a proactive rather than reactive mode. 
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Discussant's Response To "Self-Evaluative  Privilege" 
Theodore J. Mock* 
University of  Southern California 
Introduction and Significance  of  Issue 
As a somewhat frequent  participant in the Kansas Symposium on Audit 
Problems, I today find  myself  in somewhat of  an unusual situation—that of  dis-
cussant rather than presenter or observer. But in any role, I always welcome the 
opportunity to participate in the grandfather  symposium of  systematic, academ-
ic-based audit research. I congratulate Raj Srivastava, his colleagues, and 
Deloitte & Touche for  once again organizing an interesting set of  research and 
position papers. 
As a discussant for  an issues paper based in practice, I feel  obligated to give 
a qualification  similar to what one often  hears from  practitioners as they discuss 
academic papers. Before  I began to prepare my comments, I really knew very 
little about self-evaluative  privilege  or the other issues raised in Tom Powell's 
paper. 
However, the fact  that I was generally unfamiliar  with the issues raised, at 
least from  a research perspective, implies that we may have a research area 
which is academically novel. In addition, the fact  that a prominent practitioner 
is raising the issue implies that the issues are practically relevant. What else 
could a researcher ask for?  Perhaps, not much more. However, an academic dis-
cussant is bound to feel  a bit uncomfortable  reacting to a paper that includes lit-
tle literature, theory, methodology or statistical analysis! 
So, what to do? Tom Powell's paper is a lucid statement of  a set of  issues 
dealing with access to audit work-products which he develops from  an internal 
auditor's perspective. This is clearly an issue to both internal and external audi-
tors and Tom is to be commended for  bringing it to the attention of  the academ-
ic community. 
In my comments, I attempt to achieve two primary objectives. First, I 
attempt to react positively to Tom's challenge in his closing paragraph of  identi-
fying  some promising research opportunities in the arena. Second, I provide 
some guidance as to what kinds of  additions to practitioner's papers (e.g. inte-
gration of  academic literature and development of  more detailed models or the-
ories) would help promote audit research. Such additions to papers of  this 
nature would help to bridge the Practitioner-Academic  Research Gap. 
Specifically,  the following  three topics are discussed. First, is the topic of 
what aspects of  auditor workpaper access are researchable  from  a scientific 
* Helpful  suggestions from  Ganesh Krishnamoorthy are gratefully  acknowledged. 
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standpoint. In other words, what types of  knowledge can academia contribute to 
these problems? Second, is an overview of  some of  the existing literature, both 
academic and practitioner based, which may be relevant. Lastly, based on this 
review, I then identify  some research opportunities and two specific  research 
ideas, one experimental and one analytical, which may be pursued. Hopefully 
some of  these ideas will ring a bell with both academics and Tom Powell and 
will lead to some research funds  and studies in this area. 
Nature of  the Issues: Problem Solving, 
Engineering, Research or Politics? 
When reading a position paper of  this nature, one is first  struck by the sheer 
complexity of  the issues related to access to audit workpapers. Tom does an 
excellent job of  identifying  some of  these complexities, although not in a formal 
or rigorous manner which would assist one interested in research. What would 
be helpful  is a more systematic identification  of  the variables, relationships and 
agents or players which Tom sees as being relevant. The researcher is forced  to 
do this for  him or herself  and is subject to serious risks of  omission of  relevant 
variables or relations. 1 
The second thing that struck me in the paper was Tom's call for  academic 
research and the question of  the scientific  nature of  the issues he was raising. A 
distinction which is often  made in science, for  example by Kerlinger [1979], is 
that many issues which are raised by practitioners are not researchable issues. 
Kerlinger identifies  three types of  issues and problems that practitioners face: 
engineering, value and research problems. "We consider problems that are real-
ly not problems in the scientific  sense. They can be called value or engineering 
problems."2 
Engineering problems deal with "how to" issues and value issues concern 
"what is best or what is preferred"  types of  problems. In contrast, Kerlinger 
views scientific  research problems as questions that ask about relations  among 
variables or phenomenon. Whereas some of  the issues Tom raises are research 
questions, many are not. An example of  an engineering type problem is present-
ed on the first  page where he asks: "How can we protect our workpapers and 
reports from  access by parties other than those for  whom they were prepared?" 
It doesn't take scientific  (i.e. academic) research to "engineer" feasible  solu-
tions to this problem—one solution is simply to shred any potentially relevant 
evidence. 
An example of  a value question is presented later in the paper where Tom 
notes that some internal audit activities are being placed under legal department 
direction to come under the umbrella of  "attorney-client" privilege. "Is this in 
the best interest of  the profession?"  Such questions do not fall  within the direct 
purview of  science although research can provide some knowledge which might 
be helpful  such as attitudinal surveys of  the tradeoffs  which might be involved. 
In all deference  to Tom, it should be noted that many of  the questions, issues, 
problems, and assertions raised could be scientifically  addressed. For instance, 
on page 102 he asserts that "Unlimited access to internal auditing work-prod-
ucts by outside parties would have a chilling effect  both on the scope of  activi-
1 Figure 1 is a sketch of  such a model for  one aspect of  these issues. 
2 Kerlinger, [1979, p. 29]. 
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Figure 1: A Multistage Structure for the 
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ties reviewed and the frankness  with which results could be communicated". A 
testable cause-effect  relation between access to work-product and chilling 
effects  is explicit in such an assertion. On page 100 he raises another research 
issue concerning "the degree to which the work of  internal auditors might be 
used to supplement or reduce some of  their [external auditors] work." In fact, 
this second question is one that already has some research results to consider.3 
This leads to the third aspect of  Tom's paper that is readily apparent to any 
academic. The paper is devoid of  any explicit reference  to the academic litera-
ture and little reference  to the professional  literature. From an academic/audit 
standpoint, one could say that the paper lacks appropriate research documenta-
tion. What part of  the literature was systematically considered? What ideas, 
problems and assertions have support or explicit research results in the extant 
literature? These are questions whose answers would help academics interested 
in doing research of  this nature. 
Related Research and Literature 
Although I did not do a comprehensive review of  the research literature, I did 
consult a number of  sources to obtain a judgment sample of  what is available. 
My search looked at academic and professional  literature and also survey docu-
ments, such as the "Research Opportunities in Auditing" monographs (see 
foonote  3) and a review of  research presented at the USC Audit Judgment 
Symposium.4 Although I found  little research which directly addresses issues 
related to access to internal audit work-products, there is a substantial body of 
3 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.[1976]; and Abdel-kahlik and Solomon [1988]. 
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research, some of  which is listed in my references,  which may provide some 
useful  information  and guidance. 
For example, several studies have explicitly investigated aspects of  the exter-
nal auditor's assessment of  and reliance on internal audit work. Figure 1 sum-
marizes the main variables and their relations as they are discussed in the litera-
ture. The main variable in the figure  is the quality or strength of  the internal 
audit function  within an organization. This variable is affected  by or related to 
in Kerlinger's terms three primary variables: competence, work quality and 
objectivity. These three variables are in turn affected  by a number of  factors 
such as work paper quality. Such models or theories are imperative in academic 
work as they summarize the knowledge that is thought to exist on a subject and 
are open to critique and challenge. 
The existing literature has focused  on the external auditor's assessment of 
the relative importance of  the internal audit qualities of  competence, work per-
formance  and objectivity in their reliance decision.5 Such qualities may effect 
external audit efficiency  and may, in turn, be affected  by increasing access by 
outsiders to internal audit work. One possibility for  such an effect  would be that 
the access constrains or has a "chilling effect"  on audit work performance. 
An Experiment to Assess the Chilling Effect 
of  Increased Access 
At the bottom of  Figure 1, an experimental treatment is shown which indi-
cates the kind of  experiment that could be conducted in this area. Such an 
experiment would develop a task where auditors were asked to make judgments 
concerning the internal audit strength in a case where the internal auditors were 
working with or without the "self-evaluative  privilege" discussed in Tom's 
paper. The "theory" suggested in Tom's paper is that for  the treatment where 
access to internal audit workpapers is a threat and where there is no self-evalua-
tive privilege, there would be a chilling effect  on the workpapers. Other similar 
treatments, such as varying the likelihood of  increased access to workpapers, 
come to mind when reviewing these issues. Whether such an experimental 
study would be valuable from  a practicing or academic standpoint is an issue 
which symposia such as this one help address. 
In looking at Figure 1, which represents only a small part of  the issues raised 
in Tom's paper, one readily sees the complexity of  the problems being 
addressed. For example, published research shows that the external auditor's 
rankings and weightings of  these factors  vary over studies and probably over 
audit situations. Second, there are many other variables and players that proba-
bly should be considered if  one attempted to expand a model like Figure 1 into a 
comprehensive model or theory. 
Other Researchable Questions and Research Opportunities 
In my review of  Tom's paper and of  the published literature, I did attempt to 
respond to his challenge to act in a proactive manner to these issues. This 
involved the compilation of  a list of  research questions that could benefit  from 
additional academic research: 
5 See, for  example. Brown [1983]; Margheim [1986]; Messier and Schneider [1988]; and Harrell, 
Taylor and Chewning [1989]. 
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If  the internal auditors' workpapers become regularly accessed by true 
adversaries the auditors may have more difficulty  locating problem areas 
for  early detection and correction. [Powell, 1992, p. 103]. 
How do the auditor's need to document and take responsibility for  judg-
ments and actions affect  his/her evaluation of  conflicting  evidence? 
[Abdel-kahlik and Solomon, 1988, p. 130]. 
When interests of  owners, managers, regulators and other interested par-
ties diverge, what effects  will occur on internal auditor priorities and deci-
sions? [Powell, 1992, p. 102]. 
What is the effect  of  aggressive enforcement  of  compliance with laws and 
regulations on security and privacy of  client (firm)  information?  [PMM, 
1976, p. 137, (paraphrased)]. 
What mechanisms should be considered to serve the demand for  dissemi-
nation of  attest reports related to social utilities? [Abdel-kahlik and 
Solomon, 1988, p. 151]. 
Does litigation influence  audit effectiveness?  If  so, how and to what 
extent? [Abdel-kahlik and Solomon, 1988, p. 180]. 
What are the effects  of  litigation on the nature and pricing of  audit ser-
vices? [Abdel-kahlik and Solomon, 1988, p. 180]. 
Research Methods 
The above research questions and others that are evident in the literature 
imply the possible use of  a variety of  empirical research approaches and meth-
ods including controlled experiments, experimental markets studies, field  stud-
Figure 2: I n f o r m a t i o n a l  I m p a c t 
of I n t e r n a l Aud i t Workpapers 
Auditor's lack of  objectivity 
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ies and attitudinal surveys. It also might be fruitful  to utilize some of  the more 
formal,  hierarchical models of  auditor judgment to analytically assess the possi-
ble impacts of  increased access to auditor work-products on the discovery of 
material errors or significant  control weaknesses. 
An example of  the analytical approach is suggested by Krishnamoorthy's 
work [1992]. In this approach, cascaded inference  theory is used to derive ana-
lytically the effect  of  changes in the quality of  audit workpapers on the likeli-
hood of  error detection, the primary issue identified  in Tom's paper. Figure 2 
depicts the sensitivity of  the underlying likelihood ratios to differences  in audi-
tor objectivity which influences  the "source reliability" of  the evidence. These 
differences  then change the informational  impact (likelihood ratios) of  the audit 
evidence. These differences  are particularly large on the left  side of  Figure 2, 
i.e., where the auditor lacks objectivity, for  example, when the internal auditor 
is "less than frank"  in communicating the results of  audit tests (Powell, 1992, 
p. 102). 
Concluding Comments 
In my remarks I have attempted to focus  on two general issues. First is the 
issue as to what scientific  research may be able to contribute to practical prob-
lems such as increasing access to internal audit work-products. Tom's paper 
raises a number of  important problems which need to be addressed and academ-
ic research can be helpful  for  some of  these problems. Examples of  research 
questions were identified  from  both Tom's paper and from  the literature in gen-
eral. In addition, illustrations were developed of  both an experimental and an 
analytical methodology which could be used to address two of  these research 
questions. 
Second, I have suggested that practitioners could facilitate  this process in a 
number of  ways. For example, explicit incorporation of  extant research in their 
position papers would provide information  as to what previous results were use-
ful  and to what extent models, theories and methods were found  to be incom-
plete or inaccurate. If  extant research is found  to be lacking in some respect, the 
next step would be to identify  variables, relations and complexities that need to 
be considered in formal  research. Both of  these activities would help bridge the 
academic-practitioner research gap which exists. 
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Using Regression Analysis to Assist Audit Judgments 
in Substantive Testing 
Trevor Stewart 
Ann Thornton 
Deloitte & Touche 
Introduction 
Over the years there has been some debate over the use of  analytical proce-
dures in auditing, particularly non-statistical procedures to derive substantive 
assurance. SAS 56 [AICPA, 1989] clarified  the process involved in substantive 
procedures, but did not solve such audit questions as "How much work is 
enough?" There has been less debate over statistical analytical procedures, 
which usually incorporate regression analysis, perhaps because the level of  use 
by auditors is not as widespread. The very term "regression analysis" is forbid-
ding, and auditors, who are finally  becoming more comfortable  with sampling 
(as long as you don't mention the term statistics!), do not tend to show enthusi-
asm for  statistical tools unless they are packaged in a very friendly  fashion. 
Our firm  is fortunate  to have a regression tool that our auditors feel  comfort-
able using. STAR (Statistical Techniques for  Analytical Review) is a software 
tool that assists the performance  of  substantive analytical procedures by using 
regression analysis to model the relationship between an amount being tested 
and data expected to be predictive of  the amount. It is designed to help auditors 
perform  substantive analytical procedures in the context of  an audit framework, 
and it builds upon the basic concepts involved in any substantive analytical 
procedure. 
STAR was developed by our firm  and has been used in the audit practice 
since 1971. We have recently updated the software,  giving it a more modern 
user interface  and making minor enhancements to the reports and messages pro-
vided by the software  to improve the information  available to the auditor. The 
enhancements were based on prior experiences with STAR and a fresh  chal-
lenge of  the tool against the requirements of  SAS 56. However, the key features 
and the calculations remain unchanged. 
One such key feature  of  STAR is the inclusion of  an "audit interface"  that 
melds professional  judgments about materiality and assurance with the applica-
tion of  regression analysis. This feature  computes thresholds based on auditor 
judgments and thereby identifies  differences  between the recorded amounts and 
the expectations that are sufficiently  unusual to warrant further  investigation. 
We do not propose to discuss the calculations and statistics included in 
STAR in detail. Rather, we want to focus  on the use of  STAR for  substantive 
testing, and how STAR assists auditors in making the judgments required in any 
substantive analytical procedure. 
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For a more detailed explanation of  STAR and its statistical concepts, refer  to 
Statistical  Techniques  for  Analytical  Review in Auditing  [Stringer and Stewart, 
1986]. 
Substantive Analytical Procedures 
To provide a context for  our discussion of  STAR, we should first  consider 
the components of  a substantive analytical procedure. As indicated in SAS 56, 
substantive analytical procedures involve comparing recorded amounts with an 
expectation thereof  developed from  relevant financial  or non-financial  data for 
the purpose of  concluding whether the recorded amounts are free  of  material 
misstatement. 
In general, an auditor performs  the following  steps when using substantive 
analytical procedures: 
1. Develop expectation(s) of  the amount to be tested at an appropriate 
level of  disaggregation based on relevant financial  or non-financial 
data. This includes selecting reliable data expected to be predictive of 
the amount to be tested and determining an expected relationship 
between such data and the amount. 
2. Determine a threshold amount (i.e., the maximum difference  between 
the expectation of  an amount and its recorded value that is acceptable 
without explanation). It should be sufficiently  small to enable misstate-
ments to be identified  that could be material, either individually, or 
when aggregated with misstatements in other disaggregated portions or 
in other accounts. 
3. Compare the expectation(s) with the recorded amount and identify  dif-
ferences  requiring further  investigation (i.e., those differences  exceed-
ing the threshold amount). 
4. Identify  and corroborate explanations for  differences  exceeding the 
threshold amount by performing  further  analysis or inquiry and exam-
ining supporting documentation. 
5. Evaluate the findings  and determine the level of  assurance, if  any, to be 
drawn from  the analytical procedures. 
Use of  STAR 
When an auditor uses STAR to perform  a substantive analytical procedure, 
the steps that he or she1 takes are similar to those for  any other type of  substan-
tive analytical procedure, and exactly parallel those described above: 
1. Develop an expectation. The auditor determines the type of  analysis, 
an appropriate level of  disaggregation, and appropriate base data. Then 
he uses STAR's regression analysis techniques to develop a plausible 
relationship from  the base data (a regression model), between the 
amounts to be tested (the test variable) and one or more independent 
sets of  data (predicting variables) that are expected to be related to the 
test variable. Based on this relationship, STAR is used to calculate the 
expectations (regression estimates) for  the test variable based on the 
current-period values of  the predicting variables. 
1 The use of  the pronoun "he" in this paper is generic, denoting the "professional,"  whether male or 
female. 
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2. Determine threshold. STAR uses statistical techniques to determine 
thresholds, based on the regression model and the audit judgments as 
to materiality, required audit assurance, and the direction of  test (i.e., 
whether the test is primarily to detect overstatements or understate-
ments). 
3. Identify  differences  for  investigation (i.e., differences  exceeding the 
thresholds determined for  each disaggregated recorded amount). STAR 
compares the expectations with the recorded amounts of  the test vari-
able to determine the differences  (residuals) exceeding the thresholds. 
4. & 5. As above. 
As indicated in these steps, STAR performs  more than regression analysis. It 
assists the auditor in the first  three steps of  the analytical procedures process by 
performing  four  distinct activities: 
1. Regression analysis to study data relationships and to develop a model 
that can be used to calculate an expectation for  comparison with 
recorded results. 
2. Mathematical tests to assess the plausibility and predictability of  the 
relationship. 
3. A proprietary statistical algorithm to compute threshold in light of  the 
materiality and required assurance specified  by the auditor, and the 
precision inherent in the particular regression model. 
4. Identification  of  the differences  between the expectations and the 
recorded amounts that exceed threshold. 
How STAR Supports Audit Judgments 
Two important criteria should be considered when designing a software  tool 
to perform  regression analysis for  a substantive test. The regression analysis 
should be packaged so that auditors can use it as a substantive testing tool with-
out having to become mathematical/statistical experts, and the tool should be 
designed to assist the auditor as much as possible without leading him to sus-
pend audit judgment in favor  of  the automated answer. 
In this discussion, we demonstrate how we dealt with these considerations in 
designing STAR, such that: 
• The regression statistics are not totally hidden, but are presented in for-
mats with which auditors feel  comfortable. 
• Additional mathematical and statistical checks are performed  automati-
cally without requiring auditor interaction, but when the results indi-
cate unusual conditions, sufficient  explanation and information  are 
given to allow the auditor to determine what actions to take. 
• The reports, text messages, and graphics, which explain the statistics 
and mathematical tests and illustrate the relationships, are specifically 
designed to assist auditor judgments. 
In addition, we demonstrate that the limitations that arise in using STAR for 
a substantive analytical procedure are no different  than the limitations faced 
when using other means (often  nonstatistical) to perform  a substantive analyti-
cal procedure. 
We emphasize throughout our training that the effectiveness  of  STAR 
depends on the application of  sound professional  judgment at the design and 
115 
interpretation stages, and the responsible follow-up  of  any significant  differ-
ences that it highlights. STAR does not replace audit judgment; it confirms  it 
and focuses  our attention on areas where further  analysis is needed. Auditors 
using STAR must understand the basic concepts involved in developing an 
expectation and identifying  differences  for  investigation. For example, our 
firm's  training and manuals require an understanding of  substantive analytical 
procedures as a pre-requisite to learning how to use STAR. 
The auditor makes the basic decisions, such as what predicting data to use, 
the level of  disaggregation, and the materiality and assurance required to meet 
the audit objectives. These decisions are no different  than the decisions to be 
made if  the auditor uses nonstatistical analytical procedures to perform  the sub-
stantive test. However, STAR has a strength that most other techniques lack, in 
that it provides an objective determination of  threshold. This is otherwise a 
complex problem for  the auditor, because it requires combining materiality and 
audit assurance with the precision inherent in the expectation (STAR combines 
these factors  statistically, as described later). 
If  used effectively,  STAR can provide valuable objective assistance to the 
auditor making the judgments required in a substantive test and, by determining 
and illustrating the relationships between the data entered, can increase the 
auditor's understanding of  the client's business. 
To illustrate how STAR supports the audit judgments required in a substan-
tive analytical procedure, we will discuss the four  activities STAR primarily 
assists: 
1. Development of  a relationship (i.e., a model), using regression 
analysis, 
2. Plausibility and predictability checks of  the relationship using 
mathematical tests, 
3. Determination of  threshold, 
4. Identification  of  significant  differences  for  investigation. 
For each activity, we focus  on how STAR assists the auditor without elimi-
nating the need for  audit judgment. The presentation of  results, text messages, 
on-line help, and graphics provides the auditor with sufficient  information  so 
that, without being a statistical expert, he can develop and refine  a statistical 
model, and use such a model to assess whether material misstatement is likely 
at a specified  level of  assurance. 
Developing a Relationship 
Whether using STAR or not, when developing an analytical procedures 
expectation, an auditor must determine the type of  analysis, time-series (com-
parisons over time) or cross-sectional (comparisons over different  units), the 
level of  disaggregation, appropriate base data, and the model relating the pre-
dicting data to the data to be tested. 
STAR facilitates  these audit decisions with flexible  options as to data and 
disaggregation and with a sophisticated approach to building a model. STAR 
offers  both time-series and cross-sectional analysis. It effectively  allows any 
level of  disaggregation because it has no maximum limit on the number of 
observations and requires a minimum of  three observations in the base period. 
Typically, the base profile  in a time series application will contain 24 or 36 
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monthly observations. However, 52 weekly observations over one year could be 
used, or quarterly information  for  five  years. A minimum of  20 observations is 
recommended for  a cross-sectional application. 
Determine Appropriate Base Data 
Base data should include variables that are expected to be predictive of  the 
test variable and that, therefore,  are likely to be useful  in determining expected 
values for  the test variable. Sources of  data can be broadly categorized as exter-
nal, internal accounting, internal non-accounting, and dummy predicting vari-
ables. 
STAR offers  many options to allow the auditor the greatest flexibility  in 
selecting base data. For example, it is possible to use up to 24 predicting vari-
ables in a STAR model, although normally only two or three are used to prevent 
the model from  becoming too complex to be comprehensible. It is possible to 
have STAR skip or ignore portions of  base data if,  for  example, observations for 
certain periods are known to be unusual. 
If  a mathematical expression (e.g., units shipped x price index) better charac-
terizes the business relationship between a group of  predicting variables and the 
test variable, STAR includes facilities  to calculate such derived variables, pro-
vided that data for  the component variables have been entered. 
STAR also accommodates the entry of  dummy variables, if  these are 
required to account for  the presence of  unusual factors  or events, which are dif-
ficult  to quantify  and represent with an ordinary variable (e.g., holidays, fires,  or 
strikes); a trend variable if  the relationship between variables is thought to 
change systematically and in one direction over time; and other special vari-
ables, such as: 
• If  seasonal factors  are expected to affect  the relationship among vari-
ables, STAR can be instructed to create predicting variables for  sea-
sonal adjustment. In a monthly model, for  example, STAR will gener-
ate one predicting variable for  each month of  the year, each of  which 
adjusts for  seasonal effects  in the month it represents. For seasonality 
to be used, there needs to be a base period with at least three "sets" of 
observations so that a seasonal pattern can be identified. 
• Lagged variables can be specified  to build expected time lags into rela-
tionships, such as those expected between cash collections and sales, 
or between sales and advertising expenditure. For example, if  advertis-
ing expenditures in March are expected to affect  June sales dollars, the 
auditor can specify  that advertising expenditure be "lagged" by three 
months. 
The most common STAR audit applications are to test sales, cost of  sales, 
and other expenses. Typical predicting data used by auditors in STAR applica-
tions to develop expectations of  sales include inflation  indices and seasonality, 
and mathematical expressions combining factors  such as: 
• Store floor  area and sales per square foot, 
• Number of  units produced, consumed or shipped, and unit values, 
• Kilowatt hours sold and prices per kilowatt, 
• Number of  users and entry or usage fees, 
• Hours worked and labor charges per hour. 
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Develop Regression Model 
The auditor may identify  some number of  potential predicting variables. A 
decision has to be made about which particular subset results in the "best" 
model. The ideal is to use a small but powerful  set of  variables. STAR assists 
this process by using a procedure that includes a forward  selection procedure 
for  admitting new variables one at a time, as well as a backward elimination 
procedure for  removing variables that become redundant as a result of  subse-
quent admissions. Known as stepwise regression,  the goal is to ensure that all 
the independent variables that are included in the final  regression function 
(including special variables such as dummy, seasonal, or trend), contribute sig-
nificantly  to it in a statistical sense (i.e., contribute significantly  to the explana-
tory power of  the model). 
We do not recommend entering variables without regard to whether they are 
predictive of  the amount being tested, even though they are likely to be discard-
ed by STAR. The auditor should only enter data expected to have a relationship 
with the test variable. On the other hand, if  predicting variables expected to be 
related to the test variable are rejected by STAR, the auditor should investigate 
why the relationship is not acceptable to STAR. 
If  STAR finds  no statistically significant  variables, it reports this and stops 
processing: 
NO SIGNIFICANT PREDICTING VARIABLE HAS BEEN 
FOUND. STAR will not process the data further.  Review the base 
profile  and study the relationships analytically to determine why the 
predicting variable(s) do not have the expected relationships to the 
test variable. 
Unless an account is very volatile or totally subject to management's discre-
tion, it is unusual not to find  a relationship with other financial  or non-financial 
variables. In particular, the auditor should consider potentially related non-
financial  variables where STAR rejects financial  predicting variables. 
Presuming STAR finds  one or more statistically significant  variables, the 
resulting model is reported in the form  of  a regression equation. A listing of  all 
base data entered by the auditor indicates which variables are used in the model 
and which are not. 
Plausibility and Predictability Checks of  the Relationship 
Figure 1 shows the portion of  the report that summarizes the regression func-
tion along with a variety of  statistics for  informational  purposes. The effects  of 
the statistics on the model are automatically monitored by STAR. 
Regression Statistics 
STAR presents the regression model developed in the form  of  an equation: 
Y ' = a + b 1 X 1 + b 2 X 2 + . . . b n X n 
where Y' is the regression estimate for  the test variable, X n is the nth predicting 
variable, b n is the coefficient  of  the nth predicting variable, and a is a constant. 
For example, in Figure 1, the constant is 214.46 and the coefficient  of  the pre-
dicting variable is 1.1638: 
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X1 Cost of Sales 1,248.17 
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Expectation [ Y ' ( t ) ] for observation t : 
Y ' ( t ) = 214.46 + 1.1638*X1(t) 
The auditor does not need a detailed understanding of  the statistics, but is 
encouraged at a minimum to check that the model represented by the equation 
appears to make sense in the context of  his knowledge of  the business. The 
auditor should check that any special variables, such as seasonality, are as 
expected, both in terms of  the periods affected  and the magnitude of  their coef-
ficients.  In a simple STAR application (e.g., sales versus cost of  sales), the audi-
tor may be able to predict the approximate value of  the constant and of  the coef-
ficients  from  the expected business relationship. 
The coefficient  of  correlation indicates how closely the regression line fits  to 
the actual base data. Although it is not possible to provide specific  guidelines 
for  an acceptable coefficient,  the more precise the auditor expects the relation-
ship to be, the closer the coefficient  should be to 100 percent. A coefficient  of 
100 percent, however, usually indicates that the analytical procedure is closer to 
a proof  of  total than a regression application. In particular, the auditor should 
track the coefficient  from  year to year; a significant  decrease may indicate the 
presence of  a new business factor  that is not reflected  in the model. 
The STAR report for  the example in Figure 1 continues in Figure 2. In this 
figure,  the recorded amounts, the regression estimates (expectations), and the 
residuals (differences)  are displayed for  both the base period and the audit peri-
od, together with a graph of  the residuals. This graph may highlight trends and 
other influences  in the data that would not otherwise be apparent. 
The statistical and graphical information  reported by STAR can help to 
determine whether refinements  to the model are desirable. For example, a low 
coefficient  of  correlation may suggest that a significant  variable is missing from 
the model. If  we examine the graph of  the residuals and find  a large positive 
residual followed  by a negative residual of  similar size, this may indicate a cut-
off  error. Optional scatter diagrams of  the variables are available (see Figure 3) 
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Figure 
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Plot: Y Sales vs X1 Cost of Sates 
Y Sales 
X1 Cost of Sales 
Base = Year Number; Projections = ' * ' 
Correlation in Base Profile: 95X 
Other Maximum-- Minimum-- <1> Mean--
Summary Statistics All Values All Values Range Base Profile 
Y Sales 2,400 1,319 1,081 1,667.11 
X1 Cost of Sales 1,943 957 986 1,248.17 
<1> Base profile means indicated by crossbar 
that may indicate a change in conditions from  the base to the projection period. 
All this information  is designed to increase the auditor's understanding of  the 
relationships underlying the data entered, and may increase his understanding of 
the business. 
Mathematical Tests Applied to the Model 
As well as reporting the regression statistics, STAR performs  a number of 
mathematical tests on the data, and if  it identifies  unusual patterns or abnormali-
ties in the base profile,  prints appropriate warning messages. These alert audi-
tors to conditions that, if  corrected, may improve the application. A few  condi-
tions cause STAR to terminate the application; most allow the application to 
proceed, but alert the auditor to consider whether refinement  of  the model is 
necessary or preferable.  The messages and the supporting on-line help indicate 
why the condition reported might have occurred and what the auditor might do 
to correct the condition. The auditor is encouraged to refine  the model because a 
good model may eventually become invalid if  refinements  are not made as 
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needed in successive applications. 
Typically, messages indicate the presence or absence of  some additional fac-
tor affecting  the relationship between the predicting data and the test variable, 
either in isolated instances or systematically over time. Whenever practicable, 
the auditor should investigate such factors  and determine how to refine  the 
model to account for  them. A review of  the graph of  the residuals, often  in con-
junction with a review of  the scatter diagrams of  the variables, is usually helpful 
in determining the business reason for  the change in the model. Depending on 
the problem identified,  suggested refinements  to the model include: 
• Correcting errors in the base profile 
• Adding new variables to account for  significant  factors  that have been 
omitted from  the model 
• Adjusting the observations to eliminate the actual or estimated effects 
of  special one-of-a-kind  events 
• Using dummy variables when an exceptional circumstance exists, but 
it is not practicable to identify  a specific  real variable to compensate 
for  it 
• Introducing trend to account for  systematic changes in one direction 
over time 
• Removing the oldest observations from  the base profile  when a change 
has occurred in the underlying relationship 
• Stratifying  observations into more homogeneous units (i.e., disaggre-
gation of  data) when the regression base appears to consist of  two or 
more separate models. 
STAR tests for  four  major conditions: discontinuity, autocorrelation, het-
eroscedasticity, and abnormality. These tests are performed  automatically after 
STAR has identified  a model. They are logically structured and in designing 
them certain decisions were made as to significance  levels and alternative 
regression models. Such decisions are beyond the statistical expertise of  most 
auditors, but do not compromise the auditor's judgment. The results of  the tests 
are clearly communicated to the auditor who decides what, if  any, action to 
take. 
These tests are described below in some detail to illustrate the set of  proce-
dures that STAR performs  to identify  problems and to produce a reliable model 
from  the data provided, and how STAR provides the auditor with information  to 
assist him in improving the model. STAR messages are included in the follow-
ing discussion (in bold) to give an idea of  the style and language of  the text help 
provided. Each message is supported by additional on-line help that is in a simi-
lar style, but is more detailed. 
Discontinuity 
One assumption that is implied in the linear model is that of  continuity;  that 
is, that the same underlying linear relationship applies throughout the range of 
the observations. Its opposite, discontinuity,  can occur within the base period or 
between the base period and the audit period. STAR applies tests for  both types 
of  discontinuity to time-series applications. 
A model is derived from  base period data, therefore,  the consequences of  dis-
continuity within the base period can be significant,  and STAR will not proceed 
with a model in these circumstances. STAR prints a message. 
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THERE IS AN INDICATION OF DISCONTINUITY IN THE BASE 
PROFILE. STAR will not process the data further.  Discontinuity is 
ordinarily caused by a change in conditions which affects  the rela-
tionship between the variables. Examine the plot of  residuals to iden-
tify  the cause. Including an appropriate predicting variable in the 
model may eliminate the condition. 
Unlike discontinuity in the base period, discontinuity between the base peri-
od and the audit period does not necessarily mean that the regression model is 
inappropriate. STAR prints a message to alert the auditor, but does not termi-
nate processing. 
THERE IS AN INDICATION OF DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN 
BASE AND PROJECTION PROFILES. This type of  discontinuity 
does not invalidate the model but it may affect  the differences  to be 
audited. If  it is not eliminated, it may result in invalid models in 
future  years. Examine the plot of  residuals to identify  the cause. 
In many cases, the reason for  the apparent discontinuity between base and 
projection periods is the very effectiveness  of  the regression model in identify-
ing errors or unusual transactions in the audit period. However, if  the disconti-
nuity remains after  the current period data have been audited (and adjusted, if 
necessary), it should be investigated and corrected, otherwise it is likely to reap-
pear in the next period's application as a discontinuity in the base period. 
Discontinuity is often  caused by a temporary business disruption, for  exam-
ple a fire  or a strike. Either the data may be adjusted to eliminate the effects  of 
the disruption, or a dummy variable may be used to compensate for  them. 
Discontinuity is sometimes caused by a change in the line or size of  business. 
For example, a company may have acquired or disposed of  a subsidiary, or may 
have increased or decreased product lines. The application must be redesigned. 
Analytical procedures, whether using STAR or not, can only be effective  if  the 
data used is comparable over time. 
Autocorrelation 
An assumption that is implicit in simple time-series regression is that the 
residuals are statistically independent of  one another over time. In other words, 
that a regression estimate in period t could not be improved by knowledge of 
what the residual was in period t -1 or any other prior period. In the business 
world, events frequently  move in a time-related pattern and a pattern in the 
residuals may result. For example, in an inflationary  economy, where costs are 
rising continuously, but sales prices are only adjusted periodically, residuals in a 
model relating sales to cost of  sales will tend to show increasing residuals until 
a price increase takes effect.  In this case, the assumption of  statistical indepen-
dence is not valid, because regression estimates can be improved by factoring 
the pattern in the residuals. 
A systematic pattern of  interdependence over time is known as autocorrela-
tion or serial correlation  of  the disturbances. It ordinarily results in a visible 
pattern in the residuals from  the regression function,  which may be observed in 
the graph of  the residuals. If  significant  autocorrelation is ignored and the ordi-
nary regression function  is used, two events could occur. First, the regression 
projections might be less precise than expected because the pattern would be ig-
nored rather than factored  in. Second, the calculations of  the standard error 
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might be distorted. It is desirable, therefore,  to test for  autocorrelation and, if 
possible, to circumvent the problem that autocorrelation can cause. 
Because significant  autocorrelation is a potentially serious problem, STAR 
automatically tests for  it and then, if  necessary, adjusts for  it by calculating a so-
called generalized  regression function.  The test and computation of  the general-
ized regression function  are performed  automatically, but the outcome is clearly 
communicated to the auditor in a message. 
THERE IS AN INDICATION OF AUTOCORRELATION IN THE 
BASE PROFILE. Generalized least squares regression will be used to 
correct for  the condition. Autocorrelation can often  be attributed to a 
missing major factor  and is evidenced by a pronounced pattern in the 
residuals. Examine the plot of  residuals to identify  the missing factor. 
Including that factor  as a predicting variable may eliminate the con-
dition and reduce the differences  to be audited. 
The auditor is encouraged to correct the original regression model by adding 
a variable, rather than to use the generalized model. For example, if  a periodic 
event, such as price increase, is identified  as the contributing factor,  either a 
variable representing price or a dummy variable representing the percentage 
increase may be added. 
If  the generalized function  fails  to eliminate the autocorrelation, the applica-
tion is treated as fatally  flawed  and a message is printed indicating that the 
model is invalid: 
FATAL AUTOCORRELATION. This model should not be used for 
audit purposes. 
Heteroscedasticity 
Another assumption made in ordinary regression analysis is that the standard 
error is constant from  point to point. This condition is called homoscedasticity. 
In practice, residuals are not always homoscedastic. For example, in a cross-
sectional analysis of  sales across the branches of  a retail company, the sales of 
large stores might fluctuate  more in terms of  absolute dollars than the sales of 
small stores. Residuals that do not have a constant standard error are said to be 
heteroscedastic.  Heteroscedasticity can also be observed in a time-series analy-
sis in which the size of  the variables increases over time because of  either 
growth or inflation. 
Heteroscedasticity can take many different  forms.  In audit applications in 
which heteroscedasticity exists, the size of  the residuals varies in proportion to 
the size of  one of  the predicting variables. STAR tests for  heteroscedasticity 
and, where significant  heteroscedasticity is detected, performs  weighted  regres-
sion, in which the observations are weighted to compensate for  the effect  of  the 
predicting variable on the standard error. 
The test and, if  necessary, the weighted regression calculations, are performed 
automatically, but the results are clearly communicated to the auditor who is 
encouraged to review the application and to correct for  the condition if  possible. 
THERE IS AN INDICATION OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY IN 
THE BASE PROFILE. Weighted least squares regression will be 
used to correct for  the condition. Heteroscedasticity is evidenced by 
significant  correlation between the size of  the residuals and one of  the 
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predicting variables, in this case (variable  is identified).  The model 
may be improved by identifying  the cause of  the heteroscedasticity 
and introducing appropriate predicting variables. This may also 
reduce the differences  to be audited. 
Heterosedasticity is often  encountered in cross-sectional applications, where 
operating units (e.g., stores) vary considerably in size. The auditor should con-
sider using separate STAR applications, one for  large units and one for  all other 
units. 
Abnormality 
There are strong theoretical grounds for  believing that residuals will tend to 
be normally distributed. STAR performs  a test for  normality and alerts the audi-
tor to the presence of  apparent abnormality  (also known in statistical literature 
as non-normality)  in the base-period residuals. 
ABNORMALITY IN THE BASE PERIOD IS INDICATED BY: 
(STAR  prints one or more of  the following) 
• LEFT SKEWNESS - This may be caused by large negative residuals 
• RIGHT SKEWNESS - This may be caused by large positive residuals 
• KURTOSIS - This may be caused by both large positive and large 
negative residuals 
Abnormality does not invalidate the model but it may affect  the dif-
ferences  to be audited. Examine the plot of  the residuals to identify 
the outliers and, if  possible, eliminate the abnormality by correcting 
any errors or unusual events in those observations. 
Abnormality is usually apparent from  a review of  the graph of  the residuals. 
The outlier residuals should be investigated to determine if  there is a business 
reason that accounts for  them. Sometimes an outlier is explained by an unusual 
non-recurring event (e.g., a factory  shut-down), or a periodic event such as sea-
sonal peaks. The first  may be corrected by adjusting the data affected  by the 
event; the second by adding seasonal variable(s). 
Determination of  Threshold 
A major benefit  to using STAR in a substantive analytical procedure is that it 
determines the thresholds for  the disaggregated parts, based on the required 
audit parameters (i.e., materiality, audit assurance, and the primary direction of 
the audit test), and on the statistically achieved precision of  the regression. 
These thresholds are used to identify  any differences  that must be investigated. 
Without STAR, the auditor usually has difficulty  determining threshold, 
because of  the number of  different  factors  involved. 
The factors  STAR uses to determine threshold are: 
• Monetary  Precision (MP)  - The monetary quantification  of  materiality 
for  the substantive test, specified  by the auditor. As MP becomes 
smaller, thresholds become smaller, and more residuals that exceed 
threshold points are likely to be identified.  MP need not be reduced to 
allow for  allocation over the disaggregated observations, because 
STAR handles this in the determination of  threshold. 
• R Factor  - A factor  specified  by the auditor, representing the required 
level of  assurance to be derived from  the substantive test, presuming 
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positive results. As R becomes higher, thresholds become smaller and 
more residuals that exceed threshold points are likely to be identified. 
• Direction of  Test  - The auditor specifies  whether the test is primarily 
for  overstatement or for  understatement of  the test variable. 
• The statistical characteristics of  the regression function  determined by 
STAR, principally the standard error. The larger the standard error, the 
larger threshold becomes to compensate for  the imprecision of  the esti-
mates. 
If  a material amount of  misstatement exists cumulatively in the audit period, 
such misstatement could be spread throughout the observations in many ways. 
For example, it could all be in one month or it could be spread over twelve 
months. Threshold points that are set to detect misstatements spread in one way 
may not detect misstatement that is spread differently,  even though the total 
amount of  misstatement is the same in both situations. Fortunately, it can be 
shown that there is a most adverse  spread  of  error.  Threshold points that detect 
misstatement spread in the most adverse manner are tighter than those that 
would be needed to detect misstatement spread in any other way. STAR deter-
mines the most adverse spread of  error and conservatively applies it in its deter-
mination of  thresholds. 
That a most adverse spread of  error should exist may not be immediately 
obvious. The key to understanding why it does exist is to recognize that there 
are two opposing factors  that determine the probability of  detecting error: 
• The size of  the individual error taintings. The smaller the error tainting 
of  a particular observation, the less probable it is that the observation 
will be identified. 
• The number of  error-tainted observations. The more error-tainted 
observations there are, the more likely it is that at least one will be 
identified. 
It can be shown that the interaction of  these two opposing factors  ensures 
that a certain spread of  error will result in the tightest threshold requirement. 
This spread is the most adverse spread of  error because any other will allow a 
threshold that is less stringent. It is dependent on two main factors:  the size of 
the MP relative to the standard error of  the residual and the required R factor. 
Initially, it might seem that the maximum number of  observations over 
which a material error might be spread should be limited to the number of 
observations in the accounting period. For example, if  the application uses 
monthly data, the need to consider the risk of  spreading a material error over 
more than twelve observations might appear doubtful.  STAR, nevertheless, 
does not place any upper limit on the most adverse spread of  error, and the cal-
culation is performed  separately for  each observation. This approach to calculat-
ing the most adverse distribution helps to ensure that the statistical assurance 
provided by STAR is not diluted over multiple STAR applications. For exam-
ple, if  the calculation did not consider the possibility that a material error could 
be spread over sixty observations, the risk that material error could be spread 
over five  different  STAR applications that use monthly data might be higher 
than the nominal level. 
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Identification  of  Significant  Differences 
The basic concept underlying STAR's audit interface  is that the recorded 
amounts of  the test variable in the projection period may have been materially 
affected  by accounting errors, while the estimates projected from  the regression 
model should not be so affected  (because the model is based on observations 
that have been audited or obtained from  sources considered reliable). Therefore, 
differences  between the recorded amounts and the regression estimates in the 
audit period are expected to have been caused by: 
• The random variation that is inherent in business operations and in 
estimates based on a regression model 
• Errors or unusual events that affect  the recorded amount of  the test 
variable in the projection period. 
Thresholds are used to identify  which differences  are sufficiently  significant 
to warrant investigation. In the event that the difference  between the recorded 
value of  the test variable and the regression estimate for  any disaggregate part 
(i.e., any observation) exceeds the threshold in the direction of  the test, STAR 
identifies  the difference  as significant,  warranting investigation. For each such 
identified  significant  difference,  the auditor performs  further  analysis and 
inquiry to obtain, corroborate, and quantify  an explanation or, if  this is not pos-
sible, performs  alternative procedures to investigate the difference.  (Differences 
are always shown as positive if  the recorded amount exceeds the regression esti-
mate and negative if  the reverse is true, regardless of  the direction of  the test 
specified.) 
If  the difference  exceeds the threshold in the direction opposite to that of  the 
test, STAR also identifies  the difference  as significant.  The auditor should seek 
an explanation for  such differences,  even though they are not a primary focus  of 
our test. If  nothing else, the differences  may indicate problems with the predict-
ing variables in the audit period. 
The STAR report of  the projection profile  in the Alpha Company application 
is shown in Figure 4. A difference  to be investigated in the direction of  the test 
occurs in period 48, in which the residual is -171 and the threshold is 79. 
Differences  to be investigated in the opposite direction occur in periods 39 and 
47, in which the residuals are 87 and 163. 
The fact  that STAR identifies  a significant  difference  to be investigated does 
not mean that something is wrong. Instead, it indicates that the auditor does not 
have the desired assurance that something is not wrong. The difference  could be 
caused by an unusual transaction or event, or by a number of  ordinary occur-
rences that just happen to combine to cause a significant  difference.  Until the 
reason for  the difference  has been determined, corroborated, and quantified, 
however, the desired level of  assurance from  the analytical procedure has not 
been achieved. 
Auditors are recommended to check whether differences  between expecta-
tions and recorded amounts in the audit period, even if  not individually signifi-
cant, follow  any pattern that might indicate potential material misstatement in 
the aggregate. For example, they might be concerned if  most differences  were 
in one direction and many were close to threshold. This type of  rec-
ommendation is to avoid the "It's produced by a computer so it must be right" 
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mentality, and to encourage auditors to use their judgment throughout a STAR 
application. 
Figure 4 
AUDIT test for UNDERSTATEMENT using MP = 350, R = 3.0 
Optional Test 
Obs Recorded Regression Residual Excess Select 'n Sam 
No Amount Estimate (Difference) Threshold <1> Interval ple 
37 1,930 1,950 -20 
38 2,162 2,107 55 
39 2,070 1,983 87 <2> 
40 2,032 2,000 32 
41 2,002 2,064 -62 
42 2,124 2,118 6 
43 2,251 2,187 64 
44 2,280 2,321 -41 
45 2,186 2,160 26 
46 2,028 2,031 -3 
47 2,400 2,237 163 <2> 
48 2,305 2,476 -171 79 92 137 18 
25,770 25,634 136 18 
<1> Significant difference in direct ion of test. Perform further analysis and 
inquiry to obtain and corroborate explanation. Perform optional test of 
details only i f difference cannot be explained. 
<2> Significant difference in opposite direct ion to that of test. Seek an 
explanation. 
Investigation of  Significant  Differences 
STAR cannot directly help the auditor's investigation of  significant  differ-
ences, but, as illustrated throughout this discussion, reports information  that 
may be useful  in resolving issues related to the credibility of  the model and/or 
its refinement.  When our investigation of  differences  identifies  a potential cor-
rection to base data used in the model, we should preferably  refine  the STAR 
application, even though the explanation may be sufficient  for  this year's audit 
purposes. If  the model is not updated for  discovered discrepancies, it is likely to 
be less precise in subsequent years and, therefore,  may identify  more and/or 
larger differences  than necessary. 
When STAR identifies  a significant  difference  in the specified  direction of 
test, it designs a Cumulative Monetary Amount sample (CMA - a form  of  dollar 
unit sampling) for  a test of  details of  the test variable, to provide an alternative 
test if  the significant  difference  cannot be resolved. This is a last resort option, 
used only if  the auditor fails  to identify  an explanation for  the difference  or can-
not corroborate or quantify  an explanation. STAR prints the sample size and 
selection interval under the caption, Optional Test.  This is shown in Figure 4. In 
period 48, the optional CMA sample size is 18 and the selection interval is 137. 
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Example of  a STAR Application 
To reinforce  the concepts presented, we include an example of  the use of 
STAR in Appendix A. In this example, the original model was not optimal and 
STAR reported a discontinuity between the base and the projection periods. The 
auditors reviewed the data and identified  a missing variable. They corrected the 
model and reran the STAR application. 
Conclusion 
STAR does not perform  audit procedures; it assists the auditor in performing 
substantive procedures. The fundamental  decisions are made by the auditor, just 
as they would be if  any other technique were used for  the analysis. The objec-
tives of  the test are determined by the auditor; the model is based on data select-
ed and deemed reliable by the auditor; thresholds are based on audit parameters; 
and the auditor must determine how to deal with differences  identified  for 
investigation. 
However, STAR provides valuable assistance to the auditor in developing 
the model and determining thresholds. STAR translates expected relationships 
between data into mathematical forms  that can be used to make projections. 
STAR reports to the auditor if  a resulting relationship appears less than optimal, 
with suggestions as to possible causes and solutions, and graphical reports to 
help identify  the problem. Finally, STAR determines thresholds for  identi-
fication  of  significant  differences  by combining the auditor's materiality and 
audit assurance requirements with the statistical precision of  the regression 
model. 
The limitations encountered in using STAR for  substantive testing are the 
same as the limitations inherent in any substantive analytical procedure. The 
auditor must make judgments whatever tool he uses, and is ultimately responsi-
ble for  deciding whether a procedure indicates the absence of  material error at 
the required level of  assurance. While substantive analytical procedures may be 
performed  without using STAR, the benefits  of  an objective challenge to the 
data relationships expected by the auditor and an objective threshold determina-
tion make STAR a preferred  alternative in many circumstances. 
Appendix A: Example of  a STAR Application 
This example is based on a STAR application for  a client in the importing/ 
wholesale trade. STAR had been used successfully  for  several years to project 
sales of  imported products based on the cost of  purchases from  the British par-
ent company. This year. STAR reported a discontinuity between base and pro-
jection profiles  (see the message at the bottom of  Figure A-1), and the results of 
the projection profile  analysis (see Figure A-2) show that STAR identified 
significant  differences  to be investigated for  every observation in the current 
period. 
From a review of  the plot of  residuals (see Figure A-3), a distinctive change 
in the pattern is observed after  observation 37 (i.e., all the residuals are on the 
same side of  the line and many are -2 or more standard errors away). This sug-
gests that a change in operating conditions occurred in January of  the current 
year. 
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A discontinuity between the base profile  and the current data does not pre-
vent the model from  being used. However, the number and size of  the differ-
ences to be investigated (Figure A-2) would require a significant  amount of 
audit effort,  and if  the discontinuity is not resolved and eliminated this year, dis-
continuity may appear in the base next year, resulting in an invalid model. 
Discussions with the client revealed the following: 
• The client purchased almost all of  its imports from  its parent company. 
• The purchase cost to the Canadian operation was set in British pounds 
and recorded in the Canadian books at the spot rate of  exchange exist-
ing on delivery. 
• Foreign currency hedges were not used. 
• Sales prices in Canada were set well in advance, and were not changed 
during the year. 
• The exchange rate between the British and Canadian currencies had 
jumped from  1.85 to 2.05 in January of  the current year and had 
remained relatively constant during the year. 
The audit staff  tested the theory that the exchange rate was affecting  the cost 
side of  the Sales/Cost of  Sales relationship, and found  that this more or less 
explained most of  the differences  reported by STAR. 
Figure A-1 
Stepwise Multiple Regression Model 
Input Data Regression Function 
Standard Constant or Standard 
Description Mean Error Coefficient Error 
Constant 74.90 
Predicting Variables 
X1 COST OF SALES 2,841.14 716.61 1.5545 0.0663 
Test Variable 
Y SALES 4,491.44 1,147.89 
Y' Expectation 4,491.44 281.0349 
Coefficient of Correlation (100X = Perfect) 97X 
Expectation [ Y ' ( t ) ] for observation t : 
Y ' ( t ) = 74.90 + 1.5545*X1(t) 
THERE IS AN INDICATION OF DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN BASE AND PROJECTION PROFILES. 
This type of discontinuity does not invalidate the model but i t may affect 
the differences to be audited. I f i t is not eliminated, i t may result in 




AUDIT test for UNDERSTATEMENT using MP = 500, R = 2.0 
Optional Test 
Obs Recorded Regression Residual 
No Amount Estimate (Difference) Threshold 
Excess Select 'n Sam 

















































37 826 5 
515 270 25 
1,215 254 43 
773 252 28 
757 250 24 
272 366 13 
401 301 18 
324 338 14 
791 266 34 
808 257 30 
290 358 15 
804 251 23 
69,117 77,778 -8,661 272 
<1> Significant difference in direct ion of test. Perform further analysis and 
inquiry to obtain and corroborate explanation. Perform optional test of 
details only i f difference cannot be explained. 
A decision was made to revise and rerun the model because: 
• Unless the exchange factors  were built into the model, the STAR 
model would probably fail  in the following  year due to discontinuity in 
the base period. 
• Including the exchange factors  in the base would improve the model 
because the rate had fluctuated  throughout the base period, although 
never as much as in January of  the current year. 
• Revising and rerunning the model would provide the most efficient 
and objective means for  verifying  the analytical explanation received. 
To refine  the model, the predicting variable, cost of  sales, was adjusted for 
the exchange index and the model was re-run using the derived variable. 
Figures A-4 through A-6 show the results of  the STAR application after  the 
effect  of  foreign  exchange was added to the data profile. 
STAR no longer reports discontinuity (see Figure A-4) and the revised pro-
jection profile  analysis (Figure A-5) shows only two significant  differences  to 
be investigated. The plot of  residuals (see Figure A-6) shows no dramatic 
change in the last twelve months. 
By adjusting the base data, the auditors have only a few  significant  differ-
ences to investigate and have a more precise model to use in the future. 
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Figure 3 
Plot of Residuals 
Obs Recorded Regression Residual 
No Amount Estimate (Difference) 
Residuals Graphed in Units 
of One Standard Error 
- 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
1 3,747 4,037 -290 
2 4,785 4,650 135 
3 4,853 4,769 84 
4 4,439 4,258 181 
5 4,146 4,720 -574 
6 3,883 3,529 354 
7 3,563 3,638 -75 
8 3,298 3,300 -2 
9 5,261 5,873 -612 
10 5,097 5,149 -52 
11 4,380 4,664 -284 
12 3,280 3,893 -613 
13 2,388 2,459 -71 
14 4,029 3,935 94 
15 5,127 5,020 107 
16 4,346 4,400 -54 
17 3,776 3,756 20 
18 4,066 3,888 178 
19 3,139 3,311 -172 
20 3,369 3,330 39 
21 6,123 6,442 -319 
22 5,076 5,111 -35 
23 6,494 6,081 413 
24 3,756 3,938 -182 
25 3,002 2,700 302 
26 4,632 4,412 220 
27 6,699 5,996 703 
28 5,576 5,402 174 
29 3,446 3,308 138 
30 4,524 4,261 263 
31 3,702 3,761 -59 
32 3,220 3,260 -40 
33 6,208 5,954 254 
34 5,317 5,461 -144 
35 7,034 7,129 -95 
36 5,911 5,895 16 
37 3,944 4,134 -190 
38 6,103 6,765 -662 
39 9,693 10,964 -1,271 
40 6,142 7,061 -919 
41 5,101 6,008 -907 
42 4,338 4,763 -425 
43 4,868 5,421 -553 
44 4,260 4,737 -477 
45 8,146 9,051 -905 
46 6,758 7,712 -954 
47 4,933 5,376 -443 
48 4,831 5,786 -955 
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Figure 
Stepwise Multiple Regression Model 
Description 























Expectation [ Y ' ( t ) ] for observation t : 
Y ' ( t ) = 232.78 + 2.7453*X1(t) 
Figure A-5 
AUDIT test for UNDERSTATEMENT using MP = 500, R = 2.0 
Optional Test 
Obs Recorded Regression Residual Excess Select'n Sam 
No Amount Estimate (Difference) Threshold <1> Interval ple 
37 3,944 3,730 214 <2> 
38 6,103 5,998 105 
39 9,693 9,614 79 
40 6,142 6,251 -109 
41 5,101 5,345 -244 159 85 890 6 
42 4,338 4,271 67 
43 4,868 4,839 29 
44 4,260 4,249 11 
45 8,146 7,966 180 <2> 
46 6,758 6,813 -55 
47 4,933 4,798 135 
48 4,831 5,152 -321 159 162 515 10 
69,117 69,026 91 16 
= = = 
<1> Significant difference in direction of test. Perform further analysis and 
inquiry to obtain and corroborate explanation. Perform optional test of 
details only if difference cannot be explained. 
<2> Significant difference 
explanation. 




Plot of Residuals 
06s Recorded Regression Residual 
No Amount Estimate (Difference) 
1 3,747 3,645 102 
2 4,785 4,175 610 
3 4,853 4,485 368 
4 4,439 4,249 190 
5 4,146 4,691 -545 
6 3,883 3,549 334 
7 3,563 3,653 -90 
8 3,298 3,329 -31 
9 5,261 5,353 -92 
10 5,097 4,713 384 
11 4,380 4,285 95 
12 3,280 3,604 -324 
13 2,388 2,509 -121 
14 4,029 3,917 112 
15 5,127 4,952 175 
16 4,346 4,362 -16 
17 3,776 3,747 29 
18 4,066 3,873 193 
19 3,139 3,321 -182 
20 3,369 3,340 29 
21 6,123 6,481 -358 
22 5,076 5,174 -98 
23 6,494 6,127 367 
24 3,756 4,024 -268 
25 3,002 3,044 -42 
26 4,632 4,875 -243 
27 6,699 6,769 -70 
28 5,576 6,113 -537 
29 3,446 3,497 -51 
30 4,524 4,458 66 
31 3,702 3,953 -251 
32 3,220 3,448 -228 
33 6,208 5,844 364 
34 5,317 5,375 -58 
35 7,034 6,967 67 
36 5,911 5,789 122 
37 3,944 3,730 214 
38 6,103 5,998 105 
39 9,693 9,614 79 
40 6,142 6,251 -109 
41 5,101 5,345 -244 
42 4,338 4,271 67 
43 4,868 4,839 29 
44 4,260 4,249 11 
45 8,146 7,966 180 
46 6,758 6,813 -55 
47 4,933 4,798 135 
48 4,831 5,152 -321 
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Discussant's Response to "Using Regression Analysis 
to Assist Audit Judgments in Substantive Testing" 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
University of  Texas at Austin 
I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the updated version of 
STAR. Many of  my papers have addressed problems in analytical review in 
auditing and particularly regression analysis as a tool. Hearing about STAR's 
revision was like hearing that an old friend  hadn't died after  all. Thus, it was 
with some enthusiasm that I accepted Raj's invitation to discuss the updated, 
interactive version of  STAR with its new bells and whistles. 
My comments are divided into four  basic areas and are generally favorable 
toward the software  and the approach. Rather than being overly technical, I will 
try to stimulate your thinking about STAR, provide some perspective, and 
assess where we might go from  here. First is a brief  history of  STAR and some 
STAR-related regression analysis research in auditing. Second is an analysis of 
what's good about STAR and what's new in the current version, and third will 
be some areas that need elaboration or additional thought. Finally, there is an 
overall evaluation of  STAR and its impact. 
History 
As many of  you know, STAR, dollar unit sampling, and the AICPA's audit 
risk model were developed by Ken Stringer of  the former  Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells. I began my research on regression in auditing after  a 1977 conversation 
with Jim Loebbecke. We were discussing his research on "combined attributes 
and variables" sampling which was related to Stringer's "cumulative monetary 
amount" version of  dollar unit sampling. Jim said that he had based his efforts 
on the presumption that Stringer was probably right, so Jim took what he knew 
about CMA and tried to derive what he didn't. I decided that I would try the 
same approach for  STAR. 
Using Stringer [1975], I set out to derive what must be in a regression pack-
age that could satisfy  the requirements for  a substantive test. My primary prob-
lem was determining what Stringer meant by the "most adverse distribution of 
error." Stringer [1975] gave no clues but said that STAR was designed to be 
effective  even under that most feared  of  circumstances. I finally  decided that 
that must mean that the procedure was based on the sum of  estimated misstate-
ments, and therefore  it didn't matter how misstatements were distributed. My 
solution appeared in Kinney [1979]. At a conference  sponsored by DHS, I 
found  out that I had not guessed correctly about STAR but still had a useful 
result. 
Both STAR and Kinney [1979] use an upper precision limit (UPL) on error 
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calculation that is then compared to a monetary precision measure (monetary 
precision is the magnitude of  "intolerable" misstatement for  the assertion or 
account under audit). The decision rule is: 
"If  UPL (Error) > MP measure, then don't rely." 
There are two basic approaches to relating UPL to MP, as represented here 
today. They differ  on how the UPL is calculated and how MP is measured. The 
Price Waterhouse approach is based on Kinney [1979] and calculates an UPL 
on total error for  the year (in a time series model) using the standard error for 
the total. The resulting UPL for  the year is then compared to a materiality or tol-
erable error measure for  the year. Specifically,  for  Price Waterhouse the calcu-
lation is: 
U P L A P E ) = E + t (AP) x SE(E) ≥ MP 
where AP denotes the analytical procedure risk level, E is sum of  the estimated 
monthly misstatements for  the year as a whole, and SE(E) denotes the standard 
error for  total misstatement for  the year. 
The STAR approach of  Deloitte and Touche calculates the UPL by month 
and compares with a monthly MP measure (see Kinney [1979] and Stringer and 
Stewart [1985]). STAR makes the following  comparison for  all values of  n > 0: 
UPLAP (e) = e + t N√AP) x SE(e) > MP/n 
where e is the estimated error for  the month, and SE(e) is the standard error for 
the month. It can be shown that the STAR comparison has a unique minimum 
that occurs at generally small values of  n. Thus, the calculation need not be 
made for  all values of  n > 0. 
Research since 1975 has found  the following.  Regression analysis is reliable 
for  the data tested (it has been tested using simulated data and actual data with 
simulated misstatements). That is, the actual rate of  failure  to indicate material 
misstatements does not exceed the nominal level [e.g., see Kinney and Salamon, 
1982; Knechel, 1988]. Also, the procedure is "fail  safe."  If  a precise model can-
not be developed, then the SE is so large that the UPL will exceed the MP mea-
sure and the auditor is warned that there is insufficient  evidence for  reliance. 
As to the success of  field  application, there is circumstantial evidence that 
STAR may be effective  in locating potential material misstatements. Kinney 
and McDaniel [1989] show that the rate of  correction of  errors discovered in 
quarterly statements of  Deloitte Haskins & Sells clients is about twice that for 
the population of  Big Eight firms  as a whole. While the result may be due to 
poor clients or to other factors,  these alternative explanations do not seem 
likely. 
In regard to auditing standards, STAR and other regression-based procedures 
are perhaps the only fully  operational and practical means of  complying with 
the provisions of  SAS No. 56 [AICPA, 1988] for  substantive evidence. 
Regression provides a basis for  forming  conditional expectations, and a means 
of  quantifying  precision and relating the result to materiality—two difficult 
requirements of  SAS No. 56. Ratio analysis and ARIMA models may partially 
satisfy  these conditions, but generally they suffer  from  excessive standard errors 
and, thus, are not effective  as audit evidence. Finally, STAR has an advantage 
under the SAS No. 31 [AICPA, 1980] approach of  assessing risk at the asser-
tions level. In contrast to tests of  details which often  test only a single assertion, 
STAR may be effective  in detecting misstatements in more than one assertion 
and more than one account. 
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What's good about new STAR, and regression in auditing? 
In addition to the desirable features  discussed above, the new STAR 
approach is an improvement because of  the new bells and whistles that guide 
the auditor in developing an acceptable model of  an account. There is increased 
emphasis on understanding the client's business and many hints are provided to 
the auditors on how to better understand the business. First, the model-building 
exercise itself  requires understanding of  the basic covariation among and 
between financial  and physical elements. Second, the new diagnostic testing can 
confirm  or deny the auditor's preliminary understanding. For example, the audi-
tor is directed to try to understand why an expected covariation is not observed. 
Furthermore, the diagnostic approach is extended through consideration of 
omitted variables. Specifically,  the program tests for  discontinuity (or changed 
parameters since the base period), autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and 
abnormal residuals. In each case, the auditor is given hints as to what the pattern 
that violates regression assumptions might mean in terms of  an improperly 
specified  model. For example, the auditor is directed to consider whether there 
are patterns over time such as a positive residual followed  by a negative resid-
ual. This pattern may indicate a cutoff  problem. Also, it gives guidance about 
omitted causal or structural variables. 
Beyond auditing applications, there are several additional uses of  STAR and 
the auditor's skills in using STAR. A partial list includes: interim reviews of 
financial  information,  preparation and review of  forward-looking  information, 
and incorporation in a client's integrated internal control system [COSO 1991]. 
In fact,  the latter two can be combined in developing client forecasting  systems 
useful  in formulating  plans or budgets for  the future  and then providing early 
warning that things aren't working out as planned. The regression model could 
be used by the client to direct attention to implementation problems (including 
errors and fraud),  to revise the planning model estimates, or to revise the model 
itself  by including variables that had been omitted. Such a system should be 
helpful  in business operation as well as in demonstrating to others that controls 
are good [Kinney, Maher and Wright, 1990]. 
Finally, I pose a question for  professors  and practitioners alike (I don't 
expect an answer now, but I am curious about your thoughts). Given all of  the 
advantages of  STAR, why hasn't this product and approach been advertised? 
Regression analysis seems to offer  solutions to several problems of  auditors and 
offers  considerable benefits  to clients. Why hasn't D & T advertised it? Why 
don't public accounting firms  in general advertise their leading edge technolo-
gies? Why isn't it useful  to advertise audit excellence to clients, financial  state-
ment users, audit committees, and prospective employees? 
What needs elaboration? 
As to limitations of  STAR and the Stewart and Thornton [1992] paper, I 
have three general comments. The first  relates to the paper and how it could be 
made more useful  for  professors  who are interested in giving their students per-
spective on practical application of  tools such as regression analysis (Scott and 
Wallace [1992] provide some insights in this regard). The second concerns the 
guidance in SAS No. 56 and its incorporation in STAR, and the third involves 
questions about STAR itself. 
As a teacher, I would appreciate answers to three questions about the appli-
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cation of  STAR in practice. First, what is the distribution of  the ratio of  the stan-
dard error of  the regression to monetary precision? This ratio relates the preci-
sion of  the estimate measured in dollars (SE) to allowable imprecision also 
measured in dollars (MP). I believe that the distribution of  SE/MP would be 
more useful  than correlation coefficients  since, in the former,  both the numera-
tor and denominator are measured in dollars instead of  proportion of  variation 
explained. It would be especially useful  to see the distribution of  SE/MP across 
accounts, clients, and industries. Second, what is the mix of  internal, external, 
non-financial,  and indicator variables across accounts, clients and industries? 
This knowledge would allow professors  to assess the importance of  internal 
variables in designing analytical procedure research projects and to see how 
sophisticated the practice models are. Realistic classroom examples could then 
be developed. Third, what have STAR's costs been— training costs, implemen-
tation costs, and the costs of  making the transition for  staff  auditors from 
Deloitte & Touche? 
As one interested in auditing standards, I am torn between the use of  regres-
sion diagnostics to better understand the client's business vs. signalling possible 
misstatements. This same concern was expressed in the recent Expectations Gap 
Roundtable [Blocher and Loebbecke, 1992], and in a presentation at this confer-
ence two years ago [Kinney and Haynes, 1991]. The approach taken in STAR is 
consistent with SAS No. 56, para. 21, which focuses  the auditor on explaining 
unexpected results in terms of  non-error causes. Basically, para. 21 says that if 
UPL exceeds MP, then the auditor should first  consider whether the model is 
wrong (auditor mistake), then ask management for  an explanation. If  both of 
these fail,  then the auditor is directed to consider accounting misstatement as the 
possible cause. Since behavioral research has shown that auditors may focus 
unduly on nonerror causes identified  by either of  the first  two foils,  they may 
underweight the probability of  error or fraud.  This problem is not unique to 
STAR, but STAR's focus  on understanding the client's business may increase 
the tendency. 
Turning now to STAR itself,  I note two issues that provide food  for  thought. 
First, stepwise regression includes the variable(s) that best fit  the data during the 
base period. Each period, by chance, certain variables will exhibit particularly 
good fits  in explaining the dependent variable even when there is a truly causal 
variable available. The best fitting  variables in the base period may not exhibit 
much explanatory power in the prediction (audit) period. Thus, STAR may to 
some degree select randomly irrelevant variables. An alternative is a theoretical 
basis for  the model in each application. The model (or perhaps an industry 
model) might be developed once and updated through appropriate consideration 
of  omitted variables. A theoretically-based model would require more skill in 
model building, but may be more precise in the long run. 
Second, a reading of  SAS No. 31 in conjunction with SAS No. 56 raises an 
evidence integration issue that has not been adequately addressed. The issue is 
how to combine evidence across assertions and across accounts. There are at 
least two levels of  analysis for  integrating results using regression as an analyti-
cal procedure. Within an application, care must be taken to account for  the lack 
of  independence due to use of  the same regression equation to estimate multiple 
components of  an account balance [see Kinney, 1979]. Across applications, 
there is the problem of  how to combine results. Since STAR uses an investiga-
tion rule that considers the "most adverse distribution of  error," it may provide 
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protection in signalling possible misstatement when a material amount of  mis-
statements is spread over several accounts that are audited using STAR. 
Overall 
STAR was a very useful  tool in 1975. It has led to considerable research and 
to SAS No. 56. It holds much promise in the 1990s as a tool for  substantive test-
ing in auditing as well as many other areas of  client services and direct use by 
the clients themselves. 
The new "bells and whistles" should add value through better understanding 
of  clients' businesses, and increased value as a substantive audit tool. 
Furthermore, its potential as an analytical tool seems even greater now than it 
did in 1975. 
I'm delighted that the technique has survived the merger, and competitive 
and cost pressures. I hope that other firms  will consider its use as an audit and 
business tool. 
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Practical Experiences with Regression Analysis 
David A. Scott 
Price Waterhouse, Canada 
Wanda A. Wallace 
College of William and Mary 
Abstract 
Price Waterhouse has conducted a field experiment on the application of 
regression analysis, involving the launching of new software, micro-based train-
ing, and initial modeling for audit use. While the phases of the experiment 
included alpha and beta testing of the software as described herein, the core of 
the experiment involved field applications of regression analysis by engagement 
teams. Their experiences and reactions are described, as are the future plans of 
the firm. Experiences in prior field applications are likewise shared, to illustrate 
both the context in which regression analysis has been used and the nature of 
inferences drawn, as well as the statistical profile achieved in modeling. Insights 
are gained as to the tool's feasibility, time demands in its application, and per-
ceptions of users. 
Introduction 
Over the years, a number of papers have appeared suggesting the benefits of 
using regression analysis as an analytical audit tool for risk identification and 
error detection. In some cases the authors have described individual applications 
of the technique. For example, Campbell and Rankin [1986] described the use 
of regression analysis to develop expectations of sales in a manufacturing com-
pany, Kask [1979] covered an application to identify out-of-line energy costs 
for a group of hospitals, and Akresh and Wallace [1981] discussed a public util-
ity application. Others [Knechel, 1986 and Wilson and Colbert, 1989] have 
reported that regression analysis, compared with alternate analytical procedures, 
is a more accurate tool for identifying errors of varying sizes and patterns seed-
ed into simulated data. 
Despite these purported conceptual advantages from using regression analy-
sis, Deloitte & Touche is the only major accounting firm that seems to have 
used it regularly, in sampling applications [Stringer, 1975 and Stringer and 
Stewart, 1986—referred to as STAR]. While Price Waterhouse has had field 
applications using regression analysis since 1979, the scope of application has 
not been pervasive throughout the World Firm, for a number of reasons detailed 
later in this paper. Overall, as has been reported by Daroca and Holder [1985] 
and Spires and Yardley [1989], the use of regression analysis and other 
advanced quantitative procedures by audit teams, across firms, has been rela-
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tively rare. As usual, the marketplace is the ultimate proof of the pudding. 
Among the barriers have been the need for relatively powerful computing capa-
bility, the perceived complexity of the technique for non-statisticians, and 
uncertainty as to how to relate the results of a regression analysis application to 
an audit risk/satisfaction framework. 
We have been involved in studying how and if these barriers could be over-
come at Price Waterhouse. In this paper we report on our experiences to date. 
The Interest 
For a number of years the Price Waterhouse audit methodology has included 
an audit satisfaction hierarchy wherein alternate audit procedures are ranked 
based on their presumed efficiency [Walker and Pierce, 1988]. The actual pro-
cedures selected for the audit plan will depend on inherent risk assessments by 
assertion, assessed control risk, materiality, client expectations, and other fac-
tors. However, all things being equal (which is rarely the case), audit planners 
are encouraged to think first about relying on analytical procedures, then on 
internal controls, and to do detailed testing only when particular audit assertions 
cannot be satisfied in any more cost-effective way. This approach is consistent 
with evidence regarding the value of analytical procedures in risk assessment. 
Empirical studies in an external audit context, such as those by Kreutzfeldt and 
Wallace [1986 and Wright and Ashton [1988], have consistently shown that 
forty to fifty percent of errors detected were disclosed by analytical procedures. 
Coglitore and Berryman [1988] have shown how better use of analytical proce-
dures might have prevented several well-publicized audit failures [also see 
Wallace, 1991]. Analytical procedures are clearly an important risk assessment 
tool. 
Price Waterhouse believes that many advantages accrue from using analyti-
cal procedures in the audit. For example: 
• Analytical procedures enhance the auditor 's understanding of the 
dynamics of the client's business, which not only improves the quality 
of the audit but also makes the auditor better able to offer sound busi-
ness advice to the client. 
• Research confirms our own experience that analytical procedures can 
be very e f fec t ive at f inding errors. For example , Wallace and 
Kreutzfeldt [1986], Wright and Ashton [1988], and Knechel [1988a, 
1988b] all present evidence along this line. However, Loebbecke and 
Steinbart [1987], Kinney [1987], and Blocher and Cooper [1988] show 
that trends and ratios are relatively ineffective, at least at the aggregate 
level at which they are conventionally used. Research suggests some-
what of a gulf between the effectiveness of trend and ratio procedures 
on the one hand and modeling procedures on the other. 
• Analytical procedures are efficient because they usually provide evi-
dence for several audit assertions simultaneously (in contrast to a 
detailed test which may address only one or two assertions). 
At the same time as analytical procedures were receiving increased emphasis 
in the Price Waterhouse auditing methodology, professional pronouncements 
such as Statement on Auditing Standards No. 56: Analytical Procedures 
[AICPA, 1988] and International Auditing Guideline 12 [IFAC, 1990] intro-
duced new requirements for the use of analytical procedures in the planning and 
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final review stages of audit examinations. In fact, the auditing standard setters 
were mandating what made common sense, and what, by and large, was already 
being done in practice. 
The strategic emphasis by Price Waterhouse on analytical procedures stimu-
lated an interest in regression analysis as a tool for the auditor. The potential 
advantages we saw from regression analysis were the following: 
• In contrast to the judgmental predictive models embodied in the simpler 
analytical procedures such as ratio and trend analysis, regression analy-
sis, through measures of precision and goodness of fit, would give a 
more objective assessment of the reliability of predictive audit models. 
• Auditors generally have little difficulty assessing whether the direction 
of change in an accounting variable makes sense, but regression analy-
sis could be a more effective tool for assessing the reasonableness of 
the amount of change. 
• With regression analysis, auditors would be able to define unusual 
observations using objective mathematical probabilities rather than the 
subjective rules of thumb often associated with simpler analytical pro-
cedures. This should mean improved efficiency in detecting errors, a 
supposition borne out by empirical research. For example, Knechel 
[1986] concluded that "based on the analysis of Type I and Type II 
errors presented in this paper, the regression models were superior to 
the nonstatistical approaches in most cases." This finding ties to the 
idea that the best analytical procedure is the one which alerts us when 
errors exist in the data, while minimizing the number of false alarms 
when the data is error-free. This concept is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
two alternate decisions are investigate or do not investigate. The two 
possible conditions of the accounting variable are that it is or is not 
materially in error. In the bottom left and top right quadrants, the risk 
assessor makes the correct decision. In the top left quadrant, the evalua-
tor does an unnecessary investigation, referred to as a Type I error, in 
line with AICPA literature (note difficulties with this use of terms 
explored by Beck and Solomon [1985]). In the bottom right quadrant, 
the decision maker fails to investigate a situation which in fact warrants 
investigation, referred to as a Type II error. Wilson and Colbert [1989] 
reached a similar conclusion from their simulation tests that likewise 
focus on Type I and Type II considerations. 
• Regression analysis may help to quantify important interrelationships in 
a client's business which the auditor suspects exist, but cannot easily 
express mathematically. For example, one would be able to quantify the 
effect of categorical variables (like location) in addition to numerical 
variables. 
For all of these reasons, Price Waterhouse decided in 1988 to invest in a 
research project related to regression analysis. The technique made sense con-
ceptually, but the big unknown was the broadness of market acceptance within 
Price Waterhouse. Was it reasonable to expect audit partners and staff without 
real expertise in statistical concepts to try regression analysis with enthusiasm 
and confidence? Even if they were interested, would they conclude that the ben-
efit from using regression analysis is large enough to justify the cost of develop-
ing the applications? 
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Type II error 
Do not investigate 
The Software 
Regression analysis had been used on audits done by the firm since about 
1980. At that time the Firm developed its own regression analysis software 
which ran on a central mainframe accessible from the Firm's U.S. offices. Some 
early successes were reported by Wallace [1983], Such examples are augmented 
by three actual case examples from field applications, reported in an Appendix 
to this paper. However, the mainframe computing instructions were complicated 
for those who did not use the software often. In addition, turn-around time for 
regression output was sometimes measured in terms of days rather than minutes 
or hours. The concept of regression analysis as an iterative model-building 
process was not well served by the mainframe. As a result, during the decade of 
the 1980's, regression was used only by a small band of devotees in several of 
the Firm's U.S. offices, and not at all outside the U.S. 
One of the first imperatives was to secure user-friendly regression analysis 
software for a microcomputer. Price Waterhouse considered purchasing one of 
the available commercial micro-based regression analysis packages, but decided 
against that option. Some packages were replete with complex statistical jargon 
which we were sure would inhibit potential users. On the other hand, certain 
spreadsheet software packages offered regression analysis as an option, but 
these were overly simplistic modules which lacked the important statistical 
checks necessary for auditors to have confidence that their models were statisti-
cally valid. Also, none of the packages came with audit-relevant user help. A 
meeting of professionals who regularly used regression analysis in consulting 
and litigation support settings led to the decision to modify the mainframe soft-
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ware to run on the microcomputers commonly used by Price Waterhouse part-
ners and staff. The framework for approaching regression analysis appears in 
Figure 2, as do sample screens that provide an idea of the user-friendliness and 
documentary nature of the program. The user selects whether a time series or 
cross-sectional regression model is to be estimated and what confidence level is 
used. 
Data to be modeled may be assembled in a wide variety of formats, but most 
commonly is collected in a common spreadsheet template. The software can 
accommodate up to fifteen variables and up to 1,000 observations per variable, 
subject to a maximum limitation of 5,000 data points. We have found that this is 
sufficient for all but cross-sectional applications on very large multi-location 
clients, such as major retailers with more than 1,000 stores. For such clients we 
suggest partitioning the locations into groups, each containing fewer than 1,000 
units, with a separate model being created for each group. Figure 2 displays a 
sample input screen for the software. Once entered into the software, several 
analysis modules are designed to assess the data set prior to creating the regres-
sion equation. These modules provide the following information (see Wallace 
[1991] for elaboration on statistical terms): 
• various measures of the distribution of each variable including the 
largest and smallest values; the sum of all values; mean, median, and 
quartile statistics; and measures of variation, skewness, and kurtosis. 
• a matrix showing the degree of correlation between each variable and 
every other variable. 
• a table of autocorrelation statistics with lags from one to twenty-four 
for each variable. 
One purpose of the input analysis modules is to detect apparent data entry 
errors at an early stage of the process before the user's attention is drawn to out-
liers, precision intervals, etc. To illustrate, by examining the largest and smallest 
value for each variable, or by comparing the total for each variable to predeter-
mined batch totals, one may expect to detect an incorrect value for a particular 
variable. A second objective is to detect an unusual distribution or pattern in the 
dependent variable. For example, it may prove to be skewed or to have kurtosis, 
or the autocorrelation test may show a seasonal or cyclical pattern. In such 
cases, the user is directed to the descriptor variables to see whether any reflect 
the same distribution or pattern. Generally this will prove to be the case, but if 
not, the user is asked to search for an additional descriptor variable to capture 
the attribute being exhibited by the dependent variable. A third purpose of input 
analysis is to study the correlation among the variables in the model, looking for 
relationships which in direction or magnitude are inconsistent with the auditor's 
expectations. Investigation of such surprises frequently leads to model improve-
ments before the actual regression equation is produced. 
Sometimes the analysis will lead the user to transform one or more of the 
variables. The software allows variables to be transformed into natural logs, rec-
iprocals, and deflated values (i.e., to remove heteroscedasticity or size effects), 
and also facilitates the leading or lagging of variables. Figure 2 illustrates some 
of these choices in menu format. Those observations to be used in the base ver-
sus p red ic t ion phase are spec i f i ed , a longs ide desc r ip t ive s ta t i s t ics . 
Transformations are facilitated, and help screens are available to provide the 
sort of graphics guidance depicted in Figure 2. 
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Once the user has responded to whatever conditions are revealed by the 
input analysis, he or she is ready to use the software to specify the regression 
equation. Unlike some other regression analysis products, the software does not 
use the stepwise technique for variable selection as the primary means of model 
creation, although stepwise is available as an option. We believe it is preferable 
Figure 2. Overview of Software Design and Sample Screens 






for the user to specify the model based on his or her understanding of the 
client's business, and to think carefully about the regression coefficients to see 
whether they have the expected direction and magnitude. It is our judgment that 
in an audit context, the use of the stepwise technique runs the risk of turning the 
program into a "black box" which the user accepts without understanding. 
Moreover, statistical criteria are only one of the considerations of an auditor; 
indeed, descriptive power may be sacrificed intentionally in exchange for the 
greater evidential value provided by externally-generated independent vari-
ables, as prescribed in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 31 [AICPA, 1980]. 
Nonetheless, an advanced module of the program is accessible that permits use 
of stepwise, and overrides certain automated decisions integrated with the core 
program (such as the time-series choice among levels, first-differences, and 
Cochrane-Orcutt models)—see the end of Figure 2 for a sample menu. 
Table 1 






• Planning phase consideration of 
autocorrelation 
• Time-series model selection of first 
difference and Cochrane-Orcutt 
• Runs test 
• Chi-square test of contingency table 
• Durbin - Watson test 
• Autocorrelation of residuals for twenty-four 
lags 
• Goldfeld Quandt 
• Non-parametric rank correlation 





Planning phase consideration of descriptive 
statistics. 
Kolmogorov - Smirnov 
Shapiro - Wilk 
Chi squared goodness of fit. 
Moment check for both skewness and 
kurtosis. 
Planning phase consideration of correlation 
matrix 
Haitovsky statistic. 
Chow test if forty-eight observations are 
available 
Alternate dummy variable test if fewer than 
forty-eight observations are available 
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For each independent variable, the user is presented with a regression coeffi-
cient, a t-statistic, the confidence level associated with the t-statistic, and guid-
ance on interpretation. For the model as a whole, the user is presented with vari-
ous statistics, most notably R square, adjusted R square and the F statistic, again 
with guidance on their interpretation. A sample screen of such output is provid-
ed in Figure 2. At this stage, the user will decide whether to proceed or whether 
the model requires modification. 
If the user proceeds, the next output module involves a series of statistical 
checks for autocorrelation of residuals, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, 
non-normality of residuals, and continuity. For most of these conditions, more 
than one test is performed. For example, the checks for autocorrelation of resid-
uals include a runs test, a Chi-Square Test of a Contingency Table for residuals, 
the Durbin Watson statistic, and a test for autocorrelation in the residuals with 
lags from one to twenty-four. The users are not expected to know how the vari-
ous statistics are calculated. More importantly from their perspective, heuristics 
built into the software warn them when the tests indicate that there is a problem 
with one or more of these conditions. If a problem is indicated, it is explained 
and the user is provided with on-screen guidance on how best to respond. Table 
1 summarizes the automatic statistical checks performed. Figure 2 provides a 
sample screen for the summary of checks and illustrative detail-level screens. 
Test statistics are reported at ninety, ninety-five, and ninety-nine percent levels 
of confidence, to enable model builders to evaluate how severe the problem is, 
if detected. 
Once the statistical checks have been reviewed, the next module compares 
the recorded value with the regression estimate for each observation in the data 
set. Confidence intervals are presented for each observation and for the data set 
as a whole. Over the years a variety of strategies have been presented for resid-
ual investigation—for example, by Kinney [1979], Kinney and Salamon [1982], 
and Knechel [1988a]. While recognizing that this is a topic on which more re-
search is undoubtedly necessary, at present we are suggesting to users that 
aggregate precision for the reporting period should not exceed materiality, and 
that all but very small outliers should be investigated. This operationalizes the 
Kinney approach (extended to a multiple regression environment) of computing 
an aggregate standard error for the regression model in both the base and pre-
diction phase, which can be compared with materiality. Related output appears 
in Figure 2. As evidenced in such illustrative screens, the focus is on precision, 
and the confidence level is derivative, rather than the other way around. A lower 
than desired level of confidence will suggest the need for additional audit proce-
dures to be employed to achieve the desired level of audit satisfaction. 
The outliers themselves are easily spotted through both tabular and graphical 
presentation, as illustrated in both Figures 2 and 3. To further assist the user in 
identifying anomalous observations requiring investigation, the last module pre-
sents a table of equiprobable residuals (and a related graphic) (again, extending 
work by Kinney) to complement the outliers in the previous module. Choices 
available for evaluating equiprobable residuals (reflective of one-tail and two-
tail concerns) are shown in Figure 2, with screen output. A summary of the 
most unusual observations permits consideration of both evaluation tools: out-
liers and equiprobable residuals. Users are encouraged to consider both outliers 
and large equiprobable residuals when selecting items for investigation. 
Some might feel that we are insufficiently prescriptive in our approach to 
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Figure 3. Graphic presentation of regression outliers 
Blgcorp Manufacturing - Monthly sales 
investigation of outliers. However, given the substantial amount of judgment 
which underlies the audit process (for example, materiality determination or 
inherent risk assessment), it seems natural to us that context-sensitive profes-
sional judgment should play a role in developing a strategy for residual in-
vestigation. Prediction phase screens analogous to base model screens, one of 
which is shown in Figure 2, are particularly useful in time-series applications. 
Another issue raised in the literature is the linkage between regression analy-
sis and statistical sampling. For example, Knechel [1988a, 1988b] shows how 
analytical procedures can reduce sample sizes. It is a logical conceptual link, 
because both forms of evidence lend themselves to mathematical expression— 
the playing out, as it were, of the multiplicative risk model. In practice, we do 
not expect that audit teams will often need to develop integrated strategies 
involving both regression analysis and sampling aimed at the same audit asser-
tion. Sampling can be a very effect ive form of audit evidence when it is 
required, but it can be costly evidence to obtain and may not be required. For a 
variety of reasons, we would prefer audit planners to combine regression analy-
sis and other analytical procedures with assessment of control risk below the 
maximum level where possible, including tests of the client's internal control 
structure. To provide perspective as to the statistical profile of past field appli-
cations, Table 2 describes a sample of models. Dependent and independent vari-
ables are described, comparisons can be made between standard deviation and 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reported, alongside statistical problems and information on the descriptive 
power of the various analyses. This profile suggests that models typically have a 
limited number of independent variables, precision that ranges from under one 
to 237 percent on an individual observation basis, substantial descriptive power, 
and statistical flags that require separate attention. 
Testing the Technique 
The modified software was completed and alpha tested by the end of 1989. 
We believed that we had good, user friendly software, but the question 
remained: would auditors without any special mathematical training or bent 
want to use regression analysis on actual client engagements? We decided to 
use 1990 for limited beta testing of the software and the training material we 
had developed to support it. 
Beta Testing and Field Experience in 1990 
Our approach was to train the engagement teams for a small number of 
audits, with emphasis on large clients involved in retailing, financial services, 
and utilities. These industries were selected as starting points because we knew 
that existing audit strategies for clients in those industries often put significant 
emphasis on analytical procedures incorporating operating and external data, as 
well as accounting information. Eleven audit engagement teams were selected 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada and were 
trained in 1990. We referred to these teams as "new users", because they were 
deliberately selected to comprise people with no prior experience using regres-
sion analysis in auditing. Based on limited direction, each team collected data 
for their regression application and brought it to the training program. This 
facilitated "hands on" instruction using data familiar to them in a client context 
with which they had experience. 
The results of the 1990 tests were generally positive, although inevitably 
they revealed a number of areas where our software and supporting training 
could be improved. The regression applications by these 1990 teams included: 
Industry Model Type 
Retailer Cross sectional 
Retailer Cross sectional 
Utility Time series 
Utility Time series 
Dependent variable 
Inventory shrink 




Sales, inventory levels, 
store security expense, 
store size, type of store, 




vis à vis competitors. 
Volume, rate, number of 
customers, degree days. 
Volume, rates, number of 
customers, degree days, 
dew point, precipitation. 
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In addition to course attendance time, the eight teams providing formal feed-
back reported that they had spent an average of seventy hours (with a high of 
103 and a low of twenty-eight hours) developing their models, including con-
ceiving the application, obtaining the relevant data, and creating, modifying, 
and interpreting their regression model. The teams recognized that a regression 
application would typically require a front-end investment in the first year, but 
that the time required to maintain the application should drop substantially in 
the second and subsequent years. Considering that the average number of annu-
al audit hours on the eight jobs was 7,700 (with a range of 1,100 to 20,000), the 
teams did not seem to consider that the required time investment was large. 
Teams were asked whether they had changed the nature and extent of their 
other audit procedures as a consequence of using regression analysis. One retail 
team which used regression analysis primarily as an attention directing planning 
tool reported that it had been able to select fewer stores than normal for investi-
gation as a consequence of improved risk identification. This was possible 
because regression analysis indicated that stores which were not outliers were in 
line with expectations, as quantified by the model. A banking team reported a 
similar experience and estimated that 200-250 hours of investigatory work had 
been saved. Four teams using regression analysis primarily as a source of audit 
satisfaction intended to replace other audit procedures, either less effective ana-
lytics (three cases) or detailed tests of transactions (one case). Two teams did 
not alter their other planned audit work in the first year because they were 
uncertain what they would learn by using this new technique. 
Teams were also asked whether using regression analysis resulted in them 
learning anything new about the client. Six of the eight teams believed some-
thing important had been learned, typically additional insights into the interrela-
tionship among financial and operational variables. Given the fact that these 
were large clients on which considerable audit effort was already being ex-
pended, this result is noteworthy. 
All teams but one reported a favorable reaction from the client to Price 
Waterhouse's adoption of this new technique. Two of the clients already made 
some use of regression analysis as part of their business planning activity. 
Another client asked to license the software for use by its internal audit group. 
The most revealing question concerned the teams' intentions regarding the 
future use of regression analysis. Seven of the eight teams planned to continue 
to use the application they had developed, while six of the eight planned to 
develop additional applications for the client. Individuals were asked whether 
they would like to use the technique on other clients, and eighty percent 
responded in the affirmative. Based on the Firm's experience in pilot testing a 
variety of methodological and software tools over the years, these are high 
approval ratings. 
All eight teams believed there were industry-specific regression applications 
which could be used on many audits in their client's industry. To facilitate this, 
a central data base of all regression applications has been created which can be 
accessed through the Firm's wide area network. Thus a team contemplating a 
banking application, for example, can easily determine what regression models 
have been previously developed for bank audits, and who to contact for a 
detailed description of each application. 
Following the successful completion of the pilot program and some attendant 
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internal publicity, a number of other engagement teams volunteered for training, 
with the result that by the end of 1990, about fifty engagements were using the 
software. Some of these represented engagements with previous mainframe 
applications which have been converted to the microcomputer. 
Experience in 1991 
By the end of 1991, approximately eighty engagement teams had been 
trained and more than 100 applications had been designed. Early in 1992, Price 
Waterhouse decided to survey users to gain a better understanding of how the 
use of regression analysis had affected their audit engagements. Key results 
based on the twenty-six replies received to date are outlined in Table 3. The rel-
atively low response rate is the result of our sending the survey request out at a 
very busy time of year for the audit practice. In addition, a number of planned 
applications are currently in process, and so the teams were unable to report 
complete results at the time of this writing. 
Regression analysis is being used on audits in a wide variety of industries, 
but as we had initially expected, retailing, financial services, and utilities seem 
to present particularly promising opportunities because of the wealth of objec-
tive operating information upon which models can be built to predict financial 
performance. Oil and gas, publishing, commodities, and hotels have also yield-
ed several interesting applications. 
There are an almost equal number of time-series and cross-sectional applica-
tions. Nearly all of the time-series applications involve modeling monthly finan-
cial data, and from two to five years of monthly observations are used to build 
the base model. The cross-sectional applications are generally used to identify 
anomalous locations in a multiple location business (e.g., retailing) and have 
involved from about thirty to 1,400 locations. 
Most teams have chosen a confidence level of either ninety or ninety-five 
percent because they have found that this yields sufficiently tight precision rela-
tive to audit planning materiality, while minimizing the number of outliers to be 
investigated. Most of the models built have excellent explanatory power. Of the 
twenty-four teams which reported the value of adjusted R-squared in their appli-
cation, eighteen had achieved ninety percent or better. (Note that R-square must 
be viewed in tandem with precision and is typically lower for balance sheet 
accounts than income statement accounts due to lower variability in such 
accounts). 
The first-year time cost to develop and execute a regression application has 
varied considerably from twenty-two hours to 212 hours, with a mean of seven-
ty-four hours. We estimate that the cost to repeat the application in the second 
year will be less than half this amount because the costs of learning about the 
technique, designing the application, and obtaining data will be substantially 
reduced. 
It is currently difficult to tell how much time elsewhere in an audit can be 
saved because of this time investment. We have noticed that most teams, being 
uncertain of the value of this new technique, have opted to retain their previous-
ly planned detailed tests of balances and transactions "just in case". With only a 
few exceptions, the only effect of regression was to replace similar but less 
sophisticated analytical procedures. A better measure of savings would come in 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impact of regression analysis on the audit 
11. Used as attention-directing tool during planning? 
Yes 6 
No 19 
Did not respond 1 
26 




13. Used to provide satisfaction during execution phase? 
Yes 20 
No 5 
Did not respond 1 
26 
- note that when management inquiry suggests an explanation for results differing from expectations, the regression model 
can be rerun to corroborate the reasonableness and sufficiency of management's explanations. 




- generally regression analysis replaced less sophisticated analytical procedures. 
- in a small number of cases regression analysis enabled a reduction in detailed testing at various locations of multi-location 
clients. 




- since past audits were viewed as effective, the "No" responses can merely suggest comparable effectiveness. 








18. Client reaction to the auditor's use of regression analysis (1-5, where 5 is very supportive) 
Mean 3.59 
Future plans for using regression analysis 
19. Will repeat this application? 
Yes 23 
No 2 
Did not respond 1 
26 





better understanding of what they can expect from regression analysis. 
The use of regression analysis has had a number of very positive results. One 
positive result was that sixteen of the twenty-six teams reported gaining new 
insights into their client's business as a consequence of the use of regression 
analysis. Most often, the learning involved an improved appreciation of how 
key financial variables respond to changes in different operating variables. 
Another positive result was the reaction of clients, very few of whom make use 
of regression analysis themselves. Most were very interested in and supportive 
of what the auditors were doing. However, there was some degree of polariza-
tion in the answers, because a small minority of the clients were somewhat 
skeptical of a technique with which they were not familiar. 
The most revealing question concerned the teams' intentions regarding the 
future use of regression analysis. Nearly all teams intend to continue with the 
application which they had developed. However, somewhat surprisingly, only 
six teams indicated plans to develop other applications for the same client. 
Since cross-sectional applications often focus on a single model, this result 
could be skewed by the nature of respondents. Moreover, training tends to focus 
on the revenue stream, whereas multiple-year experience has led to diverse 
modeling of income and expense streams, as well as balance sheet accounts. 
Conclusions 
Our experiences to date with regression analysis have been generally posi-
tive: 
• The software works well and teams find it easy to use. 
• Once teams build an application, they nearly always maintain it. 
• Auditors have been able to improve their understanding of clients' 
businesses through the use of this technique. 
• Most clients react positively to the use of a technique which they con-
sider to be thoughtful and innovative. 
On the other hand, some sobering realities are apparent: 
• A minimum of two days' training is required before auditors are rea-
sonably self-sufficient. 
• Building a regression application is time-consuming, particularly when 
the values of key operating variables are not immediately available (as 
is frequently the case). At the same time, it should be noted that a sig-
nificant portion of the first-year time investment is non-recurring. 
• The firm must maintain, as a centralized resource, people who possess 
an enhanced level of understanding of both theory and application 
issues regarding regression analysis. 
• Even after implementing the technique on a significant number of 
engagements, it is not yet obvious that regression analysis will save 
more audit time than it costs. 
While teams generally reported that the use of regression analysis improved the 
effectiveness of their audit, it is difficult to link the identification of specific 
adjusting journal entries to the sample under study. However, it would be wrong 
to conclude that regression analysis failed to find significant errors which exist-
ed. Most of the clients in this sample are large and well-controlled, and would 
not be expected to make significant errors in their financial statements. Our 
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experience to date does not lead us to challenge the results reported by 
researchers who have studied the performance of regression analysis in simula-
tion experiments. Indeed, among the findings of past regression applications 
are: 
• discovery of reporting errors by branch operations, 
• a theft ring that accounted for a retailer's poor performance, 
• recognition of a change in cost allocation techniques that had not been 
disclosed, 
• identification of a $300,000 transaction improperly placed in a sus-
pense account which should have been in the share balance, and 
• selection of five units to visit, three of which had just been discovered 
by management as having serious problems. 
It is the intention of Price Waterhouse, for the balance of 1992, to continue to 
expand the use of the technique in a controlled manner, focusing on industries 
such as financial services and retailing where we have begun to accumulate a 
significant number of successful applications, with underlying concepts that can 
be easily replicated at other client settings. 
We believe that for regression analysis to have a chance of success in audit-
ing, auditors need software which is audit-oriented and easy to understand, yet 
statistically rigorous. They also need proper training and support, and an appro-
priate client situation in which to use the technique. Given all of these require-
ments, regression analysis can be a very useful tool. Its promise is at last being 
realized. 
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Appendix 
Field Applications 
A Time-Series Illustration for Revenues 
Bank audits are often highly reliant on analytical procedures. One reason is 
the availability of a pervasive, readily available, totally objective descriptor 
variable in the form of the bank prime rate of interest. 
The audit team at a money center bank decided to build a regression model 
to predict the bank's interest income each month on the commercial loan port-
folio. The bank was well-controlled and the team reasoned that if they satisfied 
themselves with the controls over the production of accounting information 
using an integrated test facility, and did quality analytical procedures on the 
aggregate commercial loan interest income, it would be possible to eliminate 
much time-consuming detailed testing of individual interest income calcula-
tions. 
Often regression models are built by thinking of the price and quantity 
dimensions of the variable of interest. In this case, a quantity dimension was the 
average monthly loan portfolio, for which audit satisfaction had been derived in 
part from a test circularization of customers. However, the team first excluded 
non-performing loans from the portfolio since they were typically not generat-
ing any income. A second quantity dimension included in the model was time, 
since the number of days in a given month could vary from twenty-eight to thir-
ty-one. The price dimension was provided by the average market rate of interest 
for each month. Some experimentation was done with both U.S. prime and the 
London interbank overnight rate (LIBOR) individually and in combination, 
before it was established that the inclusion of U.S. prime alone resulted in the 
model with the best predictive power. 
The model was built to predict monthly recorded interest income. However, 
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the auditors recognized that monthly income was sometimes affected by certain 
non-routine transactions, of which the three most common examples were the 
following: 
• Interest was sometimes received on non-performing loans and credited 
to income. 
• When a loan was classified as non-performing, any unpaid interest 
accrued on that loan was reversed. 
• On occasion, a non-performing loan was restored to the performing 
category, and previously reversed income was restored (usually 
because the customer had paid the arrears). 
The audit team decided that it would wish to know of and examine non-rou-
tine transactions individually, and so they were extracted from the monthly 
recorded income figure used for the regression model. 
Monthly data for the two years preceding the year subject to audit were 
obtained for average adjusted performing loans, average U.S. prime, number of 
days in the month, and adjusted interest income. The resulting regression model 
was able to predict about ninety-four percent of the month-to-month fluctuation 
in interest income during this base period, which the auditors regarded as satis-
factory reliability. All of the descriptor variables had significant t-statistics, 
indicating that they were contributing meaningfully to the model. Statistical 
tests did not indicate any problems. Therefore, the model was used to predict 
monthly interest income for the year subject to audit. 
The results were very satisfactory. The aggregate of the twelve months' 
recorded income was only thirteen percent different from the aggregate of the 
twelve months' regression predictions, a difference which the audit team did not 
consider to be significant. The aggregate precision of the estimates for the pre-
diction period was +/- 2.1%, which was considered to be acceptably tight rela-
tive to the materiality for the engagement. In fact, this precision will very likely 
improve in the future as more months' data are added to the base model used to 
create the regression equation. Finally, none of the individual monthly recorded 
balances were statistically different (ninety-five percent confidence was used) 
from the corresponding regression estimates. 
In this case the audit team believes that the use of regression analysis has 
helped to reduce substantially the time required by them to obtain audit satisfac-
tion with respect to a substantial proportion of the client's interest income. At 
the same time, the auditors' awareness of the non-routine transactions was 
heightened by their need to identify them and exclude them from the recorded 
income figures used in the regression model. The audit effort is properly 
focused on ensuring that the accounting for these transactions is correct. 
A Time-Series Illustration for Expenses 
The auditors of a Fortune 500 company decided to use regression analysis 
software for their audit of payroll costs at a major division. Their objective was 
to assess the risk that recorded payroll costs might be misstated for any quarter. 
They decided to use gross payroll costs as the dependent variable, after first 
excluding incentive compensation which they decided to test in detail. As 
explained above, many regression models have measures of price and quantity 
as descriptor variables. After considering various possibilities, the audit team 
selected the average monthly number of employees as the quantity variable, as 
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obtained from personnel department statistics, and the consumer price index as 
the price variable. 
Actual data was obtained for the previous five years, or for twenty quarters 
in total. It was then realized that during the period, two special events had 
occurred which were not reflected in the model. During one quarter, the divi-
sion had incurred a significant level of severance costs as part of a staff reduc-
tion program, while just before the end of another quarter a significant level of 
new hiring had taken place, affecting the headcount statistics significantly for 
that quarter, but having only a negligible effect upon the compensation costs. 
Additional variables were created to control for the effect of those two pro-
grams. 
Based on the data for the twenty quarters, a regression model was created 
which was able to explain about ninety-five percent of the quarter-to-quarter 
fluctuation in payroll costs. However, six of the twenty quarters exhibited dif-
ferences between actual and predicted payroll costs which were statistically sig-
nificant at a confidence level of ninety-five percent. Of those six, two quarters 
had particularly large differences on the order of four to five percent of the 
recorded payroll costs. Further analysis was planned to understand better the 
causes of these fluctuations. If the causes, once understood, were reflected in 
the model, the model would become an even more effective prediction tool. In 
other payroll applications, descriptor variables have included vacation pay, sick 
pay, overtime, down-time, and part-time employee factors, as well as the influ-
ence of the mix of unionized and non-union personnel. 
While possible refinements to the base model differences were being investi-
gated, the audit team used the existing model to assess the risk of error in pay-
roll costs for the first two quarters of the current year. The aggregate payroll 
cost for the six months exceeded the regression estimate by about two percent, 
and the auditors decided that no further detailed testing of payroll costs was 
required. 
The benefit of this regression application was to direct the attention of the 
auditors to quarters where payroll costs were significantly different from expec-
tation, and to minimize or even eliminate work on quarters which were closely 
aligned with expectations. It should be noted that the concept would apply 
equally to monthly payroll data, except that fewer than five years' history would 
suffice for model-building purposes. 
A Cross-Sectional Illustration 
A large food processor operates about forty plants producing the same baked 
goods product line for sale to food retailers in their local geographic area. Part 
of the audit strategy calls for field visits to a selected number of plants to assess 
internal controls and to test accounting balances and transactions. The auditors 
desired to develop a more sophisticated risk-based approach for deciding which 
plants they would visit. 
Each plant is a profit center with its own balance sheet and income state-
ment. The principal items on the balance sheet are receivables, inventories, and 
accounts payable. Two important income statement items are cost of ingredients 
and payroll costs. The auditors decided to build separate cross-sectional predic-
tive models for each of these five accounting variables, using as independent 
variables other accounting information and operating statistics such as sales, 
pounds produced, and number of employees. The descriptor variables for each 
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model varied depending on what was considered to be most relevant. The mod-
els produced were all effective at predicting most of the plant-to-plant variabili-
ty, ranging from about eighty-two percent of the fluctuations in payables to 
ninety-eight percent of the fluctuations in payroll costs. 
The auditors judgmentally ranked the risk of material error for each of the 
five dependent variables as 3, 2 or 1 (3 being highest risk) based on the past his-
tory of errors and other factors. The regression models were run, and the residu-
als captured for each variable for each plant (the residual is the difference 
between the recorded amount and the regression estimate). The five residuals 
for each plant were first standardized to take into account differences in the size 
of the plants and the variables, then were weighted by the inherent risk factors, 
and finally were added together to produce a single overall risk score for each 
plant. The auditors intend to focus their location visits on the plants with the 
highest risk scores. In addition, unusual fluctuations for any of the variables for 
a location not visited are to be at least discussed with the plant controller to 
determine whether there is a plausible explanation. 
The auditors believe they have developed a much more objective approach to 
selecting plants to visit. However, they recognize that their models are capable 
of continuous improvement as they gain an improved understanding of the busi-
ness by investigating differences between actual and expected performance. 
These investigations have identified such relevant factors as the introduction of 
new product lines, unionization, intracompany purchases, economies of scale 
effects, private label arrangements, and the possibility of obsolete wrappers or 
similar disruptive factors influencing descriptor variables. 
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Discussant's Response to "Practical Experiences with 
Regression Analysis" 
Peter R. Gillett 
Formerly with Grant Thornton, U.K. 
Introduction 
It has become a contemporary commonplace to characterise approaches to 
audit methodologies as either "quantitative" or "judgemental", and within the 
profession  Price Waterhouse has traditionally been seen as occupying a place at 
the judgemental end of  the spectrum. A study of  the application of  regression 
analysis within such a firm,  examining its acceptability within a culture where 
quantified  methods—statistical sampling, for  example—have not been widely 
used, is of  particular interest to those who have not yet found  a place for  it with-
in their own armoury of  audit tools. 
My own firm,  Grant Thornton, has adopted a structured audit approach 
incorporating a number of  quantified  audit methods, and yet even so regression 
analysis has not found  favour.  My discussion of  this paper is no doubt coloured 
both by my own interest in quantified  audit methods and by the limited accep-
tance of  regression analysis within the auditing profession  in general. It may be 
helpful  if  I begin, then, by making explicit some of  my prior expectations before 
reading this paper. They could be summed up, I suppose, by saying that I was 
looking to see what answers I might find  to a number of  difficulties  that may be 
encountered by auditors seeking to apply regression analysis. These include: 1. Theoretical problems, such as: 
• How are the calculations for  regression analysis carried out? 
• How is the validity of  a regression model controlled? 
• What do the various statistical terms associated with regression 
analysis mean? 
2. Conceptual problems, such as: 
• When is regression analysis applicable? 
• What audit conclusions can be drawn from  a regression analysis? 
• How can regression analysis be integrated with other audit proce-
dures? 
• How are the results of  regression analysis related to planning mate-
riality? 
• What degree of  reliance can be placed on the results of  regression 
analysis? 
3. Practical problems, such as: 
• Can plausible models be built within acceptable audit timeframes? 
• Is sufficient  client data available for  regression analysis to be car-
ried out? 
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• What is the auditor's position when the regression analysis does not 
appear to support the client's reported results? 
I shall comment a little later on the extent to which the paper addresses my 
prior concerns. 
Background 
In a paper presented to this symposium in 1990, Kinney and Haynes [1990] 
traced the history of  analytical procedures back over sixty years. The discussant 
at that time (Abe Akresh) generally agreed with the analysis of  the usefulness  of 
analytical procedure results as substantive evidence. In recent years, competi-
tive pressures driving the never-ending search for  improved audit cost-effective-
ness have created greater emphasis on analytical procedures, as have changes in 
professional  literature in the U.S. (see, e.g., SAS 56 [AICPA, 1988]) and else-
where (e.g., Auditing  Guideline  417 in the U.K. [ICAEW, 1988]). The idea  of 
using regression analysis in auditing goes back at least twenty years, and per-
haps even longer, but as the authors of  the present paper note, actual use of 
regression analysis has been relatively rare [See, e.g., Daroca and Holder, 
1985]. David Scott and Wanda Wallace cite numerous advantages of  using 
regression analysis, as do other authors [see, e.g., Stringer, 1975], and yet it has 
never been widely used in the auditing profession.  Certainly, it has long been a 
disappointment to me that auditors are generally so reluctant to take advantage 
of  mathematical tools. The questions that the authors of  this paper have chosen 
to address, then, are both important and interesting ones. I commend them for 
that. 
General Observations 
Nevertheless, there are a number of  criticisms of  a general nature that can be 
made of  this paper: 
• Firstly, there are several important questions that the authors do not 
deal with, which I shall comment on in detail later; in the authors' 
defence,  it may be said that these are not issues that they intended to 
address—however, to take one specific  example, it seems a great 
shame that the authors have not tackled the integration of  regression 
analysis with other forms  of  audit evidence. 
• Secondly, it may be said that the results reported in this paper do not 
greatly add to the sum of  human learning—helpful  software  has been 
developed, and it may be interesting to know that most of  the audit 
teams intend to maintain their regression applications in future,  but it 
will be more interesting to know, in a year or two, whether or not they 
have; this is, of  course, a criticism of  the paper rather than the underly-
ing project. 
• Thirdly, it is questionable how relevant the authors' findings  are to 
auditors who do not have access to the software  developed during 
this project, and for  whom an average time spent per application of 
seventy-four  hours would be extravagant; the mean annual recurring 
hours is reported as 2,900, and there is no reason given to suppose that 
for  an engagement with 290 recurring hours, a useful  regression analy-
sis could be completed in 7.4 hours—although this is not a problem of 
the authors' making. 
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These are very general, and somewhat sweeping, criticisms, and I should like 
to balance them with some more positive comments. It is gratifying  to see a 
firm  that has not previously been known for  its acceptance of  quantified  audit 
tools investigating the application of  regression analysis. I for  one am glad that 
the authors have chosen to share their findings  with the rest of  the professional 
and academic communities, and pleased to note that so far  they have enjoyed a 
measure of  success. The conclusions that the authors reach are frank,  realistic, 
and plausible. I congratulate them on all this. Furthermore, the authors have 
demonstrated successfully  that audit software  can be used to tackle the first 
group of  problems that I outlined in my introduction, by performing  the regres-
sion analysis, helping the auditor control its validity, and protecting the auditor 
from  the need to be able to define  and explain kurtosis (or to pronounce het-
eroscedasticity). This is a significant  step, and again I congratulate the authors. 
Obviously, this is a project which will continue for  some time yet, and I look 
forward  to hearing how it progresses. 
Detailed Comments 
It is perhaps inevitable, given the nature of  the critical process, that my 
detailed comments are largely, though not entirely, adverse. It may be appropri-
ate, then, to put them in context by making it clear that many of  them are criti-
cisms of  the paper in which David Scott and Wanda Wallace have presented 
their findings,  and not of  the project itself;  many of  them, therefore,  could easily 
be resolved. I should also like to emphasize that my comments do not, in the 
end, diminish my enthusiasm for  the work that the authors have carried out. 
According to the authors, Knechel [1986] and Wilson and Colbert [1989] 
have reported that regression analysis "... is a more accurate tool for  identify-
ing errors...." What is intended by "accurate" here? Does it concern the preci-
sion with which misstatements may be evaluated? Knechel [1988] concluded 
that regression analysis increased audit effectiveness  and was very efficient  in 
detecting potentially material misstatements. There is scope for  greater clarity 
here. I am also not clear what the authors have in mind when they report that 
"one accounting firm  seems to have used it regularly, in sampling applications." 
A more substantial comment, however, concerns the distinction that the 
authors draw between the use of  regression analysis for  risk  identification  and 
for  error detection.  My interpretation is that they are referring  to the uses of 
analytical procedures at the planning stage of  the audit, and as substantive evi-
dence as an alternative to detailed testing. From evidence that analytical proce-
dures are effective  in discovering errors, the authors conclude that they are 
"clearly an important risk assessment tool." My problem is with the justification 
for  the use of  "clearly," and the applicability of  the conclusion to regression 
analysis. Analytical procedures at the planning stage should be efficient  at iden-
tifying  areas where misstatements are likely to occur. Analytical procedures as 
substantive evidence should be effective  at detecting misstatements. If  the 
authors are claiming that a procedure that is effective  at detecting errors that 
have occurred is efficient  at identifying  where errors are likely  to occur, some 
supporting argument is needed. In any event, knowledge that the stock con-
troller at one location is living beyond his perceived means, and has a criminal 
record for  fraud  in a previous employment, is likely to be a more efficient  way 
of  identifying  a branch at risk than a cross-sectional regression analysis. In my 
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view, the costs of  carrying out regression analysis, as described in this paper, 
are likely to mean that it is more attractive as a substitute for  other substantive 
procedures than as an attention-directing device at the planning stage. 
It is not necessarily important to an understanding of  the work and findings 
presented in this paper to know why Price Waterhouse chose to develop its own 
software.  The arguments given in the relevant part of  the paper, however, are 
insufficiently  detailed to be convincing. The comment that commercial pack-
ages were replete with complex statistical jargon looks weak, for  example, in 
the light of  the terminology introduced in Figure 2 and Table 1. Of  course, it is 
quite possible that the quality of  the software  itself  dispels this concern better 
than the reasoning provided in the paper. I could not help wondering, for  exam-
ple, what help the software  gives the auditor in assessing the implications of 
information  it provides as to "various measures of  the distribution of  each vari-
able including ... skewness and kurtosis ... a matrix showing the degree of  corre-
lation between each variable and every other variable ... a table of  autocorrela-
tion statistics with lags from  one to twenty-four  for  each variable." 
We are told that the software  can accommodate up to 1,000 observations per 
variable, subject to a maximum limitation of  5,000 data points. Whilst this may 
be necessary for  some of  the audits referenced  in the paper, many auditors con-
sidering the use of  regression analysis are inhibited more by a paucity of  data 
than by such an excess. It would be interesting to know what protection the soft-
ware offers  by way of  minimum acceptable numbers of  observations prior to 
attempting a regression. 
Successful  use of  regression analysis in the auditing environment (as indeed 
for  other analytical procedures) is largely dependent on a good understanding of 
the client's business, and this is a point well recognised by the authors. This is 
reflected  in their view that specification  of  the independent variables by the 
auditor is preferable  to automatic stepwise regression. Nevertheless, whilst a 
manual stepwise regression can be stopped when the results appear to be 
acceptable, software  offers  the opportunity to combine stepwise regression with 
backwards elimination, and a "best regression" identified  in this way may itself 
provide the auditor with additional insights. Some discussion of  the implications 
of  this would be welcome. 
One further  thought on how automation can assist auditors in dealing with 
the complexities of  regression analysis: it would be attractive to see some work 
on the use of  robust regression to identify  outliers. 
The authors recognize that the issue of  residual investigation requires further 
research. Kinney and Salamon [1982], Stringer and Stewart [1986] and Knechel 
[1988] all offer  perspectives on this problem. A key part of  the Price 
Waterhouse approach is that the focus  is on precision, and the confidence  level 
is derivative. Although Price Waterhouse does not take this line, this sits well 
with those of  us who might want to combine the confidence  derived from  the 
regression analysis with other forms  of  audit assurance in some explicit form  of 
the Audit Risk Model. The authors, however, take the view that audit teams will 
not often  need to develop integrated strategies involving both regression analy-
sis and sampling aimed at the same assertion. This might initially seem plausi-
ble enough, but really it will not do for  a variety of  reasons: 
• Even if  the issue is not expected to arise often,  some treatment will be 
required when it does. 
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• It may sometimes be desirable to combine regression analysis with 
forms  of  detailed testing other than sampling, and this begs the ques-
tion. 
• Some professional  literature (e.g., Auditing Guideline 417 in the U.K.) 
expects that "...in most cases, analytical review procedures will be used 
in conjunction with other substantive tests." The onus may be on the 
auditor, then, to show why this was not appropriate; if  an approach is 
taken whereby the confidence  level is derivative, there may well be 
some "topping up" necessary to achieve the desired overall confidence. 
• This may still be true even when reliance on the environment or inter-
nal controls are added. 
In 1990, it appears that eleven teams were trained, but that eight teams pro-
vided formal  feedback.  We are not told what conclusion can be drawn as to the 
missing three teams. 
For Price Waterhouse, the positive feedback  from  the teams involved in the 
project is clearly important. From the methodological standpoint, however, it is 
by no means clear what significance  can be attached to it by readers of  the 
paper. For example, "... one retail team ... reported that it had been able to select 
fewer  stores than normal for  investigation as a consequence of  improved risk 
identification."  What does this mean? How did they know that they had 
improved risk identification?  Does this simply mean that they had greater confi-
dence in the technique than in their previous methods, and so they chose to visit 
fewer  stores? Why did they not conclude instead that as the technique identified 
fewer  stores than usual, it was a more risky planning tool? What impact did 
reducing the number of  stores have on the effectiveness  of  the audit? Or, to take 
another example, "... a banking team ... estimated that 200-250 hours of  investi-
gatory work had been saved." What does this mean? Presumably, the 200 hours 
work in question was not done—but how did the team establish that the regres-
sion analysis was just as effective?  Did they not, rather, avoid the detailed work 
because they believed the regression was effective?  But, then, was this a con-
clusion based on the application, or on the training that Price Waterhouse had 
given them? 
I am not, of  course, suggesting that any of  the conclusions these teams 
reached were wrong. I am suggesting, however, that there is no objective evi-
dence to support them. This is not itself  a criticism of  the project; one of  the 
aims was to establish whether "... partners and staff  ... would ... conclude that 
the benefit  from  using regression analysis is large enough to justify  the cost of 
developing the application." It does mean, however, that we should be careful 
not to cite these results as evidence of  the effectiveness  of  regression analysis. 
The more hesitant results reported from  the 1991 experience are perhaps more 
representative of  the reality of  the situation. It remains to be seen what implica-
tion the low response rate for  1991 has for  the overall results of  the experiment. 
Conclusions 
I have already commented that the authors addressed the technical problems 
I raised in the introduction by the design and application of  audit software.  I 
have also suggested that I did not find  in the paper satisfactory  answers to my 
concerns about the conceptual difficulties  of  integrating regression analysis 
within a structured audit approach; there is little in the paper that addresses 
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when to use or not use regression analysis, and why. What about my third cate-
gory of  prior issue, the practical problems? 
Within the scope of  the reported project there is no discussion of  the practi-
cal difficulties  that arise when the auditor who has used regression analysis con-
cludes that the client's recorded figures  are misstated. Without detailed results 
as to what caused the misstatement, or a clear idea of  where the other side of  the 
correcting journal entry should be posted, the attempt to persuade the client to 
make an adjustment can be tricky. The study has shown that positive results can 
be obtained from  regression analysis, but that they require a significant  time 
investment. Whether there are audit situations where acceptable results can be 
obtained at less cost is by no means certain. Finally, the paper has nothing to 
say regarding the difficulties  that arise on smaller audits of  obtaining sufficient 
reliable data to support regression analysis. 
On the whole, although the project is not yet complete, the results for  the 
authors appear to be substantially positive. It is no fault  of  the authors that they 
offer  little comfort  to the auditors of  smaller businesses where development 
costs of  more than a day or two would be unacceptable, and where monthly 
accounts do not exist and quarterly accounts are unaudited and unreliable. 
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Internal Control: Progress And Perils 
Alan J. Winters 
Dan M. Guy 
American Institute of  Certified  Public Accountants 
"Progress might have been alright once but it has gone on too long." 
Ogden Nash 
Over the last five  years, internal control has been a matter of  widespread 
interest and vigorous debate, a subject where action is fast-paced  and still gain-
ing momentum. During the two preceding decades, however, internal control 
was an off-and-on  again parochial topic, subject to the vagaries of  groups who 
perceived it to be relevant and beneficial  to their objectives. These groups 
included entity managers and owners, internal and external auditors, regulators 
and legislators, private sector policy makers, and independent commissions. In 
varying degrees, each of  these groups has proffered  internal control as a solu-
tion to a number of  problems. 
The intense attention devoted to internal control over the last five  years 
(since 1986) has undoubtedly made progress in our understanding of  what inter-
nal control is and how it can be used. Professional  standards, private sector pro-
posals, legislative and regulatory initiatives, and practice and academic research 
have addressed many conceptual and practical issues. However, not everyone 
would agree that all of  these developments represent progress. Although some 
problems have been solved, some have not, and other problems have been creat-
ed. In other words, internal control theory and applications have progressed, 
perhaps in an evolutionary leap since 1986, but perils remain. 
The purpose of  this paper is to survey the progress and perils related to inter-
nal control developments over the last five  years. The content of  both categories 
is likely to be disputed and the coverage will probably be incomplete. Even the 
co-authors of  this paper are not in total agreement about what is progress and 
what is peril. Nevertheless, our objective is to review the most prominent 
advances and the most serious unresolved problems associated with internal 
control over the last half-decade.  We leave it to our reviewer to propose our 
misclassifications  and omissions. 
Some of  the developments discussed in this paper are neither new nor little 
known. They are presented for  perspective and in an attempt to be thorough. 
Other developments we discuss, however, are emerging and not yet widely 
known. We believe that both areas contain pressing questions in need of 
research. As in many other areas of  accounting research, research in internal 
control lags behind the needs of,  or is overlooked by, policy makers and practi-
tioners. This is likely a problem with the process used to identify  and communi-
cate policy and practice issues, stimulate research about them, and to foster  an 
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awareness of  existing research — that is, our internal control over useful  and 
relevant research may contain a material weakness or, at least, a reportable con-
dition. We hope that our paper gives better focus  to research needs in internal 
control. 
This paper is organized into three major sections each framed  as a question: 
(1) What is internal control? (2) What is the relationship of  internal control to 
an effective  audit strategy? and (3) What is the value of  information  about inter-
nal control? To some extent these categories overlap and other organizational 
frameworks  certainly exist, but we believe these categories aptly identify  the 
major areas where key developments have occurred during the last five  years. 
What Is Internal Control? 
Prior to 1987, there were many efforts  to define  and describe internal control. 
A number of  these efforts  were rooted in the need to postulate and understand 
the relationship of  internal control to financial  reporting and auditing, common-
ly referred  to as "internal accounting control." Several notable examples of 
these efforts  are Statements  on Auditing  Procedure  No.  54, The  Auditor's  Study 
and  Evaluation  of  Internal  Control  [AICPA, 1972], The  Report of  the AICPA's 
Special  Advisory  Committee  on Internal  Control  [AICPA, 1979], and Internal 
Control  in U.S.  Corporations:  The  State  of  the Art [Mautz, et.al. 1978]. 
Other treatises on internal control took a broader perspective, probing inter-
nal control as it relates to the organization as a whole. Some prominent exam-
ples of  these works are: Management  Control  Systems  [Anthony and Dearden, 
1972], Control  in Business Organizations  [Merchant, 1985], and Statement  on 
Internal  Auditing  Standards  No.  1, Control:  Concepts  and  Responsibilities, 
[IIA, 1983]. 
In 1987, two separate and extensive endeavors to redefine  and redescribe 
internal control began. Each of  these undertakings broadened and refined  the 
concept of  what internal control is and, in somewhat different  ways, addressed 
the need for  an authoritative or "generally accepted" definition  of  internal con-
trol. We refer  to those endeavors as SAS 55 [AICPA, 1988] and the 
Treadway/COSO [COSO, 1992] reports. 
SAS No. 55 
In February 1987, an exposure draft  of  a proposed statement on auditing 
standards (later to become SAS 55) was released. Although the proposal dealt 
principally with the relationship of  internal control to an audit of  financial  state-
ments, it also broadened the AIPCA's authoritative definition  of  internal control 
beyond that in SAP 54 and elaborated on its elements. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55, Consideration  of  the Internal 
Control  Structure  in a Financial  Statement  Audit,  (SAS 55) was issued in April 
1988. It introduced the term internal control structure and defined  it as consist-
ing of  an entity's "policies and procedures established to provide reasonable 
assurance that specific  entity objectives will be achieved." The standard subdi-
vided the internal control structure into three major elements: the control envi-
ronment, the accounting system, and control procedures. An appendix to SAS 
55 and a subsequent audit guide elaborate on these three elements in consider-
able detail. 
We believe that SAS 55 improved the definition  and description of  internal 
control, as it relates to financial  statement audits, in three principal ways. First, 
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it expanded the elements that comprise internal control over financial  state-
ments and that auditors, therefore,  should consider when assessing control risk. 
Second, it linked consideration of  internal control to financial  statement asser-
tions, requiring auditors to focus  their consideration of  internal control on its 
effect  on the specific  assertions being audited. Both of  these definitional 
improvements should bring progress in the form  of  better control risk assess-
ments. Third, the revised definition  specifically  embraced internal control over 
data used to apply audit procedures, for  example internal control over nonfinan-
cial data used in analytical procedures. This definitional  change brought the 
"operational" aspect of  internal control squarely within the purview of  a finan-
cial statement audit. By removing the clouded and unworkable distinction 
between accounting and administrative control in SAP 54, the new definition 
should improve both audit effectiveness  and efficiency  through the use of  oper-
ational information. 
These areas of  progress, however, are not without perils. One of  the elements 
included in the expanded definition  of  internal control, the control environment, 
contains several components that auditors may find  difficult  to evaluate and 
relate to financial  statement assertions. For example, judgments about what con-
stitutes an appropriate management philosophy and operating style or an effec-
tive organizational structure or audit committee and how those components 
affect  specific  financial  statement assertions are somewhat subjective and some-
what new to auditors. In addition, what constitutes effective  internal control 
over operational information  and, in turn, how such information  relates to finan-
cial statement assertions is largely unexplored and, we expect, not yet widely 
used in auditing. 
Research needs concerning the progress and perils of  SAS 55's definition  of 
internal control include the following  questions: 
• To what extent are auditors considering the control environment com-
ponents in assessing control risk (as opposed to assuming control risk 
is maximum)? 
• How do auditors evaluate the effectiveness  of  control environment 
components and what specific  problems are they encountering? 
• How do auditors combine or integrate the control environment with the 
other two internal control structure elements in assessing control risk? 
• How do auditors link the control environment (as a whole or by com-
ponents) to financial  statement assertions? 
• Have auditors' assessments of  control risk improved by considering 
the control environment components? 
• How and to what extent is nonfinancial  data used in an audit and how 
are controls over such data identified  and evaluated? 
Treadway/COSO Reports 
In October 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (Treadway Commission) issued its report. Included among its numer-
ous recommendations for  reducing the incidence of  fraudulent  financial  report-
ing were several recommendations concerning internal control. One of  these 
recommendations was specifically  addressed to the question of  what is internal 
control and suggested that the committee of  organizations sponsoring the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) develop integrated guidance on internal con-
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trol. The report's discussion of  the recommendation stated that varying interpre-
tations and philosophies of  internal control existed and that a common reference 
point about what effective  internal control is was needed. 
In response to this recommendation, COSO, through an outside consultant, 
(Coopers & Lybrand) embarked on a project to develop integrated, generally 
accepted internal control guidance. An exposure draft  of  this guidance was 
issued in March 1991. After  considering comments, a revised exposure draft 
was issued in February 1992, and the final  report is expected to be issued in 
September 1992. 
The stated objectives of  the report are to establish a common definition  of 
internal control which serves the needs of  different  parties (general acceptance) 
and to provide a standard against which the internal control effectiveness  can be 
evaluated (criteria). These are admirable but ambitious goals. Their achieve-
ment would represent substantial progress. Agreement about what internal con-
trol is and how effective  internal control can be achieved would be a major step 
toward helping entities establish sound internal control and providing useful 
information  about internal control. Indeed, initial indications suggest that these 
goals may be attainable. For example, regulatory agencies charged with imple-
menting the FDIC Improvement Act of  1991 have indicated they will adopt the 
COSO report as the standard against which both the required management and 
auditor assessments of  internal control effectiveness  required by the act should 
be judged. The growth in other legislative and regulatory interest in internal 
control may provide additional impetus for  imbuing the COSO report with 
"general acceptance" (in the AICPA's auditing standards division, for  example, 
we have been involved with over a dozen regulatory agency proposals for  audi-
tor reports on internal control within the last four  months). 
More experience implementing the COSO report is needed, however, before 
its success can be evaluated. There are a number of  critics of  the report who see 
more peril than progress in its content. The major perils posed by the report can 
be classified  into two areas: (1) the definition  of  internal control and the related 
components (criteria) the report establishes for  effective  internal control, and (2) 
the measure of  significant  deficiencies  the report sets forth. 
COSO defines  internal control broadly as "a process, effected  by an entity's 
board of  directors, management and other personnel, which is designed to pro-
vide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of  objectives in one or 
more categories: effectiveness  and efficiency  of  operations, reliability of  finan-
cial information,  and compliance with applicable laws and regulations." The 
report also identifies  five  components of  effective  internal control: (1) control 
environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4) information  and 
communication, and (5) monitoring. These components represent criteria or 
standards for  establishing and evaluating effective  internal control. 
It seems intuitively reasonable to establish internal control categories that 
correspond to the three major categories of  entity objectives (financial  report-
ing, compliance, and operations). This categorization permits universal criteria 
to be applied to major segments of  internal control. As the COSO report states, 
these categories allow a directed focus  on internal control by different  parties to 
suit their specific  needs. Such a categorization, however, also creates a percep-
tion that internal control components within these categories are clearly identifi-
able and distinguishable and that experience and expertise in applying the 
COSO criteria is equally well-developed for  each of  these categories. 
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This perception is not valid and, although the COSO report attempts to dispel 
the inference,  our experience with numerous regulatory requests for  auditor ser-
vices on internal control demonstrates that the misperception is common. For 
example, the Chief  Financial Officers  Act of  1990 requires an auditor's opinion 
on internal control over financial  reporting, compliance with laws and regula-
tions, and certain operations objectives. In addition, the act requires auditors 
to "review management's process for  evaluating and reporting on internal 
control." 
While we have a fairly  well-developed body of  knowledge about how to 
apply the COSO criteria to internal control over financial  reporting, our knowl-
edge of  how to implement these criteria for  internal control over compliance 
and operations is extremely limited. For example, how do we implement the 
risk assessment, control activities, and information  and communication criteria 
for  the categories of  compliance with laws and regulations or operations? 
Regulatory initiatives calling for  such implementation are fast  outpacing our 
ability to provide those services. We have found  in our experience at the 
AICPA that regulators often  have unachievable expectations about the services 
independent auditors can provide regarding internal control in the compliance 
and operations categories. For example, we have had requests for  auditors to 
provide opinions that an entity has adequate internal control to ensure compli-
ance with laws and regulations requiring drug free  workplaces and nondiscrimi-
nation in providing housing. Consequently, when legislative and regulatory 
bodies request services concerning internal control, we are careful  to always use 
a modifier  with the term internal control—financial  reporting, compliance, or 
operations—to help avoid misunderstanding. 
Another concern about the COSO criteria is that certain components may be 
so subjective as to not be susceptible to reasonably consistent estimation or 
measurement. Those components most often  cited include integrity, ethical val-
ues, and management competence. Management (or auditors) may not be able 
to determine objectively whether those criteria have been satisfied,  yet their 
existence as criteria is likely to create the expectation that they have. On the 
other hand, however, the COSO criteria may currently be at the same evolution-
ary stage that generally accepted accounting principles were at forty  years ago. 
Refinement  is probably necessary and likely to occur. 
Another peril arises because the report uses the concept of  a material weak-
ness to separate effective  from  ineffective  internal control. Using this measure 
causes two problems. First, no conceptual or empirical construct of  a material 
weakness exists for  internal control over either compliance or operations. The 
construct has been developed only for  internal control over financial  reporting 
by relating deficiencies  in internal control to the likelihood of  material misstate-
ments in the financial  statements. Obviously, such a construct is not an appro-
priate measure of  a material weakness in either internal control over compliance 
or operations. In the absence of  sound definitions  of  material weaknesses per-
taining specifically  to both the compliance and operations categories, the deci-
sions of  those who evaluate internal control in those categories and those who 
use such evaluations will be subject to extreme variations in consistency and 
usefulness. 
Even though an accepted material weakness concept exists for  internal con-
trol over financial  reporting, it also poses complications. There are strong disin-
centives to concluding that such weaknesses exist. Practice experience in both 
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financial  statement audits and in engagements to report on internal control 
under SAS 30 indicates that material weaknesses rarely exist. This rarity stems 
from  the perception that their existence constitutes a violation of  the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of  1977. As a result, deficiencies  in internal control are 
almost never deemed sufficiently  significant  to be material weaknesses and use-
ful  information  about internal control is suppressed. Indeed, SAS 60 was devel-
oped to foster  the flow  of  useful  information  about internal control over finan-
cial reporting by creating an additional, lower-level deficiency  not embedded in 
legislation—a "reportable condition." Because of  the legal implications of 
material weaknesses, COSO's decision to adopt that concept is likely to perpet-
uate their rarity. 
An additional concern with the material weakness construct (for  each of  the 
three control categories) is that it may not be operational for  some of  the crite-
ria—particularly the control environment criteria. What constitutes a material 
weakness in integrity, ethical values, management competence, or management 
philosophy and operating style? Applying the material weakness concept to 
these criteria is likely to create a very fuzzy  line between effective  and ineffec-
tive internal control, with the result that the identification  of  such weaknesses 
will be rare. Moreover, the lack of  material weaknesses may lead to unwarrant-
ed implications, for  example, that management is effective. 
Research needs concerning the progress and perils of  the internal control def-
inition and criteria in the COSO report include the following  areas: 
• The extent to which the COSO report definition  and criteria has been 
adopted, voluntarily or mandatorily, by entities that report on internal 
control. 
• The implementation of  the five  COSO criteria in each of  the three inter-
nal control categories, with special considerations to the compliance and 
operations categories—problems encountered and refinements  needed. 
• The decision processes management and auditors use in deciding 
whether material weaknesses exist in each of  the three categories. 
• The application of  COSO criteria to smaller entities and specific  indus-
tries. 
• The relationship between the SAS 55 definition  of  internal control and 
the COSO definition  and the need for  reconciling SAS 55 to COSO. 
What Is the Relationship of  Internal Control to an Effective 
Audit Strategy? 
The proposal and ultimate issuance of  SAS 55 sparked considerable contro-
versy about the validity of  some of  its concepts and whether its implementation 
would have a positive or negative effect  on financial  statement audits. Because 
SAS 55 is the authoritative guidance for  forming  judgments about internal con-
trol effectiveness  and incorporating them into a financial  statement audit, con-
cerns about its conceptual validity and implementation are critical. Moreover, 
portions of  SAS 55 are being adapted as guidance in attestation standards the 
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) is developing for  auditors to use in performing 
and reporting on internal control effectiveness  using the COSO report. Thus, 
issues concerning SAS 55 have taken on added significance. 
Some of  the potential progress and perils associated with SAS 55 were dis-
cussed in the previous section. This section will consider other significant  areas 
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of  advances and hazards directly attributable to SAS 55. The areas of  controver-
sy we believe to be of  the greatest consequence are: (1) the meaning of  control 
risk and (2) the nature and application of  tests of  controls. 
What Is Control Risk? 
The concept of  control risk was first  recognized in auditing standards with 
the issuance of  SAS 39. Control risk was further  refined  and given more promi-
nence by SAS 47; SAS 55 sets forth  the most recent amplification  of  that con-
cept. Some commentators, however, believe that SAS 55 changed the concept 
of  control risk significantly  from  that in prior standards and made it theoretical-
ly and operationally unsound [Morton and Felix, 1990, 1991]. 
SAS 55 defines  control risk as "the risk that a material misstatement that 
could occur in an assertion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis 
by the entity's internal control structure policies and procedures." This defini-
tion is essentially the one in SAS 47 modified  to accommodate the SAS 55 
requirement that control risk be assessed at the assertion level. The fundamental 
disagreement over this definition  is whether it means that the assessed level of 
control risk must always represent the auditor's belief  (estimate) about the true 
but unknown level of  control risk or whether, for  audit efficiency  reasons, an 
auditor may decide not to confirm  that belief  and arbitrarily set control at the 
highest possible level (100%). 
The essence of  this disagreement was stated clearly and concisely by Morton 
and Felix [1990] " ...[I]t seems unreasonable to assume that an auditor either 
has no beliefs  until competent evidential matter is collected, or that his beliefs 
are irrelevant unless sufficient  evidential matter is collected to provide a basis 
for  reliance thereon." Some believe that such an assumption, instead of  being 
unreasonable, is prudent. Stated differently,  what support should exist for  a 
belief  that the level of  control risk is below 100% before  that belief  can be used 
in the audit? Should auditors be permitted1 to use beliefs  for  which they have 
not gathered evidence or should they be required to obtain evidence to support 
those beliefs  before  they are used in the audit process? 
Research about internal control judgments has been abundant and fruitful. 
Additional consideration is needed, however, of  how audit effectiveness  differs 
when auditors use beliefs  about control risk that are unsupported by tests of 
controls as opposed to when auditors assume control risk is 100%. Some impor-
tant questions are: 
• When an auditor has a tentative but unconfirmed  belief  that control 
risk is less than 100% but believes it is inefficient  to perform  tests of 
controls to confirm  the belief,  what is the role of  those unconfirmed 
beliefs  in the audit process (normative and descriptive)? 
• When an auditor has a tentative but unconfirmed  belief  that control 
risk is less than 100% but believes it is inefficient  to perform  tests of 
controls to confirm  the belief,  what is the affect  on the audit process of 
setting control risk at 100%? 
1 Morton & Felix [1991, pp. 4-5] strongly imply that use of  an unsubstantiated belief  that control 
risk is less than 100% should not only be permitted but required. The rationale is that the audit will 
be more effective  than if  the auditor assumes control risk is 100% and audits accordingly. 
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The meaning of  control risk raises other questions apart from  financial  state-
ment audits. Because the risk model is incorporated in the attestation standards, 
control risk applies to assertions other than financial  statements. Therefore,  in 
addition to questions about the meaning of  control risk in financial  statement 
audits, audit policy makers are being confronted  with questions about the mean-
ing of  control risk in the context of  an audit of  an entity's compliance with laws 
and regulations and its operations results. Even more modernistic and intriguing 
are questions about the meaning of  control risk in an audit of  internal control— 
that is, what does control risk mean and how should it be considered when an 
auditor is engaged to express an opinion on the effectiveness  of  internal control 
over financial  reporting, compliance, or operations? 
What Are Tests of  Controls? 
Tests of  controls are audit procedures performed  to evaluate the effectiveness 
of  the design or operation of  internal control structure policies or procedures. 
They consist of  four  major categories: 
(1) Inquiry of  appropriate entity personnel. 
(2) Inspection of  documents and reports. 
(3) Observation of  the application of  policies or 
(4) Reperformance  of  the application of  policies or procedures by the 
auditor. 
This definition  and description of  tests of  controls, summarized from  SAS 
55, is probably the most controversial aspect of  the standard. 
Some commentators on SAS 55 believe that its construct of  tests of  controls 
has reduced the extent and relaxed the nature of  control testing [for  example, 
Kinney and Felix, 1992]. Other commentators believe that the construct has 
achieved exactly the opposite effect—control  testing is more prevalent and 
more focused  than it was prior to SAS 55 [see, for  example, Sullivan, 1988]. 
Commentators in the first  group believe that "tests of  controls" has had a 
deleterious effect  on audit effectiveness  that manifests  itself  in (1) a de-empha-
sis of  testing controls at the transaction level, (2) a de-emphasis of  reperfor-
mance tests, and (3) a decline in the use of  sampling in testing controls. They 
believe that these conditions are symptomatic of  underauditing; that inquiry, 
observation, and document inspection are inherently less rigorous and reliable 
than reperformance;  and that sampling is significant,  if  not essential, to proper 
evaluation of  control effectiveness. 
Remarkably, commentators who support the test of  controls concept in SAS 
55 agree that the three conditions enumerated above have occurred, but believe 
that they reflect  a shift  to a more effective  audit approach brought about by SAS 
55. In other words, SAS 55 was intended to create the above three conditions as 
a means of  improving audit effectiveness. 
Indeed, the explanation for  different  interpretations of  the same set of  events 
lies in the perception of  what constitutes audit effectiveness.  Most proponents 
of  SAS 55 believe that previous internal control standards failed  to concentrate 
the auditor's internal control consideration on the primary sources of  misleading 
financial  statements: improper or biased selection and application of  accounting 
principles, biased judgments about accounting estimates, and inaccurate or 
incomplete disclosures. Instead, in their view, the old standards focused  the 
auditor's internal control efforts  primarily on financial  statement misstatements 
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resulting from  clerical or processing mistakes. 
This perception of  what the focus  of  internal control work should be under-
lies the broadening of  the definition  of  the internal control structure in SAS 55. 
The expansion was intended to direct the auditor's control work toward control 
components considered to be most relevant to the major sources of  financial 
statement misstatements. As a result, the expanded definition  brought the con-
trol environment and the accounting system directly into the scope of  the audi-
tor's consideration. SAS 55 accommodated these two new control components 
by recognizing tests suitable to their nature. These tests were labeled tests of 
controls and included the types of  procedures set forth  in the initial paragraph of 
this section. 
The design and operation of  most of  the control environment components 
and many of  the accounting system components cannot be tested at the transac-
tion level, or by reperformance,  or through the use of  sampling. Yet these com-
ponents are much more closely associated with the primary causes of  financial 
statement misstatements than are controls over individual transactions. 
Furthermore, because of  the increased use of  EDP applications, the most effec-
tive approach to considering the control procedures component is often  to focus 
on the higher-level, supervisory control procedures (general controls). These 
control procedures also cannot be tested at the transaction level, or by reperfor-
mance, or through the use of  sampling. 
Whether SAS 55 has created a proper focus  on internal control, whether 
auditors have understood and implemented that focus  in their audit approaches, 
and whether the tests of  controls established by the standard provide reliable 
evidence and are being implemented properly will no doubt continue to be 
debated. These questions pose important research opportunities for  assessing 
the progress and perils of  SAS 55. 
What Is the Value of  Information  About Internal Control? 
Effective  internal control is valuable because it helps achieve objectives. In 
addition, however, there is a growing belief  that information  (reports) about the 
effectiveness  of  internal control is also valuable. The value of  such reports is 
virtually indisputable for  some uses. For example, reports about internal control 
effectiveness  are indispensable to management in achieving sound control. In 
fact,  one of  the five  COSO criteria, monitoring, explicitly recognizes the need 
for  such information.  Reports about internal control for  other than manage-
ment's use, however, is viewed as progress by some and peril by others. It is the 
value of  these other uses we discuss in this section. Throughout the remainder 
of  the paper, we use the term "reports" to mean an independent auditor's report 
on an entity's internal control. Although such reports may not be accompanied 
by a separate management assertion on internal control effectiveness,  we con-
sider such an assertion to be at least implicit. 
Calls for  reports on internal control are not new. Various bodies have pro-
posed or supported both voluntary and mandatory reports. These groups include 
independent private-sector commissions (Cohen & Treadway Commissions), 
legislators & regulators (Wyden & Dingell and SEC), and professional  groups 
(AICPA and FEI). Although it is not our purpose to recount this history, a good 
summary of  it can be found  in Appendix A of  the COSO report. 
More activity in the area of  reports on internal control effectiveness  has 
occurred during the last five  years than at anytime in the past. Although some 
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recommendations have come from  the private sector (notably the Treadway 
Commission) and some reports have been issued voluntarily by public compa-
nies, by far  the most activity has been in government. The following  list pro-
vides some examples of  internal control reports that the government has man-
dated within the last five  years and that involve independent auditors. 
• FDIC Improvement Act of  1991 
• CFO Act of  1990 
•OMB Circular A-133 
• Government Auditing Standards (Yellow Book) 
• HUD Program Audit Guide 
• Student Financial Assistance Programs Guide 
• Mortgage Banker Single Audit Program 
• REA Borrower Audits Program 
• Aviation Safety  & Capacity Expansion Act of  1990 
In addition to these recent initiatives, other requirements for  reporting on inter-
nal control have existed for  some time, for  example reports involving casinos, 
investment companies, depository trust companies, securities transfer  agents, 
and a myriad of  entities subject to OMB Circular A-128—each of  these situa-
tions also include some type of  independent auditor involvement. 
The content of  current internal control reports varies in at least eight major 
areas: 
(1) Category of  internal control reported on (financial  reporting, compli-
ance, or operations). 
(2) Aspect of  internal control reported on (design, placed in operation, or 
operating effectiveness). 
(3) Presence or absence of  separate management assertion (report) about 
internal control. 
(4) Criteria used to judge internal control quality (SAS 30, SAS 55, 
COSO, agreed-upon criteria). 
(5) Measure of  deficiencies  to be reported (material weakness, reportable 
condition, material inadequacy). 
(6) Auditor service (examination, agreed-upon procedures, by-product of 
other services). 
(7) Assurance provided (opinion, negative assurance, negative/positive 
assurance, findings  only). 
(8) Report distribution (public, restricted). 
This brief  overview of  current reporting on internal control demonstrates a 
strong demand for  such reports and the serpentine reporting practices associated 
with them. Whether the demand reflects  an intrinsic utility in such reports is 
arguable. (After  all, the demand is largely regulator induced and not subject to 
free  market considerations of  cost and benefit.)  Whether the cobweb of  report 
contents enhances or diminishes the meaningfulness  of  such reports is also an 
open question. 
Report Demand 
The fundamental  proposition underlying a demand for  reports on the quality 
of  internal control is that reporting on the output  of  a process is not enough. 
Reporting on the process itself  is also necessary. Stated somewhat differently,  if 
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a report about the output of  a process is available, does a report about the 
process that produced that output add incremental value?—is one type of  report 
simply a substitute for  the other? Exhibit 1 illustrates this concept using the 
three categories of  objectives presented in the COSO Report.2 
Exhibit 1 
Relationship Between Internal Control Structures and Products 
Internal Control Structure Product 
Financial Reporting Financial Statements 
Compliance with Laws & Regulations Compliance Performance 
Operations Requirements Operations Performance 
Currently, independent auditors provide assurance about each of  the three 
outputs in Exhibit 1. They audit financial  statements, express opinions on 
whether the requirements of  laws or regulations have been complied with, and 
provide assurance about whether the outcome of  operations meets certain speci-
fications. 3 As noted earlier, however, auditors also currently provide assurance 
about internal controls over financial  reporting, compliance with laws and regu-
lations, and operations. If  this latter type of  service satisfies  an unmet need in a 
cost-beneficial  manner without creating unwarranted expectations, then such 
services represent progress. If  not, perils exist. There are arguments for  both 
positions. 
Those who advocate reports on internal control usually cite two major bene-
fits.  One benefit  pertains to the act of  reporting itself  (a behavioral effect)  rather 
than to the information  content of  such reports. The premise is that reports on an 
entity's internal control will cause its management to devote more attention to 
internal control quality and, therefore,  better internal control will result. 
Improved internal control, in turn, will yield improved output, e.g., more reli-
able financial  reporting, greater compliance with laws and regulations, and bet-
ter operating performance. 
This perceived benefit  may pertain more to compliance and operations objec-
tives than to financial  reporting objectives. If  internal control (process) does not 
achieve financial  reporting objectives, then an audit of  the current-period finan-
cial statements (output) can be used to achieve those objectives—change the 
financial  statements based on the audit. Thus, even if  the act of  reporting on 
internal control over financial  reporting (process) does improve that internal 
control, it does not add anything to the achievement of  financial  reporting 
objectives beyond what an audit of  the financial  statements (output) can 
achieve. 
The same is not true for  the compliance and operations categories of  internal 
control. If  internal control (process) does not achieve current-period compliance 
2 Although this relationship is seemingly straightforward,  our experience has been that internal con-
trol over a specific  process is often  confused  with the output that process produces. 
3 As an example of  an engagement involving operations specifications,  the Environmental 
Protection Agency has requested that auditors provide assurance on the oxygenate content of  gaso-
line distributed in various areas of  the United States. 
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and operations objectives, an audit of  the current-period compliance and opera-
tions performance  (output) cannot be used to change the current-period results 
to achieve those objectives. Consequently, if  the act of  reporting on internal 
control causes management to devote more attention to internal control and 
thereby improve it, then reports on internal control over compliance and opera-
tions may add to the achievement of  current-period objectives in each of  those 
areas beyond what an audit of  the output provides. 
The other major benefit  of  reports on the quality of  internal control relates to 
their information  content. The premise is that such reports provide information 
that is not available from  reports on the output of  the process. That is, reports on 
internal control provide information  relevant to decisions about an entity that 
cannot be satisfied  by reports on the output. 
In the area of  internal control over financial  reporting, the argument has been 
made that reports about the quality of  internal control serve to provide needed 
information  about an entity that is not available from  its financial  statements 
[Hooten and Landsittel, 1991]. For example, two entities might have the same 
financial  position and operating results for  a given period yet one entity have 
sound internal control and the other inadequate internal control. Financial state-
ments do not provide information  about the quality of  internal control. Yet, the 
argument goes, the quality of  internal control is a critical indicator of  the enti-
ty's future  success. Those who make decisions about an entity need information 
about internal control to be effective  decision makers. 
Opponents of  this argument point out that its validity depends heavily on 
what categories of  internal control are reported on. Poor internal control over 
financial  reporting can be compensated for  by auditing the financial  state-
ments—annual, interim, or both. Thus, for  the financial  reporting category, the 
argument boils down to which type of  information  is least costly to provide. 
Providing information  about internal control over financial  reporting does not 
seem to supply any incremental value beyond that afforded  by audited financial 
statements—no progress, just peril. 
If,  however, the compliance and operations categories of  internal control are 
reported on, additional information  value may arise. The rationale relates to the 
inherent difference,  discussed earlier, between the category of  financial  report-
ing objectives and the categories of  compliance and operations objectives. 
Current-period compliance and operations performance  cannot be changed to 
meet objectives based on an audit of  actual results, as can financial  reporting 
performance.  Thus, reports on the quality of  internal control over compliance 
and operations may indeed provide "early warning" information  about whether 
objectives in either of  those areas will be achieved. That is, reports on internal 
control quality in each of  these areas may provide information  about risks and 
uncertainties attendant to achieving the related objectives that audits of  the actu-
al results cannot provide as quickly or cannot provide at all. Stated differently, 
although an audit of  the compliance or operations output may reveal that objec-
tives were not achieved, it may be too late to do anything about it. On the other 
hand, reports on internal control over both areas may provide time to make 
adjustments to accomplish these objectives. 
Not everyone agrees, however, that reports on internal control over compli-
ance and operations provides incremental information  in the most cost-effective 
manner. Opponents to such reports often  argue that the type of  output provided 
is the key consideration. If  historical results do not provide timely information, 
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other types of  output do. For example, improved reporting of  specific  risks and 
uncertainties or required financial  forecasts,  both attested to by independent 
auditors, have been suggested as better alternatives to reports on internal con-
trol. 
In our view, not much progress has been made in resolving the questions 
concerning the relative merits of  reports on internal control versus reports on 
output. Although the demand for  reports on internal control is growing, much of 
it stems from  legislative and regulatory requirements. This source of  demand 
raises the question of  whether reports about the quality of  internal control are of 
more value to specific  users than to the general public. 
Report Users 
Currently, reports on internal control are issued to both specific  parties, such 
as regulatory agencies, and to the general public. Unlike the general public, 
however, a specific  party's relationship with an entity may be directly affected 
by the entity's internal control. For example, a specific  party may provide fund-
ing to an entity under the condition that certain internal control requirements be 
met to help ensure that the funds  are used appropriately. Because of  such rela-
tionships, specific  parties usually have a clearer understanding of  the purpose 
and limitations of  internal control, internal control reports and the auditor's ser-
vices are generally tailored to their specific  needs, and they are able to require 
the entity to take certain actions if  internal control is deficient.  We believe, 
therefore,  that internal control reports are much more useful  for  these parties 
than for  the general public, and less likely to create perils for  management and 
their auditors. 
Reports to the general public are much more hazardous than those to specific 
users; hazardous to the public, the entity, and its auditors. The public, in gener-
al, does not have as clear an understanding of  the purpose and limitations of 
internal control as specific  parties do. In addition, the general public cannot take 
specific  actions to compel an entity to alter its internal control on the basis of  an 
internal control report. At most, members of  the investing public might alter 
their investment decisions about an entity based on the reported quality of  its 
internal control. Investors' ability to factor  information  about internal control 
into their investment decisions, as alluded to earlier, is contentious and largely 
unexamined. Public reports on internal control should be discouraged until there 
is a better understanding of  the relationship between information  about an enti-
ty's internal control and its potential for  success. 
Report Content 
As noted previously, the content of  internal control reports varies consider-
ably. Much of  the variation is attributable to the piecemeal fashion  in which 
reporting on internal control has developed. Professional  standards, instead of 
providing a general framework  for  reporting on internal control, have permitted 
considerable flexibility  in such reporting. These standards have, for  the most 
part, addressed individual internal control engagements as the need arose, creat-
ing a wide diversity of  performance  and reporting requirements. The myriad 
forms  of  internal control reports has created confusion  not only among report 
users, but also among the practitioners who are asked to provide them. 
Only recently has the ASB acted to promulgate a general framework  for 
reporting on internal control. Currently, the ASB has an exposure draft  of  an 
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attestation standard for  reporting on internal control over financial  reporting 
outstanding and is developing another for  reporting on internal control over 
compliance with laws and regulations. These standards should help achieve 
greater consistency in both the performance  standards for  internal control 
engagements and the resulting reports. 
There is concern, however, that, through the combination of  the COSO 
report criteria and the proposed attestation standard on internal control over 
financial  reporting, too much homogeneity in reports will result. If  the concept 
of  material weaknesses, as prescribed in both the COSO report and the proposed 
attestation standard, results in the virtual absence of  material weaknesses (for 
reasons discussed earlier), all reports will look alike. These boilerplate reports 
are not likely to have much information  content and, instead, serve only as a 
basis for  litigation against management and auditors if  the entity encounters 
problems in the future. 
Research needs concerning the progress and perils of  the value of  reports on 
internal control include the following  questions: 
• Does the act of  reporting on internal control cause management to 
improve internal control quality? 
• Can reports on internal control over financial  reporting, compliance, or 
operations provide information  beyond that available from  reports on 
the output? 
• How do regulators (or other classes of  specific  parties) determine their 
information  needs about internal control and use the information  in 
internal control reports? 
• How does the general public perceive and use internal control reports? 
• What is the content of  internal control reports issued to the general 
public and in what significant  ways do these reports differ? 
Summary 
The brisk activity in internal control over the last five  years has raised new 
issues about internal control and renewed emphasis on old issues. Many of  the 
developments flowing  from  this activity have gone beyond the discussion stage 
and into implementation. In several instances, implementation has been under-
taken on the faith  or perception that the actions will be beneficial  and, thus, 
have bestowed an urgency on the need to understand their effects. 
Because implementation is taking place, data now exists, and we hope is 
accessible, for  empirical research on many theoretical internal control issues. 
We hope that efforts  will be devoted to this research and that this paper will 
help to focus  them. 
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Discussant's Response to "Internal Control: Progress 
and Perils" 
Andrew D. Bailey, Jr* 
University of  Arizona 
Introduction 
This comment is organized around the Winters and Guy paper and the COSO 
(Committee of  Sponsoring Organizations) Internal Control-Integrated 
Framework project [COSO, 1992; Winters and Guy, 1992], I was a member of 
the Project Advisory Council to COSO, Guidance and Oversight. This group 
included representatives from  each of  the COSO participating organizations, 
FEI (Financial Executive Institute), IIA (Institute of  Internal Auditors), IMA 
(Institute of  Management Accountants), AICPA (American Institute of  Certified 
Public Accountants), and AAA (American Accounting Association). As the 
AAA representative, I participated in all COSO Advisory Council deliberations. 
As is the habit of  the AAA, I was not authorized to speak for  the Association. 
The AAA Executive Committee recently endorsed the private sector initiative 
represented by the internal control framework  project, but did not endorse the 
specific  contents of  the report. Discussions with the AAA were still in progress 
when this paper was submitted. Any comments made by me concerning the 
results of  the framework  study are mine and not those of  the AAA or other 
COSO Advisory Council members. 
Background 
Some background, as I interpret it, on the evolution of  the COSO Internal 
Control project may be of  use. In developing the COSO response to the 
Treadway recommendations concerning an integrated definition  of  internal con-
trol, it was decided to develop the project within the existing FERF (Financial 
Executive Research Foundation) research framework.  The usual research 
process involves a task force,  such as the COSO Project Advisory Council, but 
drawn from  FEI members. Ordinarily a FERF project team is in direct charge of 
their project and accepts direction from  the task force  as it deems reasonable. It 
is the project team's option to reject advice and FERF's option to publish or not 
publish the resulting report. Given the nature of  this project and the perception 
by many that the internal control project was essential to providing a basis for 
potential legislation and/or regulation in the area, the COSO Advisory Council 
wanted to take a much more direct hand in setting direction for  the resulting 
report. The initial relations between the Coopers & Lybrand project team and 
The author wants to thank the members of  the COSO Advisory Council for  their valuable input on 
an earlier version of  this paper. Interpretations remain my own. 
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the COSO Advisory Council required some effort  due to these circumstances. 
The Coopers & Lybrand team, quite reasonably, considered all COSO Advisory 
Council input as just that — advisory. They chose to accept some, but certainly 
not all, of  the advice. The COSO Advisory Council found  this difficult  to deal 
with; however, an amicable set of  protocols was developed over time. 
Changed Project Management 
During this period, I believed that both the Coopers & Lybrand project team 
and the COSO Advisory Council anticipated that the final  product would be a 
FERF monograph. However, approximately halfway  through the effort  it was 
concluded that a more extensive public disclosure effort  than originally planned 
would enhance the possibility of  general acceptance of  the project results. 
Because of  the advocacy implications, FERF withdrew from  the management of 
the project. As a result, no monograph would be published by FERF. 
Discussions following  this decision focused  on the means of  developing the 
COSO project in a form  more like that of  a standard setting effort.  The resulting 
public exposure process can be characterized as a standard setting effort;  how-
ever, as COSO has no standard setting authority, whether the results will consti-
tute a standard will depend solely upon the degree of  acceptance this document 
generates. 
The COSO Framework Study 
The COSO Framework is premised on the idea that internal control is essen-
tial to the efficient  and effective  operations of  a business, reliable external 
financial  reporting (note that COSO only went this far  on the topic of  external 
reporting) and compliance with laws and regulations. It is also influenced  by a 
belief  that legislators and regulators have misconceptions about the value of 
internal controls or, at least, about the value of  external reporting on internal 
controls. The concern with legislators and regulators explains some of  the posi-
tions adopted by COSO. 
Serious questions arise as to the importance of  internal controls and reporting 
on internal controls. First, is internal control necessary to meet the operations, 
reporting and compliance objectives of  a firm?  If  we can rely on even the sim-
plest biological analogies to the marketplace, survival of  the fittest,  we can pret-
ty well accept that internal control is important to the management of  a firm.  As 
a corollary, we can assume that some form  of  internal reporting will take place 
on this topic. Virtually all successful  firms  commit some fraction  of  their 
resources to development, maintenance, and reporting on internal control sys-
tems. A virtually unqualified  "yes" seems to be appropriate with respect to this 
point. How much firms  commit is, at this time, based on a firm  by firm 
cost/benefit  analysis, taking into consideration current mandated regulations. 
Less obvious is the answer to the second question: Is external reporting on inter-
nal control useful?  There is little empirical evidence to support the demand for 
external reports on internal controls other than from  legislative and regulatory 
bodies. Winters and Guy [1992, p. 183] contend that "Those who advocate 
reports on internal control usually cite two major benefits...a  behavioral 
effect...[and  an] information  content [benefit]." 
The COSO Framework is composed of  four  separate volumes: Executive 
Summary; Framework Study; Management Reporting to External Parties; and 
Tools. This structure seems quite obvious with the possible exception of  the 
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separation of  the Management Reporting to External Parties from  the 
Framework Study. The separation is the result of  COSO advisory members' 
deliberations on the topic of  external reporting and significant  contradictory 
commentary on the same topic from  those receiving the exposure draft.  The 
contradictory commentary, disagreements and concerns are, in my opinion, 
reflected  in the final  document in a number of  ways: external reporting is not 
required for  good internal control; only external financial  reporting is addressed 
in any substantive and explicit way by the report; and external auditing is not 
given much explicit prominence in any of  the volumes. This latter point may 
reflect  management's concern for  expanding audit fees  and a general feeling 
that the audit adds little value in the circumstances addressed by the report. The 
public accounting participants in the process would undoubtedly not accept the 
lack of  value added position; however, concern for  extended legal exposure, a 
desire to make progress on a common set of  definitions  and criteria and the 
inclusion of  a volume specifically  addressing external reporting issues may 
influence  them to accept the report. 
Summary of  the COSO Documents 
The following  comments are based on the COSO report, Internal  Control-
Integrated  Framework,  Committee of  Sponsoring Organizations of  the 
Treadway Commission, Revised Draft,  February 1992, revised based on recom-
mendations of  the April 13, 1992 COSO Advisory Committee meeting [COSO, 
1992]. Subsequent changes are reflected  where they are known to be part of  the 
planned revisions. 
Throughout this paper I have drawn very heavily (in fact,  as much as possi-
ble) on the actual words used in the COSO documents. I have not used quota-
tion marks or page references,  as they would be distracting. However, subject to 
my errors in transcription or subsequent COSO changes, statements attributed to 
COSO use COSO's words. As you will have noted above, I have also drawn 
from  SAS 55 and the Winters and Guy paper [AICPA, 1988; COSO, 1992; 
Winters and Guy, 1992], In these cases, I have endeavored to use page and 
paragraph references  as well as quotation marks. These quotations and observa-
tions are inserted at the points where they seem to bear on the COSO volumes 
discussed. I have endeavored to clearly distinguish my opinions, which are mine 
alone. 
a. Objectives of  Framework  Study:  COSO established two objectives for  its 
integrated framework  study, (emphasis added) to: 
• Establish a common definition  serving the needs of  different  parties. 
• Provide a standard  against which business and other entities—large or 
small, in the public or private sector, for  profit  or not—can assess their 
control systems and determine to improve them. 
b. Success in meeting these objectives requires: 
• A common and generally accepted definition  of  internal control. 
• A generally accepted set of  standards  for  assessing whether an organi-
zation's  internal  control  system meets effectiveness  standards. 
The COSO document does present a definition  and standards, but it is too 
early to know whether either will be accepted as the common definition  and 
standards for  internal control. There was certainly a good deal of  discussion 
about the definition  and standards among all parties to the process. Many of  the 
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exposure draft  comments have been incorporated into the definition  and stan-
dards. These comments were incorporated, both to improve the definition  and 
standards and also in an attempt to assure the general acceptance necessary to 
meet the COSO study objectives. Without additional exposure efforts,  one 
could expect continuing dissatisfaction  with specific  aspects of  the definition. 
Some of  these disagreements would clearly be a matter of  editorial choices, e.g., 
where the wording is not that used by a particular organization in its current lit-
erature. These disagreements are unlikely to persist if  the COSO framework 
gains any significant  degree of  prominence. Other matters may prove more sub-
stantive but will have to await attempts to apply the COSO framework  in the 
field  to existing and newly arising problems, e.g., external compliance reporting 
in the banking industry. Disagreements about the breadth or narrowness of  the 
definition  and standards (both exist) are unlikely to be resolved at this late date. 
The broader definition  adopted by COSO had the predominant level of  support 
from  both COSO participants and those responding to the report drafts. 
It is too early to know whether the COSO framework  will become the stan-
dard of  application. However, there are forces  that encourage its adoption. The 
Congress and its regulatory arms may find  it a useful  point of  departure when 
considering new legislation or regulation in the internal control reporting arena. 
There are already indications that at least part of  the COSO document will be 
included in pending regulations. The private sector participants clearly hope for 
such reliance and for  an understanding on the part of  the lawmakers that the 
COSO framework  also addresses the limits of  lawmaker requests. Some private 
sector participants hope that it will act as a brake on regulators' desires for  addi-
tional mandated public reporting and auditing. At the same time, the public 
accounting sector may find  that the COSO framework  provides them with a 
ready marketing tool. However, while there are incentive compatible reasons to 
expect acceptance by many of  the principals involved, this acceptance is only 
likely to be retained among the participants based on early successes or failures 
in application. Winters and Guy say [p. 180]: 
Agreement about what internal control is...may be attainable. For exam-
ple, regulatory agencies...have indicated they will adopt the COSO report 
as the standard against which both the required management and auditor 
assessments of  internal control effectiveness...should  be judged...imbuing 
the COSO report with 'general acceptance'.... 
More experience implementing the COSO report is needed...before  its 
success can be evaluated.... 
Realistically, I believe that the COSO framework  will become an integral 
part of  the internal control literature for  the next five  to ten years. During that 
time events will determine its survival as a seminal work or as a useful  effort 
needing elaboration, extension or revision. In any case, it will have set the agen-
da for  consideration and action and moved the internal control discussion for-
ward. 
Definition 
COSO defined  internal control [COSO Advisory Committee meeting, 
February 1992; revised based on April 13, 1992] as follows  (emphasis added): 
Internal control is a process, effected  by an entity's board of  directors, 
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management and other personnel, designed  to provide reasonable as-
surance regarding the achievement of  objectives in the following  cate-
gories: 
• Effectiveness  and efficiency  of  operations. 
• Reliability of  external  financial  reporting. 
• Compliance  with applicable laws and regulations. 
According to SAS 55, Para 6: 
An entity's internal control structure consists of  the policies and proce-
dures established to provide reasonable assurance that specific  entity 
objectives will be achieved. (Note: The SAS focus  of  interest is on those 
parts of  the internal control structure "...relevant to an audit of  the entity's 
financial  statements.") 
The categories of  internal control form  the expanded basis of  the COSO defi-
nition. The explicit incorporation of  operations and compliance categories sub-
stantially expands the usual ASB (Auditing Standard Board) definition.  While 
SAS 55 broadened the definition  of  internal control and eliminated the account-
ing and administrative controls distinction and as a result recognized the impor-
tance of  operations, SAS 55 only addresses the context of  reliable external 
financial  reporting and the planning of  an audit for  that purpose. The COSO 
definition  envisions these categories as important in their own right, perhaps 
even more important than the more limited outlook suggested by the ASB. 
COSO recognizes that there is no sharp line delineating these categories and 
that consideration of  any category will likely involve consideration of  aspects of 
another category. COSO also recognizes that the methods of  measurement 
needed to address these categories are not equally well developed. They do not 
consider the measurement problem to be sufficient  to suggest that the categories 
should be ignored or de-emphasized. Those concerned with the regulators' ap-
parently lesser concern for  the limitation of  measurement in these areas may 
continue to be concerned about the inclusion of  these categories. 
According to Winters and Guy [p. 180-181]: 
... Such a categorization...creates a perception that internal control compo-
nents within these categories are clearly identifiable  and distinguishable 
and that experience and expertise in applying the COSO criteria [see 
Components below] is equally well-developed for  each of  these cate-
gories. 
This perception is not valid and, although the COSO report attempts to 
dispel the inference,  our experience with numerous regulatory requests for 
auditor services on internal control demonstrates that the misperception is 
common.... 
Regulatory initiatives calling for  such implementation are fast  outpacing 
our ability to provide those services.... 
While the broader definition  had the preponderance of  support, some of 
those commenting on the definition  felt  that it was too broad to the point of 
defining  not internal control, but management. Others felt  that it should be nar-
rowed to encompass only financial  statement preparation. There was a good 
deal of  concern that the broad definition  would extend the litigation exposure of 
anyone associated with the design, functioning  or reporting on internal control, 
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and that it would encourage regulators to extend their reach in this area. 
Components 
Integral to the definition  are five  interrelated components. The drafters  of  the 
COSO framework  indicate that these components are derived from  the way 
management runs its business. The definitions  below are drawn from  the related 
chapters in the Framework document. I have, as noted earlier, used the docu-
ment's wording. 
Control  Environment  - Control environment factors  include: the integrity, 
ethical values and competence of  the entity's people; management's philosophy 
and operating style; the way management assigns authority and responsibility 
and organizes and develops its people; and the attention and direction provided 
by the board of  directors. 
Winters and Guy point out [p. 181]: 
Another concern about the COSO criteria is that certain components may 
be so subjective as to not be susceptible to reasonably consistent estima-
tion or measurement. Those components most often  cited include integri-
ty, ethical values and management competence. 
These are actually all a part of  a single component, Control Environment. They 
also say, [p. 185]: 
...[T]he expanded definition  [of  internal control in SAS 55] brought the 
control environment and the accounting system directly into the scope of 
the auditor's consideration. ...[t]hese components are much more closely 
associated with the primary causes of  financial  statement misstatements 
than are control over individual transactions. 
Given the above two statements by Winters and Guy, I am not sure why the first 
comment is offered  as the concepts are already in SAS 55. Do Winters and Guy 
mean that SAS 55 already allows auditors to rely on overly subjective inputs to 
too great a degree? This point has been argued elsewhere by Morton and Felix 
[1991] and Kinney, et. al., [1990]. 
Risk Assessment - Risk assessment involves identification  and analysis of 
relevant risks to achievement of  the objectives as a basis for  determining how 
risk should be managed. 
Winters and Guy comment that [p. 184]: 
...Even more modernistic and intriguing are questions about the meaning 
of  control risk in an audit of  internal control—that is, what does control 
risk mean and how should it be considered when an auditor is engaged to 
express an opinion on the effectiveness  of  internal control over financial 
reporting, compliance, or operations? 
I am unclear as to the uniqueness of  the problem as it applies to financial  report-
ing as this concept seems quite well established, i.e., the probability of  material 
error occurring and not being identified  and corrected by the control system. 
With respect to operations and compliance, the problem relates to the material-
ity measurement concept discussed elsewhere and the definition  of  error. In 
both of  these cases, Winters and Guy have a point. 
Control  Activities  - Control activities are policies and procedures (which are 
the actions of  people to implement the policies) to help ensure that management 
197 
directives identified  as necessary to address risks are carried out. Control activi-
ties can be divided into three categories, based on the nature of  the entity's 
objectives to which they relate: operations; financial  information  reporting; or 
compliance. 
Information  and Communication  - Pertinent information  must be identified, 
captured and communicated to people in a form  and timeframe  that enables 
them to carry out their responsibilities. Information  systems produce the reports 
containing operational, financial  and compliance-related information  that make 
it possible to run and control the business. They deal not only with internally 
generated data, but also with information  about external events, activities, and 
conditions necessary to informed  business decision making and external report-
ing. 
Monitoring  - Internal control systems need to be monitored — a process that 
assesses the quality of  the system's performance  over time. This is accom-
plished through ongoing monitoring activities, separate evaluations, or a combi-
nation of  the two. 
The tests of  controls discussion in Chapter 6, Monitoring, implies that the 
"actual functioning"  of  a system can be established by discussion with person-
nel. This is recognized to be a weak statement of  the evidence required to estab-
lish "actual" functioning  and likely to be a satisfactory  approach in only rare 
circumstances. In my opinion, it allows too much evidential weight on dis-
cussion with personnel. 
SAS 55, Para 51 states: "Inquiry alone generally will not provide sufficient 
evidential matter to support a conclusion about the effectiveness  of  design or 
operation of  a specific  control procedure." The use of  the word "generally" is, 
in my opinion, a weak statement similar to that in the COSO report. Also, SAS 
55, Para 8 says: 
For purposes of  an audit of  financial  statements, an entity's internal con-
trol structure consists of  the three following  elements: The control envi-
ronment; The accounting system; and Control procedures. 
Note that, from  above, it would appear that the SAS and COSO Control en-
vironments are pretty much the same. However, the SAS Accounting system 
and Control procedures appear to be included primarily in the COSO Control 
activities. Clearly, the SAS envisions Risk Assessment, Information  and 
Communication and Monitoring as part of  internal control. This is seen in SAS 
55, Para 29: "Control risk should be assessed in terms of  financial  statement 
assertions." 
The original exposure draft  of  the framework  included a larger number of 
components. Based on exposure draft  responses, several new aspects of  internal 
control were added to the components and the components were reduced in 
number. It would appear that COSO has incorporated virtually all of  the expo-
sure draft  commentary in this area. Remaining debate seems to be focused  more 
on presentation and integration within the model. Those who feel  that the com-
ponents should be incorporated directly into the definition  in order to produce, 
in their view, a more complete stand alone definition  will be disappointed. 
All components apply to all categories and are, in that sense, an integral part 
of  the definition  of  internal controls. 
The Framework takes the position that all components must be present to 
have an effective  internal control system in each of  the category areas. It is rec-
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ognized that some trade-off  may exist as to the strength of  one component ver-
sus another and still have an effective  internal control system, but all compo-
nents must be present. It is hard to imagine an entity that is devoid of  some as-
pect of  each of  these components. 
Effectiveness 
Internal control can be judged effective  in each of  the three categories, 
respectively, if  the board of  directors and management have reasonable assur-
ance that (emphasis added): 
• They understand the extent to which the entity's operations objectives 
are being achieved. 
• Financial  reports  are being prepared reliably. 
• Applicable laws and regulations are being complied  with. 
Commentary on this aspect of  the study tended to concentrate on the mean-
ing of  reasonable assurance as it applied to the reliability and compliance cate-
gories. Those with a legal background tended to be concerned because of  the 
meanings applied to these terms in the law. COSO decided to continue with 
these commonly used terms and to rely on explanatory materials to make their 
meanings, in this context, clear. Some expressed concern about the focus  on 
boards and management assurance as opposed to third party assurances. As 
third party assurances come only with external reporting, COSO decided to 
address that issue only where third party reporting was discussed, i.e., external 
financial  reporting. 
As stated in SAS 55, Para 17: 
Whether an internal control structure policy or procedure has been placed 
in operation is different  from  its operating effectiveness...This  Statement 
does not require the auditor to obtain knowledge about operating effec-
tiveness as part of  the understanding of  the internal control structure. 
Further in Para 29, SAS 55 states that: 
Assessing control risk is the process of  evaluating the effectiveness  of  an 
entity's internal control structure policies and procedures in preventing or 














Internal Control Model - Categories And Components 
While not presented in the currently revised document, an internal control 
model is implicit in the above (the model was developed and presented to the 
COSO Advisory Committee by the drafters  and may appear in a future  draft  of 
the report). I will present a slightly adapted model framework  from  that derived 
directly from  the above and discuss its relationship to the current COSO 
Framework document. 
Note that the internal control definition  categories  form  the columns of  the 
matrix and the five  components the rows. In the current document the column 
labeled above as "External Reporting" is labeled "Reliability of  financial  report-
ing." I have used the more general, "External Reporting" because I believe that 
it provides a more internally consistent model and allows for  all forms  of  exter-
nal reporting. There may be a bit of  confusion  about my apparent switch to 
"external" reporting as a header in that the definition  does not include the word 
"external" in the financial  reporting category. Thus, the financial  reporting cate-
gory refers  to all financial  reporting, internal and external. However, other 
forms  of  internal and external reporting considered by COSO are a part of  the 
information  and communications component. Treating the financial  reporting 
category as primarily a concern for  external reports seems, to me, more appro-
priate and consistent for  model purposes. It also seems appropriate to do so 
because of  the external reporting emphasis given this category in the separate 
volume on the matter. The following  discussion as it relates to financial  re-
porting has an external reporting orientation. 
Winters and Guy believe that "[I]nternal control theory and applications have 
progressed,...." [p. 177] It is not clear to me that we have made much progress 
to a normative theory of  internal control beyond general control theory as 
appearing in the industrial engineering literature. We do have some conceptual 
models, such as the one above, that form  the basis for  developing criteria for 
internal control. These are descriptive theories of  internal control derived large-
ly from  the observation of  practice. 
The rationale behind the three categories can be developed along several dif-
ferent  lines of  thought. When approaching it from  the COSO Framework writ-
ers' point of  view, the three categories are considered in terms of  an entity's 
conditions for  continued economic existence and success. The operations cate-
gory represents the need to transform  inputs into outputs in an economic man-
ner that will satisfy  the customer's needs. The compliance category may be 
viewed as meeting the essential restrictions placed on an entity by various sanc-
tioned governmental and voluntary external entities. Where inability to supply 
the customer market will result in failure  through competitive market forces, 
lack of  compliance with critical laws and regulations can result in entity failure 
even when some parts of  the market are clamoring for  the product. External 
reporting may be required under a variety of  circumstances. The one most obvi-
ously envisioned by the current COSO document and present practice is exter-
nal financial  reporting. In a financial  market environment like our own, obtain-
ing the necessary capital to permit continuing operations requires com-
munications with external capital providers. Others may also use external finan-
cial reports for  purposes such as credit setting, contract negotiations, etc., and 
these are envisioned by COSO as well. The broader category I have used, 
"External Reporting," also envisions external reporting not currently considered 
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commonplace, e.g., external reports to bank regulators, external reports of  com-
pliance with environmental laws and regulations, etc. The COSO Framework 
document considers that external reports other than external financial  reports 
reside in either the operating or compliance categories of  the definition  through 
the component "Information  and Communication." They also believe that the 
inclusion of  only the more limited external financial  reporting category will bet-
ter retain and highlight the link to the separate volume on external financial 
reporting. Thus while the COSO form  of  the model allows for  other than finan-
cial external reports, it does so only indirectly. 
The above comments address materials embodied in Chapter 1 of  the COSO 
Framework document. The balance of  the COSO statement is an elaboration on 
the above definition,  components and effectiveness  statement. Five additional 
chapters are devoted (one each) to the five  components, a sixth chapter to limi-
tations of  internal controls and a final  chapter to the roles and responsibilities of 
the various parties within an entity. 
Management Reporting to External Parties 
This section deals only with external financial  reporting. The issues of  exter-
nal reporting on operations and compliance are not dealt with by the COSO 
Framework. 
There is a major discontinuity between the process orientation of  the 
Framework document and the state orientation adopted in this volume. The 
Framework's definition  of  internal control as a process seems to be appropriate 
and creates no problem until we encounter reporting issues. In that context, two 
problems arise. First, there is the matter of  the current level of  technology and 
cost of  auditing a process. This problem exists for  both internal and external 
reports, but is probably most significant  for  external reports where an audit 
might be considered. Second, particularly in an external report, the degree of 
exposure when expressing an opinion on the continuing operation of  a process 
is perceived to be more extensive than expressing an opinion on the point-in-
time state of  a system. There can be little argument that as no actions actually 
occur at a point-in-time, more exposure with respect to actions exists if  one 
expresses an opinion covering a period of  actual system operation. These issues 
become evident in the external reporting volume where point-in-time reporting 
is selected, i.e., a report on a state of  the process but not the process itself. 
The volume indicates that users may be most interested in whether the sys-
tem was functioning  and will function  in the future.  However, the volume also 
indicates that management and/or auditors cannot provide much evidence on 
either. With respect to the future,  there can be no question that evidence is not 
obtainable; with respect to the past, the evidence is obtainable. However, in the 
context of  this volume, even if  obtained and indicative of  a material weakness, 
it would be reported only if  management had not corrected and tested the 
change. 
Winters and Guy [pp. 186-188] argue that the behavioral and information 
content benefits  of  reporting on internal controls do not flow  to external finan-
cial reporting because if  a material error occurs, it can be corrected and the 
external financial  reports will be reliable; this may miss the point or simply be a 
matter of  definition.  They are certainly correct that the final  product of  the suc-
cessful  audit will be reliable financial  statements even if  the internal control 
system did not produce them as desired. However, in the interim, the failure  of 
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an internal control system to produce such statements may be costly in terms of 
decisions made with faulty  information  or losses incurred through resource dis-
sipation. Perhaps the poor decision and resource loss issues are really an opera-
tions issue. This is the position of  the COSO Framework. Nevertheless, I do not 
agree with the statement by Winters and Guy [p. 188] that "... for  the financial 
reporting category, the argument boils down to which type of  information  is 
least costly to provide." Reports on internal control provide different  informa-
tion about the firm  than the output contained in the financial  statements. It 
remains an empirical issue as to whether this different  information  is worth the 
cost of  production. I see the internal control reporting on financial  issues in 
pretty much the same light as that on operations and compliance. In all three 
areas internal reports are provided to management; in all three areas there is dif-
ferent  information  than would be provided by an output report only. In all three 
areas there are, internally, actions that can be taken to create a more effective 
and efficient  environment; in all three areas, externally, there is very little 
empirical evidence as to the demand for  reports on these matters. In all three 
areas, a conceptual argument can be made that the information  would provide 
another means of  evaluating management performance  and thus in making deci-
sions on retention and rewards for  management. I would agree with Winters and 
Guy [p. 189] that "In our view, not much progress has been made in resolving 
the questions concerning the relative merits of  reports on internal control versus 
reports on output," although I do not see it as a versus issue. 
Unfortunately,  whether by intent or not, and as noted by Winters and Guy, 
the COSO report reads like an attempt to avoid ever having to report a material 
weakness: 
Another peril arises because the report uses the concept of  a material 
weakness to separate effective  from  ineffective  internal control. Using this 
measure causes two problems. First, no conceptual or empirical construct 
of  a material weakness exists for  either internal control over compliance or 
operations.... In the absence of  sound definitions...such  evaluations will be 
subject to extreme variations in consistency and usefulness. 
Even though an accepted material weakness concept exists for  internal 
control over financial  reporting, it also poses complications. There are 
strong disincentives to concluding that such weaknesses exist. [pp. 181] 
...If  the concept of  material weaknesses, as prescribed in both the COSO 
report and the proposed attestation standard, results in the virtual absence 
of  material weaknesses..., all reports will look alike. These boilerplate 
reports are not likely to have much information  content and, instead, serve 
only as a basis for  litigation.... [p. 190] 
The position adopted on reporting material weaknesses is supported as a con-
structive focus  designed to encourage monitoring and correction throughout the 
period. Admittedly, it does encourage correction and "testing" on a "timely" 
basis. However, it assumes very little value in the disclosures exercise, but pro-
vides no evidence to support that view. Winters and Guy assert that [p. 189]: 
...We believe...that internal control reports are much more useful  for 
these [specified]  parties than for  the general public, and less likely to cre-
ate perils for  management and their auditors. 
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Reports to the general public are much more hazardous than those to 
specific  users; hazardous to the public, the entity, and its auditors.... At 
most members of  the investing public might alter their investment 
decisions.... 
The reasons given by them are the usual "it will confuse  the public" statements. 
The COSO document asserts that external reporting is not an element of 
internal control, but provides no evidence that such reports do not contribute to 
internal control. The document also asserts that point-in-time reporting is, in 
general, most appropriate, but offers  no evidence. Further, the document specif-
ically asserts that point-in-time reporting meets the needs of  security holders 
and other external parties, but provides no evidence. 
The discussion concerning interim reporting reduces, in my opinion, to 
reporting on system design for  interim reporting, a point of  view rejected when 
discussing the need to report on effectiveness.  This is perhaps a bit too harsh a 
judgment, but it definitely  reads as an attempt to avoid reporting any material 
weaknesses. 
Conclusions 
What can we expect the debate over internal controls to be like during the 
coming years? First, the debate over the definition  of  internal control is not 
over. Despite COSO's valiant attempt, the lack of  a theory of  internal control 
beyond that found  in engineering control theory assures that the debate will 
continue. COSO has provided one model with its categories and components of 
internal control. Like many other models, it does not derive from  some funda-
mental postulates but rather from  a studied consideration of  what occurs in the 
business environment. This does not make these models useless. In fact,  the 
very lack of  a theory makes them particularly important for  the improvement of 
practice as well as for  their potential contribution to the eventual creation of  a 
more fundamental  theory. 
Second, there are even more pragmatic reasons to expect the debate to con-
tinue. While the COSO report will gain acceptance as a point of  departure when 
considering internal control issues, there will be debate over the details whenev-
er there is a disagreement among participants as to the desirability of  some 
action bearing on internal controls. For example, a regulator under pressure to 
accomplish some goal, such as the perceived protection of  the general public, 
may come to believe that a report by management, attested to be the auditor's, 
will serve to create that protection. Whether the regulator is correct or has more 
than political support for  the position may be of  less consequence than the need 
to take action. 
This is already evident in the recent banking regulation requirements for 
reporting on compliance with laws and regulations. Adherents to the COSO 
report may arrive at differing  positions on the desirability of  this particular 
action. Those who desire to have such reports could take the position that 
COSO addressed the standards for  such reports, even though they provided 
some cautions and no example reports. Others might believe that COSO was 
more than cautionary in its concern for  the expansion of  external reporting in 
this area and that, in fact,  COSO would not support the extension of  external 
reporting in this area. Whatever the "facts"  in this particular case, it would 
appear that the regulations will stand and that the debate will move in the direc-
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tion of  limiting the laws and regulations to which the opinion will apply, speci-
fying  the detailed attestation work necessary and attempting to specify  and limit 
the risk exposure to the auditor, i.e., in large part dealing with those details of 
measurement and risk not addressed by COSO in the area of  external reporting 
on compliance with laws and regulations. 
As there are already many other such reports being prepared for  internal or 
limited use (for  example, on environmental control matters), we might expect to 
see a series of  proposals for  additional public disclosures. We can all think of 
public interest groups that may find  it worthwhile to push for  such action. 
The internal control debate is only one of  many areas where the profession's 
exposure has increased in recent years. There is little doubt that the profession 
has had a long standing role with respect to the evaluation of  internal controls. 
However, since the enactment of  the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practice Act), the 
nature of  that role has been expanding. FCPA opened up avenues for  increased 
service to clients in satisfying  the requirements of  that act. At the same time, 
meeting this client service clearly opened up the potential for  auditor attestation 
exposure. For some time the profession  resisted offering  an external attestation 
opinion on internal controls. It now appears that the profession  supports some 
form  of  external attestation report. The argument appears to be that the profes-
sionals are being held liable in any case, so let's do the work and get paid for 
the risk. However, this is only one area of  increased risk in the ever expanding 
client service domain of  the profession. 
As the profession  has moved or been pushed, depending upon your perspec-
tive, from  its traditional franchise  as the auditors of  external financial  reports to 
client service organizations, its practitioners have found  themselves caught in 
the muddy waters of  marketing essentially new services while attempting to 
limit exposure. Unfortunately,  one gets the impression that each service is open-
ing up substantial, unanticipated exposures and that attempting to limit the 
exposure is akin to holding back the tides. I have no solution. Perhaps limited 
liability corporations and tort reform  will help, but I am fearful  that even with 
such reform  the profession  is in danger of  losing its franchise  or being charged 
so high a price for  its franchise  as to lose its business viability. Neither of  these 
results is in our interests or the interests of  the broader society. 
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